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ABSTRACT
Equal Open Access and Competition Creation in the Wireline Telecommunications
Local and Last Mile Market Segments
Daniel L. Van Epps
Expanded telecommunications was deemed a serious need for end users. The “Local
Market” and “Last Mile” market segments have largely consolidated into “natural utilities”.
Competition and access problems occur if new providers enter the local market and desire
competitive access and service to end users. Local and last mile telecommunications market
structures are believed to be significantly responsible for inhibiting achievement of a more
perfect marketplace. The purpose of this study was to examine potential solutions from
laboratory network emulation results addressing the research question “Can equal open access
and competition for all users be created in the telecommunications local and last mile segments?”
Emulations for 63 local and last mile models were designed and grouped into 16 scenarios. An
observation questionnaire was designed to provide further qualitative data regarding the models.
The experiment was constructed and attempted to be operated, but the SOHO routers
representing telecommunications marketplace participants could not be properly configured to
successfully network with each other to provide Traceroute data for validity and verification
purposes. Observation data was obtained and was classified into groups and used to create
model “filters” regarding optimal local market competition, provider interconnectivity, and four
types of last mile provision. All of the models were filtered and scored. Those with the lowest
scores (best attributes) were considered to be the leading candidates to address the research
question. Further discussion involved opportunities for continued research, application of the
findings in real telecommunication markets, and possibilities of why the emulation failed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Background
More government agencies tasked with economic retention and development mandates
have identified telecommunications as a serious need for their end users (Benkler, 2009, p.21)
and have become increasingly involved in their telecommunications markets. Some agencies,
quasi-public private partnerships, cooperatives, non-profit corporations, and end users
themselves have also tried entering various telecommunication market segments and
jurisdictions on their own hoping to provide services, lower costs, increase competition, and in
certain cases possibly profit from provision.
The “Local Market” telecommunications market segment is where providers establish
their market presence, house their switching equipment, and administer their services. The “Last
Mile” telecommunications market segment is where providers’ networks link to their end users’
facilities. The two segments have largely consolidated over time into “natural utilities”
sanctioned by local governments as monopoly franchises per infrastructure mode to relieve
“unnecessary” and “costly” duplication of wireline-type infrastructure provision previously
experienced when multiple providers competed in the same market areas each with their own
systems.
The local and last mile market segments combined can be referred to in telephony as the
“Local Exchange” and in data networking as a Metropolitan Area Network (“MAN”). The
junction of middle mile and last mile market segments involves the local providers “bridging”
the two (or more) systems with their network equipment within a facility, and using written
agreements to determine each of those other providers’ and end users’ access and use terms and
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conditions. Most MANs are inherently configured for technically efficient enterprise service
emulating private end users’ Local Area Network (“LAN”) architectures, where the LAN
provider totally controls their infrastructure and service provision to their own equipment, and in
the case of businesses to their staff end users.
Problems occur however if new providers enter the local market and desire competitive
access and service to those MAN end users. The incumbent provider(s) can virtually
monopolize the MAN market by controlling the access to and use of their systems, and those
competitors gaining access and use will likely encounter unfair competition disadvantages
including assessed prices above the incumbents’ costs, restricted throughputs and services, etc.
(van Schewick, 2010, p.266). Competitive providers not agreeing to the incumbent’s terms,
rates, etc., must additionally construct their own last mile systems to provide end users with
service under their own administration and favorable terms, or may elect not to enter that local
market at all. The reduced competition affects end users with potentially higher costs and more
limited service, while incumbent providers’ local and last mile market shares are increased to
between 75% - 95% (Elliott & Settles, 2010).
Another model featuring a government enterprise providing similar last mile rights of
way, infrastructure, facilities, network equipment, and carriage service to end users within its
jurisdiction is a “Public MAN”. The government likewise can contract with middle mile
providers for its end users to gain upstream network connectivity. Such public
telecommunications provision may again be implemented to create competition in the local and
last mile markets (van Schewick, 2010, p.370), but Public MANs similarly structured to the
usually private sector ISPs can also compete unfairly vs. private incumbent and other
competitive providers, and possibly constitute a public monopoly.
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Problem Statement
The local and last mile telecommunications market segment structures are believed to be
significantly responsible for inhibiting the achievement of a more perfect telecommunications
marketplace.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine potential solutions from experimental network
emulation results within a laboratory setting regarding equal open access and competition in the
local and last mile telecommunication market segments.

Research Questions
The following research question was answered by this study.
•

Can equal open access and competition for all users be created in the telecommunications
local and last mile segments?

Assumptions
The assumptions for this report were as follows.
•

Appropriately and accurately scaled down networks constructed and researched within
laboratories can model, simulate, and emulate larger networks situated in the real world.

•

In reality a truly perfect telecommunications market can never be achieved. Such markets
can approach perfectly competitive status but remain at best imperfectly competitive.
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Limitations
The limitations of this study were as follows.
•

The results of the study were limited by the validity and reliability of the experiment’s
instrument developed and used to gather and report data.

•

The experiment relied upon emulations of Internet service providers and Municipal Area
Networks within the laboratory, as actual in-service ISPs and MANs were not feasibly
available for testing purposes.

•

Theoretical perfectly competitive markets permit an infinite number of providers and end
users to transact their business, and in reality evolving technology is handling ever-increasing
numbers of market participants. However for the purpose of this study only a limited number
of providers and end users could be feasibly emulated and tested for the experiment.

•

The experiment and its results are not necessarily applicable to various wireless modes of
telecommunications.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This chapter of related literature reviewed the economics, politics, technologies, and
social aspects and issues involving the distribution sector and telecommunications industry, the
evolution and current state of the industry’s wireline technologies, and the telecommunication
industry market.

Production-Distribution-Consumption Market Overview
This section examined the Production-Distribution-Consumption market model,
technology uses by market participants, the politics and philosophies of trade, government
involvement in markets, and the importance of the distribution sector in the market.

Production-Distribution-Consumption Market Models
Although the term “Market” has numerous definitions and may be sub-grouped by locale,
demographics, and other interests and aspects, it can also be defined as a collective of producers,
distributors, market and exchange places, and consumers serving in respective market segment
roles of Production, Distribution, Marketplace Provision, and Consumption. Usually the flow of
goods and services starts with a Producer intending to provide them for consumption by a
consumer. Intermediary parties are necessary including Distributors utilizing mobility,
transportation, communications, and telecommunications means to convey products and services
among parties, and providers of actual and virtual sites for marketplaces and exchanges.
Sometimes Producers are Consumers as the products and services are reconfigured into other
types of products and services and are further conveyed to other Consumer=Producers until they
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are finally consumed by end user Consumers. Consumers to can then be Producers, as in the
case of producing garbage that is conveyed to a trash collector consumer.
Figure 2.11 details a similar multi-dimensional model “ … composed of many
interdependent sectors, subsectors, and players,” with a supply chain goal of “an allencompassing end-to-end solution … optimized by material, information, and money, flowing
simultaneously, in real time, and without paper.” (Battelle Memorial Institute, 2007, p.xi).
Suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers are broken out from manufacturers, with private sectorprovided Transportation; Information and Related Technologies; and Warehousing and
Distribution, and public sector-provided Transportation Infrastructure and Regulations and
Tariffs, both spanning an entire Supplier-Consumer “Goods, Information and Money” spectrum.

Figure 2.1. Battelle economic model. (Battelle Memorial Institute, 2007, p.xi).
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Market Technology
Providers and consumers can incorporate technology as a tool and/or technique to help
create new and better products and services, solve production and use problems, devise new uses
and applications for products and services, develop improved technologies, etc. Distribution
providers can incorporate mechanization to automate natural mobility and communication into
transportation and telecommunication respectively. Providers that did not incorporate or upgrade
their technologies were at the potential mercy of other providers that did. Distributors were
increasingly more important, as other participants in the P-D-C economic model have become
more automated and technology-reliant. The U.S. Federal Communication Commission’s
National Broadband Plan (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009) noted the
developments and benefits of technology when utilized by market participants in their production
and distribution of information vs. previous controls imposed by the lack of such technologies.
The conduct of key business activities such as communication, collaboration,
process enhancements, and transactions is made easier by use of broadband applications
such as online conferencing, social networking, cloud-based business software, and ecommerce. Perhaps chief among the benefits of broadband for business is that it allows
small businesses to achieve operational scale more quickly. Broadband and associated
information and communication technologies can help lower company start-up costs
through faster business registration and improved access to customers and suppliers.
Broadband also gives small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) access to new markets and
opportunities by lowering the barriers of physical scale and allowing them to compete for
customers who previously turned exclusively to larger suppliers. E-commerce solutions
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eliminate geographic barriers to getting a business’s message and product out to a broad
audience.
However, small businesses are not fully capitalizing on these opportunities. An
estimated 60M Americans go online every day to find a product or service; but only 24%
of small businesses use e-commerce applications to sell online. The large majority of
small businesses are missing an opportunity to level the playing field versus their larger
rivals.
The benefits described above are most compelling when broadband is supported
with significant investment in information technology (“IT”) hardware, software, and
services and material improvement in business processes. Even technologically lagging
firms in the small and midsize space recognize that broadband is a key part of a firm’s
basic IT infrastructure. Yet IDC, a research firm, indicates that roughly half of small and
midsize firms say that they are cautious when it comes to investing in new IT. Other
small businesses voice skepticism about select broadband applications either because of a
perceived lack of applicability or uncertain profitability (U.S. Federal Communications
Commission, 2009, pp. 266-267).
Anderson noted how consumers used technologies and the benefits of them doing so.
We, the users, will figure out what to do with (technology), because each of us is
different: different needs, different ideas, different knowledge, and different ways of
interacting with the world. The engineers brought us the technical infrastructure of the
Internet and Web - TCP/IP and http:// - but we were the ones who figured out what to do
with it. Because the technology was free and open to all, we, the users, experimented
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with it and together we populated it with our content, our ideas, and ourselves. The
technologists invented the pot, but we filled it (C. Anderson, 2009, p.88).
van Schewick discussed the benefits of systems to the economy and society, depending
upon how they were structured.
The architecture of a system influences economic structures and behaviors
regarding the development and evolution of the system, and affects the amount and kind
of innovation that might occur. In particular, architectural features influence which
actors may develop and change a complex system, the incentives under which they act,
and the governance structures through which their activity is organized. Conversely,
innovation may change existing architectures or create new ones (van Schewick, 2010,
p.29). Furthermore, since economic considerations shape actors’ (users’) decisions,
system architects (providers) will tend to favor architectures that support their own
economic interests. At least in part, then, architectural designs hinge on the choices of
economic actors, all of whom pursue their own interests under their particular constraints.
Thus, the evolution of architectures is partly endogenous (van Schewick, p.32).
The economic system in which the network is used consists of the actors who use
and operate the network, the relationships among them, and the governance structures
through which they interact. By providing the context in which innovations are to be
deployed, this economic system may constrain the evolution of certain parts of an
architecture more than simply considering the dependencies within an architecture would
suggest. The economic system in which the network is used influences who controls the
components that must be altered and what incentives these actors may have to make these
changes (van Schewick, 2010, p.152).
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van Schewick then discussed technology’s contributions to economies and societies.
Technological progress is the most important engine of growth for modern
economies. Economists have estimated that as much as 70% of the growth in output per
hour in the U.S. between 1950 and 1993 can be attributed to technological growth.
Exactly how and to what degree specific technological advancements contribute to
economic growth, however, is less clear.
Research in economics indicates that technological inventions do not contribute
equally to economic growth. Instead, over extended periods of time, technical progress
and economic growth seem to be driven by a few general-purpose technologies; some
examples are the steam engine, the electric motor, semiconductors, and information
technology. General-purpose technologies offer generic functionality that can potentially
be applied in a large number of sectors within the economy. As the use of a generalpurpose technology spreads throughout the economy, use of the technology increases
productivity in the sectors in which the technology is applied. At the same time, new
applications of the technology or adoption of the technology in additional sectors of the
economy increase the returns to innovation in the general purpose technology, triggering
new advances in the general-purpose technology itself. These advances, in turn, may
spawn the adoption of the general-purpose technology in additional sectors of the
economy, or may lead to new or improved applications in sectors that already use the
technology. Thus, the adoption of general-purpose technologies exhibits increasing
returns to scale. The ongoing dynamic interactions among new or improved uses of the
technology, adoption of the technology in additional sectors of the economy and
advances in the general purpose technology can create enormous increases in economic
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growth.
Owing to the general nature of a general-purpose technology, and the mere
existence of such a technology is not sufficient to have a positive effect on economic
growth. A general-purpose technology's effects on growth stem from its adoption in
more and more sectors of the economy and from the resulting increases in productivity.
Owing to the general nature of the technology, however, its potential applications and
uses are not immediately obvious. Instead, realizing a general-purpose technology's
inherent promises in a specific sector of the economy requires a considerable amount of
innovative activity in order to identify and realize potential uses. Thus, adoption of a
general-purpose technology in a specific area is an important innovative activity in its
own right; for this reason, such activity is often called co-invention.
As a result, the rate at which a general-purpose technology can affect economic
growth depends on the rate of co-invention, not primarily on the rate of technological
innovation in the general-purpose technology itself. Thus, the cost of co-invention is an
important determinant of the speed with which the social benefits of the general-purpose
technology can be realized. In fact, the empirically found delay with which firms'
investments in information technology lead to increases in economic growth is usually
explained by the high costs of co-invention - that is, by the costs of finding the best ways
to apply the new technology in a firm's daily operations, the costs of developing the
appropriate software, and the costs of changing organizational structures and processes in
response to the new opportunities.
Thus, on the one hand, general-purpose technologies have the potential to
contribute disproportionately to economic growth - that is their promise. On the other
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hand, the rate at which a general-purpose technology can contribute to this growth is
limited by the rate at which new uses of the technology can be identified and realized.
These insights help us think about the importance of application innovation for
economic growth. As a general-purpose technology, the Internet has the potential to
contribute disproportionately to economic growth. The ability to communicate cheaply
and cost-effectively with computers all over the world may be usefully applied in a large
number of contexts. The higher the number of uses, the higher the aggregated increases
in productivity and the higher the effect of the Internet on economic growth. The rate at
which the Internet can contribute to economic growth, however, depends on the rate of
co-invention - that is, the rate at which potential uses for the Internet are identified and
applications that enable or support these uses are developed, deployed, and used.
Measures that increase the cost of co-invention or otherwise reduce the amount of coinvention can harm social welfare significantly. Specifically, increasing application-level
innovation increases economic growth; in contrast, limiting application-level innovation
may significantly limit the Internet's ability to contribute to economic growth.
The importance of innovation in applications goes beyond its role in fostering
economic growth. The Internet, as a general-purpose technology, does not create value
through its existence alone. It creates value by enabling users to do the things they want
or need to do. Applications are the tools that let users realize this value. For example,
the Internet's political, social, or cultural potential - its potential to improve democratic
discourse, to facilitate political organization and action, or to provide a decentralized
environment for social and cultural interaction in which anyone can participate - is tightly
linked to applications that help individuals, groups, or organizations do more things or do
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them more efficiently, and not just in economic contexts but also in social, cultural, or
political contexts (van Schewick, 2010, pp.357-359).
Shirky noted technology improvements were assisting end user-provided sharing,
cooperation, and collaborative efforts.
For the last hundred years the big organizational question has been whether any
given task was best taken on by the state, directing the effort in a planned way, or by
businesses competing in a market. This debate was based on the universal and unspoken
supposition that people couldn't simply self-assemble; the choice between markets and
managed effort assumed that there was no third alternative. Now there is. Our electronic
networks are enabling novel forms of collective action, enabling the creation of
collaborative groups that are larger and more distributed than any other time in history.
The scope of work that can be done by non-institutional groups is a profound challenge to
the status quo. The collapse of transaction costs makes it easier for people to get together
- so much easier, in fact, that it is changing the world (Shirky, 2008, pp.47-48).
Ridiculously easy group-forming matters because the desire to be part of a group that
shares, cooperates, or acts in concert is a basic human instinct that has always been
constrained by transaction costs. Now that group-forming has gone from hard to
ridiculously easy, we're seeing an explosion of experiments with new groups and new
kinds of groups (Shirky, p.54).

Political Philosophy of Trade
As discussed, a market hosts participants that may potentially trade products and services.
Ideally trading would be “perfect” – fair and free from malice, fraud, outside coercive influence,
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and other intentional or unintended biases. Trading can theoretically function without
competition by its participants. Such non-profit trading involves sharing or donations of
products and services among producers and consumers for a potential collective public good and
for non-material needs. "Communitarianism", "Primitive Communism", and the similar
“Cooperatism” movements tend to consider trade more as a basic utility. All producers and
consumers are "winners", and there are no "losers" or sufferers as a result of trades in those
models. Some religious-based societies tend to view products and services and their trade as
being subservient to higher personal beliefs. Shirky further elaborated upon these cooperative
types.
Sharing creates the fewest demands on the participants. Many sharing platforms
operate in a largely take-it-or-leave-it fashion, which allows for the maximum freedom of
the individual to participate while creating the fewest complications of group life.
Knowingly sharing your work with others is the simplest way to take advantage of the
new social tools (referring to the digital photograph sharing website Flickr) (Shirky,
2008, p.49). Cooperating is harder than simply sharing, because it involves changing
your behavior to synchronize with people who are changing their behavior to synchronize
with you. Unlike sharing, where the group is mainly an aggregate of participants,
cooperating creates group identity - you know who you are cooperating with (Shirky,
pp.49-50). Collaborative production is a more involved form of cooperation, as it
increases the tension between individual and group goals. The litmus test for
collaborative production is simple: no one person can take credit for what gets created,
and the project could not come into being without the participation of many (Shirky,
p.50). Collective action is the hardest kind of group effort, as it requires a group of
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people to commit themselves to undertaking a particular effort together, and to do so in a
way that makes the decision of the group binding on the individual members. A union or
a government engages in collective action, action that is undertaken in the name of the
members meant to change something out in the world, often in opposition to other groups
committed to different outcomes (Shirky, p.51).
Anderson discussed “Free” trading among end users.
Free can mean many things, and that meaning has changed over the years. It
raises suspicions, it has the power to grab attention like almost nothing else. It is almost
never as simple as it seems, yet it is the most natural transaction of all. If we are now
building an economy around Free, we should start by understanding what it is and how it
works (C. Anderson, 2009, p.17). Even after most cultures established monetary
economies, day-to-day transactions within close-knit social groups, from families to
tribes, was still mostly without price. The currencies of generosity, trust, goodwill,
reputation, and equitable exchange still dominate the goods and services of the family,
the neighborhood, and even within the workplace. In general, no cash is required among
friends. But for transactions between strangers, where social bonds are not the primary
scoring system, money provided a common agreed-upon metric of value, and barter gave
way to payment. But even then was a place for Free, in everything from patronage to
civil services (C. Anderson, pp.36-37). In giving something away, (Peter Kropotkin,
1902) argued, the trade-off is not money, but satisfaction. This satisfaction was rooted in
community, mutual aid, and support. The self-reinforcing qualities of that aid would, in
turn, prompt others to give equally to you. “Primitive societies” worked that way, he
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argued, so such gift economies were closer to the natural state of human affairs than
market capitalism (C. Anderson, p.40).
In reality, trading is imperfect and politics are usually introduced into the trading process
due to human nature. For-profit trade creates a more materialistic valuation of products and
services when they are traded for other products and services, representative currency, or
financing. Adam Smith posed when a party makes a (for-profit-type) trade they are valuing the
desired products and services more so than what they are exchanging for them; if in a for-profittype trade a party does not value the product or service at a greater value than what they desire to
trade for it, then the party has the option of not trading and is free to retain their product or
service or solicit offers from other parties (Smith, 1776).
“Capitalism” can be defined as private entrepreneurial producers and consumers seeking
to trade products and services in an attempt to increase or at the least maintain their corporate or
personal worths. In pure Capitalism, producers must demonstrate certain returns on investments.
Revenues are used to offset expenses, and excess revenues are available for use as profits,
dividends, positive investment ratings (resulting in lower borrowing rates), and reinvestment
means. Conversely, any lack of producer revenues could increase debts, ultimately risking
bankruptcy and potential liquidation, with further complications to raise future capital.
Shareholders may also encounter losses, and other lawsuits, legal fines, and similar punishments
are also possible. In the capitalistic trading contest there are winners and losers, where winners
may remain in the market and possibly acquire more assets, market share, and pricing power,
while losers may find competing and remaining in the market more problematic. Skewed
gamesmanship may enter into for-profit Capitalistic trading, including advertising and marketing
techniques used by a producer to coerce a consumer into purchase choices, and bartering
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techniques employed by both producers and consumers to shift trade values in their favors. In
both cases where further wealth and fewer losses are desired, there may be increased risks of
trading and/or marketplace irregularities to accomplish those goals.
Ideally a “Perfect Market” would exist where producers, consumers, distributors, the
market, and trade are all perfect in their functions. In reality only “Imperfect Markets” exist,
possibly resulting in various irregularities that affect market participants. A “Cornered Market”
can be defined as a market where a provider or consumer has attained significant market share
over other competitors through unfair techniques that adversely affect other competitors. An
“Oligopoly” results when a small group of providers corners a market, a “Duopoly” results when
two providers corner a market, and a “Monopoly” results when one provider dominates or
completely captivates a market. Conversely, an “Oligopsony” results when a small group of
consumers corner a market, a “Duopsony” results when two consumers corner a market, and a
“Monopsony” results when one consumer dominates or completely captivates a market. A
“Cartel” and “Collusion” are attempts by market participants to cooperatively and usually
covertly corner a market. A market where both providers and consumers are present - a basic
necessity for markets to exist – can be defined as a “Served Market”. A market lacking
providers, consumers, or both can be defined as an “Unserved Market”. In theory a market
lacking a distributor is not necessarily an unserved market if the producer and consumer are
situated immediately adjacent to each other, but in reality distribution is naturally part of the PD-C model and if the provider is absent then the market is unserved.
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Government Involvement in Markets
Markets under both Cooperatistic and Capitalistic model types can theoretically exist
without government involvement and its oversight. A government can nonetheless be a
significant consumer for wares and may be quite welcomed by producers, distributors, and other
consumers to participate in a market in that respect. Market participants are typically willing to
subsidize their government for it to provide functions they do not desire to provide on their own
such as emergency services, sovereign defense against internal and abroad threats, promoting
and assisting their growth and security, currency standardization, a legal system to enforce
private property rights, binding agreements, etc.
If markets experience problems including those previously addressed and cannot fairly or
conveniently rectify the situations themselves, then they may invite participant litigation or
require the government to play an arbitrating regulatory role to reduce irregularities and prevent
potential market-wide and participant failures. One opinion during the 2010 Wall St. financial
crisis supported the regulatory option. “Ultimately … litigation is a poor substitute for
regulation.” (Sorkin, 2010). As one mission of governments is to retain and expand their
economies, functional markets are desired and even dysfunctional markets are tolerated, but
market failures are distinct threats to a country's economy, society, sovereignty, and must be
avoided at all costs to ensure its long-term success and survival.

Mixed Economies
Any government intervention in a market can be defined as a “Mixed Economy” and is
usually undertaken to achieve certain desirable goals for the market or enforce political
ideologies. In one definition of a "Mixed Economy", an issue can be located as a midpoint
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somewhere within a range of extreme economic philosophies, with multiple issues having
varying positions on the range. MSNBC commentator Lawrence O'Donnell said, “As any
introductory economics course can tell you, there‘s no capitalist economy anywhere in the world
and there is no socialist economy anywhere in the world, not even Cuba. We are all mixed
economies, that is, mixes of capitalism and socialism, and we all vary that mix in different ways.
That‘s why we have a mixed economy, an economy in which we‘re trying to use the best, most
efficient forms of capitalism, and the best, most efficient forms of socialism where necessary.”
(Povich, 2011).
A mixed economy can also result when a government uses a number of solutions in an
attempt to correct market problems. U.S. federal government agencies including the former
Interstate Commerce Commission and its successor Surface Transportation Board, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and numerous others have
regulatory oversight regarding distribution markets. Likewise states' public service/public utility
commissions are responsible for certain intrastate distribution market regulations. Some
regulations are reserved for county, district, municipal, and other local government agencies.
The amount and degree of regulation these government agencies have over market participants
varies per the powers granted by their legislatures and the will of their executive branch leaders.
Of course the executive and legislative branches are also influenced by voters, lobbyists, higher
level executive and legislative governmental branches, and other parties with particular interests
in market regulation. A government agency can control markets as both a consumer and a
producer. For example the U.S. federal government can purchase gasoline for strategic national
security reserves, and in a producer role release ("resell") it, with both actions most likely
affecting the gasoline market. Similarly the federal government can sell some of its assets (i.e.,
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mineral rights, forests) to other producers, which may affect market prices for similar assets and
final prices to consumers.
In theory, a government is non-profit with its revenues adequately covering expenses
while maintaining a reserve fund. Most of the government's revenues are obtained from taxes
and fees, with some revenues and royalties acquired from product and service conveyances. But
in reality the government is usually willing to forego equilibrium by providing tax breaks, grants,
sub-market rate loans, tariffs on international wares, and other incentives to subsidize market
participants. Obviously there will be resulting shortfalls in its near term revenues, but the
government hopes the thus-stimulated economy will provide sufficient revenues to eventually
offset its investments and cover borrowing debts.
Ongoing mixed economy debates include what degree of government involvement is
necessary to achieve desired market goals, what market goals are addressed with government
involvement, what are the effects upon market participants, and what are the costs to the
government for intervention. von Mises argued that there is no such thing as a mixed economy.
"The market economy or capitalism, as it is usually called, and the socialist [mixed] economy
preclude one another. There is no mixture of the two systems possible or thinkable; there is no
such thing as a mixed economy, a system that would be in part capitalist and in part socialist."
(von Mises, 1949). Former astronaut and Eastern Airlines CEO Frank F. Borman, II once said,
“Capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell,” (Taylor, 1982) which in a strict
interpretation of Capitalism is correct but competes against many governments’ mixed economy
goals where all market segment participants are advocated as winners to benefit and expand their
economies.
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Other possible mixed economic models include “Statism” that can be defined as where
government market intervention is significant. Conversely, “Laissez-faire” can be defined as
where government market intervention is more limited, sometimes to the extent of permitting the
market to function by and regulate itself. “Corporatism” can be defined as where private
providers have greater influence over any government market intervention. “Socialism” can be
defined as where consumers have greater influence over government market intervention.
However von Mises considered government provision not to be Socialism, "It is a step on the
way toward socialism, but not in itself socialism." (von Mises, 1949). “Autocratic”,
“Authoritarian”, “Totalitarian”, and similar government regime types can be defined as where
those governments usually being controlled by one party or an individual have significant if not
complete control over their sovereign markets in the express interest of the government.
“Anarchy” can be defined as the absence of government, which like total dictatorial control may
be equally less desirable.
Market segment participants may try to counter government intervention to protect their
investments and other interests by contributing to politicians’ election campaigns, and seeking
legislative deregulation and favorable court rulings if those options are available or permissible
in the particular governance model.

Government-Assigned Markets
The most invasive and pronounced solutions to market problems a government could
incorporate are when it assigns a market or market segment to one or more select participants,
provides a market or market segment itself, or creates a hybrid public-private partnership, all of
which can be considered a "sanctioned market". Such assignments can be achieved through

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

22

techniques including urban planning, territorial sovereignty, eminent domain, market
restructuring, nationalization, and privatization. A “Natural Monopoly”, “Natural Utility”, or
“Public Utility” can be defined as when a market served by a single participant is considered to
be more efficient than having multiple participants competing against each other, or when
provision by multiple participants in the market is thought to be technically, physically, or
practically inefficient, unwieldy, or “redundant”. Certain distribution system and carriage
service providers for electricity, railroads, pipelines, telephony, and cable TV have often been
designated natural monopolies or “Government Sanctioned Monopolies”.

Government-Provided Markets
Early in U.S. history many transportation market segments were privately provided.
However such roadways, turnpikes, canals, interurban, and streetcar lines often succumbed to
bankruptcy and overall market failures, leaving other market participants with more limited
choices for distribution modes. Even the U.S. federal government, which had nationalized many
private roadways such as the National Road, assigned their control to state governments. U.S.
government agencies now generally provide distribution transportation market segments
including highways, secondary roadways, and streets; trails; waterways on rivers and canals with
some requiring dams and locks; seaways; and airways (airspace over sovereign territory, airports,
and air traffic control). A few exceptions to those examples include private drives and
completely privatized or public-private partnerships for bridges, highways, turnpikes, ports, and
other infrastructures and facilities. While government agencies provide these systems, they tend
not to engage with other transportation service providers for competitive carriage.
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In some markets and market segments, government agencies constitute public
monopolies. Public transit systems with buses, commuter trains, and other variants of vehicles
(again with a few exceptions) are generally government agency-provided, with their own system
ownership, maintenance, control, security, monitoring, liability, and additional responsibilities.
The government agency in those cases is the sole carriage provider/operator. Many government
agencies, particularly at the municipal level, provide their citizens with distribution
transportation pipeline-based water and sewer systems and service. Their systems (the
distribution market segment), products (water from the government producer, sewage from
consumers as producers) and carriage (the service) are combined into one agency.

Quasi-Public/Private Markets/Market Segments
In other instances, U.S.-based government agencies along with private providers jointly
own and/or administer distribution systems using various hybrids of public-private partnership
(“PPP”) models as the sole market or market segment providers, a sample of which are detailed
in the following cases.

U.S. Postal Service.
The U.S. Postal Service was created in 1775 with the U.S. Constitution empowering
Congress "To establish Post Offices and post Roads" as an "independent establishment of the
executive branch of the Government of the United States". In 1971, the Post Office Department
was reorganized as a quasi-independent agency of the federal government - wholly owned by the
government and controlled indirectly by the U.S. President. USPS had a government sanctioned
monopoly on most first class mail and standard formerly "third class” mail. USPS said
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monopolization provided "for an economically sound postal system that could afford to deliver
letters between any two locations, however remote"
(http://about.usps.com/publications/pub542/pub542_ch1_002.htm 2013), ensuring rural delivery
service (a.k.a. “Universal Service”) immune from network rationalization and creamskimming
risks usually found in private business models. In effect, producers mailing letters to a consumer
located nearby were subsidizing producers mailing letters to distant consumers’ locations, with
the charges built into postage costs. USPS was tax exempt, non-profit, and was “self-funded and
does not receive any Congressional appropriations to support its operations, (although) some
funding is provided to cover the costs of certain statutorily mandated services”.
(http://www.usps.com/financials/anrpt08/pg43.htm 2011) USPS competed against private parcel
carriers, including DHL that was once owned by the Government of Germany's Deutsche Post
until its privatization in 2000. Although USPS was a carrier and subcontracted other modal
carriers to assist with parcel carriage service, it was not a distribution market provider, i.e., it did
not own its own highways.

U.S. Railroad Administration/U.S. Railway Administration.
During WW I, German submarines patrolling off the U.S.'s east coast were sinking ships
destined and arriving from Europe. The panic resulted in transoceanic ships refusing to depart
and railroads' east coast port-bound trains backing up in some cases west to Pittsburgh. Thus in
1917 as an emergency wartime measure to address the gridlocking and other rail industry
problems of the era, the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission recommended the U.S.
government create the U.S. Railroad Administration to nationalize and administer all of the
railroads for the duration of the war. USRA as a government agency was the sole provider of
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both the distribution system and carriage service nationally. The lines were re-privatized to their
respective owners and USRA was dissolved after the war until its re-incarnation as the U.S.
Railway Administration to address the Penn Central Transportation Co.'s bankruptcy and
conversion into Conrail. USRA version 2.0 was government intervention in the market that
determined what rights of way, infrastructure, and service providers would continue to exist and
operate in specific markets. Had the government not taken over the railroads during WW I and
the PCTC crisis, the nation’s security, economy, and distribution systems risked market failure
and during WW I hostile takeover by foreign governments.
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak).
The quasi-public/private National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) was created
by the Rail Passenger Service Act in 1971 to assume intercity passenger service spun off by
private railroads that preferred freight carriage service. Those railroads that under their
traditional monopolized distribution + carriage service business models had been losing money
for decades providing rail passenger service were then freed to concentrate solely upon freight
carriage service in an attempt to stabilize their finances and better compete against other
transportation modes using more advantageous business, governance, and market models.
Amtrak, an independent for-profit corporation, with all preferred stock owned by the U.S.
government and common stock owned by railroads and their successors, leased rail line access
("trackage rights") from private rail carriers for some of its trains, and owned other rights of way
and infrastructure segments elsewhere. In addition to providing intercity and some commuter
passenger services, it has carried mail and some intermodal freight traffic. Amtrak constantly
faced calls for reorganization, privatization, spinoffs of some services, discontinuance of certain
long distance train routes, and even liquidation as it continued to have budget problems, but
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interestingly it has increased its patronage, popular support, and received federal American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 stimulus funding to increase service provision. In some
markets Amtrak owns its distribution market segment and provides carriage service as a
monopoly, while in most other cases it has government mandated access to private railroads’
lines. Former Amtrak President David Gunn (having previous public transit agency experience)
resisted calls for separating Amtrak’s own systems from its service provision, advocating instead
that Amtrak be operated essentially as a public transit agency without competition assuming that
other companies were not interested in rail passenger service provision. After his departure there
were calls by the former G.W. Bush Administration for Amtrak’s restructuring, including
renewed investigations of the distribution-carriage separation option using a PPP model variant.

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail).
As the result of Penn Central Transportation Co.'s and other regional rail carriers' Ch. 77
bankruptcies, Congress re-established U.S. Railway Administration to reorganize and
consolidate those carriers on 4-1-1976 into the U.S. government-subsidized private Consolidated
Rail Corporation for continued freight and some passenger services in the U.S. Northeast and
Midwest and Southern Canada regions. Conrail as a government-assigned system provider +
carriage service provider competed against more solvent and other government-subsidized
private system + service providers often in the same market areas until its eventual privatization
on 10-21-1986. The government reportedly subsidized Conrail with $7B in 1983 dollars
(Sumcad, 2007).
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Conrail Shared Assets.
On 6-1-1999 Conrail was jointly acquired by competitors CSX and Norfolk Southern,
which then split up most of its distribution and carriage assets amongst themselves. However in
certain market areas, fairly equal splits could not be accomplished without giving one company
an advantage over the other. To solve the problem and gain buyout approval from the U.S.
Surface Transportation Board, the companies created Conrail Shared Assets to control the
Detroit, South Jersey/Philadelphia, and North Jersey areas consisting of 1,202 miles of Conrail’s
former network (http://www.conrail.com/freight.htm 2010). CSA conducts local carriage and
train car switching for consumers in those markets, who then have a choice of using CSX’s or
Norfolk Southern’s networks for carriage service beyond the CSA local market areas.

Ohio Rail Development Commission.
The Ohio Rail Development Commission was an independent state agency created under
the Ohio Department of Transportation, and controlled by ODOT and the Ohio Department of
Development with oversight by the Governor’s Office and the State Legislature. ORDC was
authorized by to acquire and operate rail lines, generally those that were unwanted by private
railroad companies and/or were in danger of being abandoned or liquidated. ORDC could also
construct new and restore abandoned rail lines. Its preferred business and governance model as
proclaimed by former Executive Director James Seney was to “rescue, rehabilitate, and
reprivatize” rail lines back to private railroad companies, and forgo “running a railroad”
(personal communication, 7-2003) itself.
ORDC had public-private partnerships with two railroad companies for the operation of
two rail lines it owned and/or controlled. In one case, ORDC purchased an unwanted line from
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Conrail between Minerva, OH-Hopedale, OH, and has long term net leased it to the Ohi-Rail
Corp. The private railroad was responsible for its operation, maintenance, improvement,
liability, taxes, etc., including lease payments. In a larger second case, Conrail sold a main line
from near Mingo Jct., OH to Columbus to an investment firm that had no interest in operating it.
Instead it net leased-to-own the line to ORDC, which likewise was not interested in operating it.
ORDC franchised the small Columbus & Ohio River Railroad Company to net operate it, and
later after the lease period concluded, took possession of the line and long term (and no-bid) net
leased it to the railroad. However ORDC continued to subsidize the railroad even though it was
merged into the $B+-valued Genesee & Wyoming Railroad Company’s worldwide conglomerate
of similar small railroads. ORDC also authorized C&OR to sublet the line’s right of way
adjacent to the tracks to telecommunications providers, and the railroad received those lease
payments instead of ORDC or the State of Ohio.

Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority.
To expedite rail service between the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach, the
Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority was created in 2002 to acquire, construct, and
administer a 20-mile rail line and other transportation facilities that were provided equally to the
Union Pacific Railroad Co. and BNSF Railroad Co. The project acquired the existing rail line
between the ports, removed it, and constructed a concrete-lined trench with new tracks below the
above street level to replace hundreds of grade crossings with overpasses spanning the trenches.
This separation eliminated noisy train horns blowing and accident-prone grade crossings while
permitting faster train speeds and greater throughput. Use and operating agreements addressed
responsibilities among the ACTA and its users including operation, maintenance, taxes, liability,
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security, debris removal, monitoring, etc. Line maintenance expenses were pro-rated based on
each railroad’s gross tons-mile. ACTA contracted out for maintenance, and the railroads were
responsible for the segment’s dispatching and security. Project revenues including use fees and
container charges offset construction debt and administration expenses. ACTA was assessing
the railroads $15.79 per 20’ loaded container, $4.21 per empty container, and $8.42 per other rail
cars (Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, 2005, p.22). Theoretically other railroads and
qualified users had access to and use of the line segment, whereupon all use fees and container
charges might have been re-assessed proportionately based upon the new traffic.

Akron Metro Regional Transit Authority.
After the Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co., Conrail, Penn Central Corp., et al. abandoned
certain rail line segments in the Summit County, OH area, the Akron Metro Regional Transit
Authority purchased some of those segments to railbank and rehabilitate them for future uses. In
2000 CSX Transportation sold Metro the 24.42 mile Akron-Canton segment of its former
subsidiary Valley Railway Co.’s Cleveland-Zoarville/Valley Jct. main line. Many government
agencies in Ohio also owned rail lines though typically net leased them or net franchised line
administration and carriage service to private railroads. Metro likewise chose not to engage in
freight carriage service and franchised the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Co. to provide the
service to local users. However Metro open accessed the Akron-Canton line segment for the
non-profit Cuyahoga Valley Scenic Railroad to provide passenger rail services on weekends
(U.S. Surface Transportation Board, 2003), and reserved for itself providing future rail commuter
service. A “Track Coordination Agreement” designated dispatching of trains by Metro, W&LE,
and CVSR, a formula and percentage determined the charge base revenue per car rates and
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maintenance fee paid by the railroads, and other agreements dictated line maintenance, liability
responsibilities, etc.

Consolidated Facilities Corporation (ConFac).
USRA during its mission to reform PCTC and other affected railroad companies did
analyze creating both Conrail and a “Consolidated Facilities Corporation”. Under one scenario
ConFac was to own and operate the affected railroads’ rights of way, infrastructures, and certain
facilities while leaving Conrail to provide only carriage service. In theory the option could have
permitted open access on ConFac’s system to all railroads. In both cases, system users would
have paid access and use charges to help defray the PCTC reformation and other government
costs involved over time (U.S. Railway Association, 1975, p.49). However railroad companies
with their own systems in PCTC’s service area opposed the model presumably because the
ConFac model might have been more efficient than their own private monopolized distribution +
carriage service models. Some opponents also argued that ConFac might have encouraged
efforts by other solvent railroad companies to likewise “nationalize” their systems (if ConFac
was to be a government agency or quasi-government agency) (U.S. Railway Association, 1975,
p.50). The private railroads were paying property taxes and were subject to U.S. ICC market
regulations that ConFac and its users might have been exempt from due to its open access model,
yet those railroads could also have accessed ConFac’s system to equally compete for service and
lineside customers without being subject to those taxes, regulations, and other responsibilities
and costs incurred from owning their own systems too. The ConFac option was ultimately
dropped in favor of a traditional distribution system + carriage service model for Conrail similar
to the other railroad companies’ models, although Conrail required significant subsidization to
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return it to profitability. Conrail later rationalized and abandoned unwanted line segments that
might have been preserved under ConFac so that more intercity routes could have been available
for routing choices and network redundancy, and local communities could have retained their
network rail access to serve their freight and passenger customers. ConFac critics incorrectly
portrayed the separation of the distribution system from carriage service model as
“nationalization”, where true nationalization involves government ownership and operation of in
this case a railroad.

Ohio Turnpike Commission Adjacent Rights of Way.
In addition to providing its tolled highway, the Ohio Turnpike Commission obtained
additional revenues from leasing its right of way adjacent to the highway infrastructure to
various telecommunication system providers. Qwest, MCI, AT&T, and IXC were some of the
known providers that had marked fiber lines located adjacent to the highway lane, and system
construction company Gudenkauf Corp. of Columbus, OH workers once said they had installed
conduits and fiber for Marconi and other providers embedded within concrete median barriers
that had since been abandoned. OTC easement fees assessed to MCI as of 7-1-1988 were $1925
per mile annually (Ohio Turnpike Commission, 1988), although its annual rates c.2009 had
increased to $3K-$4K (J. Disantis, personal communication, July 15, 2009).

Government-Sponsored End User Aggregation.
Some local and state government agency programs “aggregate" or pool private utilities'
consumers together amicably with agreements and then purchase those services on their behalf in
virtual bulk quantities from select utility providers at prices hopefully closer to wholesale than
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regular retail prices. Aggregation supposedly reduces subscriber costs associated with multiple
individual accounts, and is in effect a quasi public-private partnership where the government
agency performs some of the private provider’s services for them (Ohio Consumers' Counsel,
2009). The concept could theoretically be used by government agencies to acquire wholesale
speed telecommunication services for local market end users, and has been advocated by
consultants as a solution to assist rolling out faster speeds to rural areas.
While aggregation is a method of trying to create market competition and might eliminate
the monopolies utility providers may have over local service markets, it does so by increasingly
concentrating a competitive consumer market into a concentrated, perhaps monopsonistic end
user market. Should multiple government agencies collaborate in the aggregation program with
their respective end users, the end user market becomes more concentrated for the utility service
provider to contend with. To be more fair, the government agency aggregator should authorize
its end users to pool together in groups and contract with the service provider of their choices
from multiple providers instead of the aggregator selecting only one provider for the end users.
Proponents say aggregation programs save the selected provider on costs such as end user
billing. Yet in one model the billing function was merely transferred to the government agency
and consolidated with their other enterprise service billings. The provider in effect was being
subsidized by the government agency or being cross-subsidized by the government agency’s
other services. The government agency might also pass along the aggregation program’s costs to
end users not enrolled in the program who are subscribed to another competitive service
provider, or to end users not using the particular service at all from any provider in the form of
various taxes, unless the aggregation program’s costs are required to remain captive to the
enterprise.
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The contracts between the government agency aggregator and the provider are typically
for multiple years in exchange for locked-in rates vs. paying the current going market service
prices. Each party believes the locked-in price will benefit their interests depending upon
commodity exchange price fluctuations. Yet for example Hurricane Katrina wiping out (then
constrained) natural gas capacities would have bankrupted numerous aggregation providers had
they not been permitted to break the lock-ins to raise rates or cease service provision. The long
term contracts could also be pointless since oftentimes each party by agreement can break the
contract prematurely, and end users can also drop out at their convenience and select other
service providers, thereby proportionally minimizing the aggregation savings.
Aggregation program providers claim to enable end user leverage against incumbent
service providers, but it actually introduces more market intermediaries - the government agency
"represents" the end users as an agent, and possibly becomes involved as another intermediary in
the market. Some distribution mode utilities have been merged and acquired by others, and
thereafter rationalized portions of their networks. Others have spun off the portions of their
vertically integrated systems such as “last miles” that deliver services to end users so they can
concentrate more exclusively upon for example energy exploration, generation, and wholesale
distribution to third parties taking over as retail distributors. It is these distributors that
government agency aggregators in some markets must now contract with and not with the more
insulated wholesalers, and the distributors are increasingly challenged by pricing power by both
the wholesale provider and the aggregator.
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Provider Financing and Subsidies
Private providers usually fund their own functions to gain entry into a market.
Government agencies too are required to be funded if they intend to gain similar market entry.
But if government agencies subsidize private providers for assistance with market entry ability,
or if the government cross-subsidizes its agencies to enter the market, the market could become
unfairly skewed against those providers not being likewise subsidized. Governments typically
advocate economic retention and development, and therefore advocate providers' fiscal
successes. At what point does and/or should a government intervene financially to balance
providers' returns on investments, market shares, fiscal responsibilities, investment ratings, etc.?
Worldwide, many governments unabashedly engage in subsidy practices to its private or quasipublic/private providers, or provide products and services themselves against private providers.
When those various mixed economic market types then compete against each other in the global
market, conflicts usually arise from the degree of unfair subsidies, currency exchange rates,
sovereign government policies and regulations, and other market distortions.

Distribution Market Segment Importance
End user access to and use of distribution services is increasingly important to the point
of becoming an inherent right. “Indeed, today the Internet is largely recognized as a general
purpose technology, and broadband is regarded as a basic infrastructure, in the same way as
electricity, water or roads. Many citizens even consider the Internet as a ‘fundamental human
right,’ and some countries have started to put in place legislation stipulating that access to the
Internet is a human right for their citizens.” (International Telecommunication Union, 2010,
pp.4-5). “(Based on a survey of 27,000 adults in 26 countries carried out by the British
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Broadcasting Corporation in 2010, around three-quarters of interviewees considered Internet
access as a human right. Countries that have ruled that access to Internet is a human right for
their citizens include Finland, France and Estonia.) The U.S. National Broadband Plan reads as
follows: ‘Broadband, … is a modern necessity of life, not a luxury. It ought to be found in every
village, in every home and on every farm in every part of the United States’ [FCC, 2010]”.
(International Telecommunication Union, 2010, p.18).

Wireline Telecommunications
Telecommunications can be divided into Wireline and Wireless means, where wireline
can be defined as telecommunications provision using physical infrastructure such as copper
wire, coaxial cable, fiber optics, etc. to discretely channel electrons or photons between
transmitter and receiver equipment. Wireless can be defined as telecommunications provision
using the electromagnetic spectrum to transceive electrons or photons without the need for
physical wireline infrastructure. Wireline and wireless networks are often commingled with
each other to provide service over both mediums. However as mentioned in the Limitations
section, this study will focus largely upon wireline telecommunication technologies since the
results cannot be similarly conveyed to wireless telecommunications due to certain physical and
characteristic differences.
Information began being conveyed amongst living beings by natural communication
means, and was further assisted by emerging technologies becoming formal telecommunication
systems. Information has since become one of the world’s most valuable commodities. “In
multiple sectors - including finance, retail and advertising - free-flowing and interoperable data
have increased competition, improved customer understanding, driven innovation and improved
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decision-making. Fortune 500 companies such as Google and Amazon have based their business
models on the importance of unlocking data and using them in ways that produce far-reaching
changes.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.207). Thus the systems for
transporting information have become equally as important, and the goal of a communications
network is to make it possible for applications to interact through a network (van Schewick,
2010, p.50).
The telephone system was developed to transceive analog signals containing voice data
via wire infrastructures, and the system was eventually adapted to deliver signatures, text, images
and other variants. The early telephony market featured numerous individual service providers
establishing their own infrastructures and providing equipment to customers. “After telephone
patents held by AT&T’s parent company expired in 1894, more than 6,000 independent phone
companies sprouted up.” (Anderson & Wolff, 2010). Those “end users” subscribed to a
particular provider, which entitled them access to and service from that carrier to its other end
user subscribers. If a customer desired access to other end users not subscribing to that network,
they had to additionally subscribe to that provider’s network, or be able to interexchange to it via
each users’ cooperating carriers linking their networks together. Telephone pole heights
skyrocketed laden with subscriber line circuits, again with some customers subscribing to more
than one provider requiring another set of line circuits. Other end users who were well-financed
could construct and operate their own private networks separate from telephone system
providers’ networks.
After numerous market shakeouts, bankruptcies, mergers, acquisitions, and
consolidations in the telephony market, and marketplace interexchange difficulties and conflicts
among providers reminiscent of rail interchange problems and occasional violence among
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railroad carriers that resulted in the creation of the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission and
numerous state railroad regulatory agencies, telecommunication regulators determined that local
market telephony provision was more efficient (using the state of the art technology at the time)
under the provision of a sole "common" carrier vs. having an openly accessible marketplace of
multiple competing carriers utilizing their own separate networks.
The American Telephone & Telegraph Company formed an early vertical monopoly by
combining its local market exchanges with longer distance interexchange service and network
equipment manufacturing and provision. AT&T then horizontally integrated most of the U.S.
telephony service market, with a few independent carriers remaining in other market areas
including the former General Telephone and Electronics Corporation. “By 1939, AT&T
controlled nearly all of the US’s long-distance lines and some four-fifths of its telephones.”
(Anderson & Wolff, 2010). This structure continued until independent startup company
Microwave Communications, Inc., began using microwave relay stations to provide competitive
interexchange service via both wireline and wireless means. AT&T legally challenged their
marketplace entry and interexchange ability, but instead a number of court cases broke up
AT&T’s vertical monopoly. AT&T was stripped of its “local exchange carrier” function and
was subdivided into regional LEC Bell operating companies, but was permitted to keep its long
distance interexchange carriage service. More providers including Sprint and Qwest then
entered the interexchange market by acquiring easements for fiber optic-based infrastructures
buried on railroad rights of way in the mid 1990s, similar to the former telegraph companies
utilizing aerial easements on poles constructed on railroad rights of way.
Thus end users desiring telephony access and service had to subscribe to a sole
government-franchised LEC common carrier provider in their market area, but had a choice for
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their preferred long distance “for-hire carrier” and “private carrier” provider their LECs
interchanged with. End users were charged tolls for any calls that went outside of their local
exchange and certain adjacent exchanges that constituted “local” service.
Computers, which are essentially machines to process, transceive, and store data, evolved
from simple abacuses to mechanical clock-like devices to large mainframe units, digital
microprocessor desktop units, portable laptop and mobile device units, and infinite variations
thereof depending upon their intended (and in cases unintended) applications. Early mainframes
were capable of simultaneously hosting multiple end user data entry terminal units, and
monitors, printers, and other peripherals to output data at local or off-site locations. Those
systems required Local Area Networks (“LANs”) or Wide Area Networks (“WANs”) depending
upon the distances between the mainframes and end user equipment. Mainframe operators often
had to lease private dedicated data-grade telephony circuits from LECs and/or interexchange
carriers (“IXCs”) to scale their networks remotely. But the LEC’s and/or IXC’s networks and
networking and interfacing equipment were often bottlenecks in mainframes-end users data
throughput capacities, the disproportionate spread increasingly due to end users upgrading their
computers with processing capabilities that doubled every few years and carriers unable (or
unwilling) to keep up an equal pace of newer and more powerful equipment implementation.
The U.S. Dept. of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency in a quest to
interconnect its various computers throughout the U.S. developed a WAN dubbed the “Internet”,
although it was disruptive to the traditional phone system.
[RAND Corporation researcher Paul] Baran's main motivation was to design a
system that could not be taken out by the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Yet the topological
change advocated by Baran was not the reason everyone from the military to industry
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vehemently opposed his design. The objection was to his proposal to break the (network
traffic) messages into small packets of uniform size capable of traveling independently of
one another along the network. This could not be achieved with the existing analog
communications system. Thus he advocated a switch to a digital system. This step was
too difficult for AT&T, the communications monopoly of his time, to absorb. Therefore,
AT&T's Jack Osterman quashed Baran's provision when he declared, "First, it can't
possibly work, and if it did it, damned if we're going to allow the creation of a
competition to ourselves." Baran's ideas, defeated at every step by industry in the
military, were rediscovered only years later, when the Advanced Research Projects
Agency, not aware of his results, independently constructed the same vision. By that
time, however, the Internet was well along its course of development (Barabási, 2002,
pp.144-147).
Soon thereafter other government agencies, universities, etc. interfaced their LANs and
WANs to this network, thereby increasing its worth with every newly accessible end user and
their IT equipment. Email and File Transfer Protocol were initial Internet services were used to
distribute messages and files amongst users. “The Internet is the first big communications
network to make group communication a native part of its repertoire. The basic logic of the
Internet, called ‘end-to-end communication’, says that the Internet itself is just a vehicle for
moving information back and forth – it’s up to the computers sending and receiving information
to make sense of it. While the telephone network was engineered for transmission of voice (and
the phone company fought bitter legal battles to keep it from being used for any other purpose),
the Internet does not know what it is being used for.” (Shirky, 2008, p.157).
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The early Internet's routers and sub-networks were interconnected via distribution
providers' dedicated wholesale long distance lines and/or retail LEC lines, and their traffic shared
via “peering”. “Peering allows two providers exchanging large volumes of traffic to save money
by connecting directly, rather than routing traffic across their paid Internet connections. Peering
is often free as long as the amount of traffic exchanged is not out of balance, providing
substantial cost savings for bandwidth for high-traffic sites and networks.” (Miller, 2009b). The
Internet later shifted from a more U.S. government-provided enterprise to greater administration
by private providers. “In the U.S., this (privatization) model translated into efforts to shift
telecommunications from the regulated monopoly model it followed throughout most of the
twentieth century to a competitive market, and to shift Internet development from being
primarily a government-funded exercise, as it had been from the late-1960s to the mid-1990s, to
being purely private property, market based. This model was declared in the Clinton
administration’s 1993 National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, which pushed for
privatization of Internet deployment and development.” (Benkler, 2006, p.152). “It was the
policy of the U.S. to ‘let the private sector lead’ in deployment of the Internet. To a greater or
lesser degree, this commitment to private provisioning was adopted in most other advanced
economies in the world. In the first few years, this meant that investment in the backbone of the
Internet was private, and heavily funded by the stock bubble of the late 1990s. It also meant that
the last distribution bottleneck - the “last mile” - was privately owned. Until the end of the
1990s, the last mile was made mostly of dial-up connections over the copper wires of the
incumbent local exchange carriers. This meant that the physical layer was not only proprietary,
but that it was, for all practical purposes, monopolistically owned.” (Benkler, 2006, pp.398-399).
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Benkler noted the difference between networks for “dumb” equipment (i.e., televisions)
vs. “smart” equipment (i.e., computers). “In the broadcast and telephone era, devices were
starkly differentiated. Consumers owned dumb terminals. Providers owned sophisticated
networks and equipment: transmitters and switches. Consumers could therefore consume
whatever providers could produce most efficiently that the providers believed consumers would
pay for. Central to the emergence of the freedom of users in the networked environment is an
erosion of the differentiation between consumer and provider equipment. Consumers came to
use general-purpose computers that could do whatever their owners wanted, instead of specialpurpose terminals that could only do what their vendors designed them to do. These devices
were initially connected over a transmission network - the public phone system - that was
regulated as a common carrier. Common carriage required the network owners to carry all
communications without differentiating by type or content. The network was neutral as among
communications.” (Benkler, 2006, pp.396-397). In the early-to-mid 1980s, AT&T laid some of
the first generation fiber optic lines along various rights of way to better handle the volume and
improve transmission quality of interexchanged network data, and to increase the capacity of its
remaining analog voice circuits.
By the mid-to-later 1990s the costs of network equipment were dropping and its speed
and capacity capabilities were improving significantly. The 1996 Telecommunications Act
encouraged further market entry of third parties to provide IXC, IXC and Internet Protocol
(“IP”), and IP-only service to compete against the incumbent LECs and IXCs. Williams, Level
3, and others then constructed $B+ nationwide and international networks, some with greatly
excess capacities for future expansion and needs. Even non-telecommunication distributors such
as Dominion, Enron, American Electric Power, and Norfolk Southern Railway created
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subsidiaries to operate their own for-hire and private telecommunication networks along their
core distribution market rights of way and even physically within some of their infrastructures.
Some market segment providers leased or sold excess unused “dark” fibers and other
infrastructure to third party providers and end users without actually providing service
themselves upon it. Distribution market incumbents and later market entrants were forced to
upgrade their decade or so old systems to increasingly newer technologies to remain competitive
in speeds, capacities, and other services, all the while being saddled with past $B infrastructure
buildout debts. AT&T for example acquired smaller network equipment providers and
telecommunication providers utilizing more advanced networking equipment as an alternative to
investing in their own network upgrades.
To recoup their network buildout expenditures, wholesale IXC and IP providers primarily
targeted high-end end users, some of which could afford to connect directly into their networks
to receive wholesale service thus disintermediating retail service providers. Residential and
small business customers were left to retail service providers, who received service from
wholesale providers. However the high-end end user marketplace was extremely competitive for
a relatively scarce number of those users, forcing intense competition among providers and
service discounts to gain and retain accounts, which did not assist in paying down their debts.
Enron as a quasi-wholesale provider believed there would be a shortage of bandwidth service at
the time, and attempted to establish a bandwidth exchange market where various providers could
trade capacities akin to regular commodity exchange markets.
In the later 1990s the industry became fraught with finance and accounting scandals,
blatant fraud, and dubious revenue generation techniques. Some wholesalers engaged in a
lease/leaseback program with network equipment providers where the carriers would provide
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equipment to end users; however when some carriers could not repay the equipment providers
they went into default, and in one case the equipment provider acquired the wholesale carrier and
began providing wholesale service itself.
Wholesalers under their growing $B buildout debts then sought revenues in the LEC
markets by providing voice and retail Internet service. Some wholesalers merged with and/or
acquired LECs and Regional Bell Operating Companies (“RBOCs” – the seven LECs in
different jurisdictions formed after AT&T was divested of its LEC function) as a means to
immediately gain access to the local market vs. constructing their own competitive local
exchange networks (i.e., Qwest acquiring RBOC US West). Other wholesalers including AT&T
attempted to gain access by using the 1996 Telecommunications Act provisions to force access
onto LEC and cable networks capable of IP and telephony service at rates lower than the LEC's
or cable provider’s own provision costs. Other IXCs courted independent private MAN
(“Municipal/Metropolitan Area Network”) providers with fiber optic ring topology
infrastructures as alternative intermediaries to LECs to enter local markets.
In 2004 a U.S. Supreme Court ruling declared local networks to be private property,
accessible by third parties at the discretion by their owners (akin to railroad trackage rights)
without any federal or state-regulated discounted access rates. The USSC then authorized cable
companies engaging in ISP to control outside access by LECs and ISPs onto their networks to
provide competitive Internet service, similar to incumbent LECs arguing for equivalent
restrictions regarding network access by third parties for DSL ISP.
Yet LECs were authorized to enter the IXC market to essentially rebuild vertical LEC +
IXC networks. The incumbent IXCs protested to regulators and courts to no avail, which while
being locked out of additionally serving the LEC market seriously affected the going concern
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status of a few of their business units. Empowered LECs then merged with and acquired a
number of the financially strapped and market entry restricted IXCs, including for example SBC
purchasing AT&T (SBC then renamed to AT&T), and Verizon buying MCI WorldCom. Those
and similar consolidations resurrected the LEC + IXC vertical near-monopoly model AT&T
once enjoyed on a national scale, but the model became more monopolistic regionally and
oligopolistic nationally (also akin to the railroad market that is oligopolistic nationally but
monopolistic or duopolistic regionally and locally). The SBC and Verizon buyouts did contain
some conditions to protect high-end end users who would have been re-intermediated with their
former LECs to obtain wholesale IXC and/or IP service. Combined LEC + IXC providers then
invested more $Bs in installing fiber optic infrastructures from the local central switching offices
to customers’ curbs or premises in more profit-promising metropolitan markets to provide
“bundled” (multiple packaged services) LEC, IXC, IP, rebroadcast television, and other
telecommunication services. In certain cases individual “naked” services were still offered.
The cable television industry started as community area towers located at high
geographic elevations with antennas to capture broadcast television and FM radio signals that
were distributed to customers over coaxial cable infrastructure networks in lieu of customers
constructing their own tall towers and big antennas. Cable companies then started distributing
television signals from satellite-based networks, and as those networks and terrestrial
broadcasters were converted to digital transmission formats, cable providers also converted their
systems to digital and upgraded their networks to fiber optics and hybrid coaxial-fiber optics.
With the upgrades and relatively similar network equipment technology, cable providers then
offered bundled and in certain cases naked ISP, LEC, IXC, and other telecommunication services
to their customers. Cable providers had their share of scandal and fraud, with the former
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Adelphia broken up and acquired by other providers as the market continues to consolidate and
regularly faces market re-regulation. Time Warner cable was a formal IXC, an advantage over
other cable companies that must contract with LECs or IXCs for retail/wholesale
telecommunication service access. Benkler discussed both the cable and LEC providers’ system
rollouts. “The end of the 1990s saw the emergence of broadband networks. In the U.S., cable
systems, using hybrid fiber-coaxial systems, moved first, and became the primary providers.
The incumbent local telephone carriers have been playing catch-up ever since, using digital
subscriber line (DSL) techniques to squeeze sufficient speed out of their copper infrastructure to
remain competitive, while slowly rolling out fiber infrastructure closer to the home. As of 2003,
the incumbent cable carriers and the incumbent local telephone companies accounted for roughly
96% of all broadband access to homes and small offices.” (Benkler, 2006, p.399).
Some public utilities that had entered the wholesale telecommunications market later
spun off those business units, citing too little revenue from too much competition for too few end
users, or are leasing their infrastructures to third party operators. Enron, which entered the
telecommunications market by leasing fiber lines from other providers to form a national
network, dissolved the unit after its bankruptcy, and that unit’s officials have since appeared in
courts on various fraud charges. Some electric power utilities were trying to offer IP service
again with new “Broadband over Power Lines” technology using their existing electric
transmission lines and end user premise electric wiring networks.
Mid- and higher-end end users were exploring the glut of providers’ extra fiber lines and
capacities by leasing and buying their own fiber strands and channels for their own WAN use
and connection to retail or wholesale Internet providers. Google in particular leased and/or
purchased dark Williams Communications fibers to potentially provide WAN, ISP, or other
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expedited access from its databases to end users. More non-incumbent non-profit corporations
and government agencies were installing their own infrastructures and networks to provide
service to other non-profits, government agencies, for-profits, and residential consumers in
competition with existing market providers.

Rights of Way
While wireless telecommunications take advantage of transceiving signals through the
air, wireline signals constrained physical channels require real property to host those support
infrastructures. Depending upon the required route of the network segment, rights of way may
be required through virgin lands and/or developed lands already hosting one or more uses. If
routed through developed lands, the installation may have to cross or share the same or adjacent
rights of way already assigned to other existing infrastructures. Rights of way can be “Private
Ways” if the land is privately owned, or “Public Ways” if they are owned by a government
agency or similar organization. Usually the infrastructure provider secures easements on the
right of way vs. purchasing the right of way outright from the private or public landowner. The
landowner may require annual fees and certain access and use terms and conditions from the
infrastructure provider in exchange for an easement agreement, and likewise the provider enjoys
certain access and use with restricted interference from the landowner and other third parties.
Thus ownership of the rights of way is critical for determining infrastructure provision.
Infrastructures may require surface, aerial, or subsurface right of way easements.
Generally the larger the infrastructure the more expensive the rights of way acquisition and
easement costs will be, though telecommunication lines, particularly fiber cables, tend to require
less space than other distribution infrastructures. Generally, telecommunications lines are
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mounted aerially or buried for increased security, less conflicts with other infrastructures and
their users, etc. Aerial infrastructure installations require rights of way for support structures
such as poles, electric transmission line towers, buildings, and other means. Subsurface
infrastructure installations require rights of way for cables or to host conduits, pipelines, and
other channels to protect internal cables.
Sometimes telecommunication infrastructures share rights of way with third party
infrastructures, available space permitting, while at other times providers prefer secure separate,
independent easements. Independent burials may be feasible in rural or more open areas, but in
urban and highly developed locales available space may be at a premium. Usually government
agencies that have developed their rights of way with streets, sidewalks, water/sewer pipelines,
and with other utilities’ infrastructures loathe having them torn up and reconstructed every time a
telecommunication infrastructure provider requests using a portion of the rights of way as part of
their network routes. Apparently once asphalt streets are excavated for say a water/sewer line
project, the refilling and asphalt patch is rarely the same quality or physical characteristics as the
original paving, and consequently the patched trench tends to fail faster than the surrounding
asphalt on the street. The reported cure is to remove all the asphalt from the whole street,
properly fill and tamp any washouts given the opportunity, and repave the street, which if oil
prices are high and asphalt in short supply can incur great costs. Thus some government
agencies have begun insisting upon coordinated infrastructure burials so that only one trench in
the right of way is dug for all (or similar) distribution providers at one time to better coordinate
disrupting the existing surface, subsurface, and sometimes aerial infrastructures and their users.
The technique may be cost effective if multiple providers can be coordinated simultaneously for

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

48

the project, but it carries a risk of other infrastructures directly interfering with the
telecommunications installation in the same trench.
Even if the telecommunications system is not buried in the same trench as other utilities
and infrastructures, failure of say a water/sewer, gas, or steam line can potentially disrupt not
only its host right of way but those of other installations tens to sometimes hundreds of feet
away. Directional boring techniques are available in place of trenching and filling for some
challenging or congested segment locations so that installations can be converted from surface or
near surface to deeper underground, such as a line being bracketed to a bridge to jointly cross a
river can be bored deeply under the river. Higher costs to bore at such depths are offset by less
risk to the infrastructure and disruption of high value network traffic.

Infrastructure
The following sections generally concentrate upon wirelines and networking equipment
utilized with buried infrastructures. Similarly as was stated in the previous section, infrastructure
ownership is also critical for determining service provision.

Wirelines
Some type of wireline technology is required to connect or network two or more
telecommunication devices together if they are desired to communicate with each other, or if a
substitute wireless connection means is not available. The type of wireline utilized must match
or adapt to the interfacing ports on the devices, else a network cannot be formed and the devices
may remain stranded from communicating with each other. If the devices transceive electronic
signals, the wirelines must be able to conduct those signals; likewise if the devices are photonic,
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a wireline constructed of light-conducting material must be utilized. Some network equipment
can be hybrids containing a mix of electronic and photonic transceiving equipment, subsequently
requiring a mix of electronic and photonic conducive wirelines. To fulfill the goals of
telecommunications, wirelines must be designed, produced, and installed to convey information
from one source to another as quickly and with as near exactness to the original transmission
construct as possible, minimizing any resistance and noise that might interfere with the signals,
and reducing the need for additional re-amplification or regeneration equipment if possible.
Early wirelines were bracketed to poles and other structures with ceramic, glass, and
other non-conducting materials used as insulators in-between the brackets and the support
structures. Later lines jacketed with insulation were attached directly to supports and pulled
through passageways, pipelines, and conduits. Newer conduit types featured “innerducts” divided channels and subconduits within conduits - to help separate and organize different
internal cables. An advantage of burying conduits containing cables vs. burying cables alone
was that the cables could be pulled out of the conduits and replaced with new and upgraded
cables instead of abandoning and trenching in new lines, having saved up to 80% or more in
construction costs.
Later wireline technology featured wires covered with insulation and strand sets twisted
together to reduce interference. More shielding and grounding were featured in some types of
“twisted pair” wiring per particular networking applications. Twisted pair wirelines used almost
exclusively in end-to-end networks (i.e., end user premise-last mile-middle mile-long haulmiddle mile-last mile-end user premise) were later being phased out by providers in their long
haul and middle mile network segments in favor of coaxial and fiber optic cables that required
less regeneration equipment, although they were being replaced more slowly in last mile network
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segments due to costs and competition from wireless and other means of distributing
information.
Coaxial cable conveyed different types of signals than twisted pair, and was designed
somewhat differently than twisted pair wirelines featuring a center wire core, a layer of
insulation, an outer layer of shielding wire, and another layer of outer insulation. Due to its low
signal loss and better shielding design, signals distributed via coaxial traveled further distances
than those upon twisted pair cables. Early mainframe computers used a type of coaxial cable to
network with other devices, and cable modem telecommunication service used the same coaxial
cable that distributed cable television signals. Some providers used coaxial cable to upgrade
from twisted pair in their long haul and middle mile network segments, though fiber optics
eventually replaced most coaxial lines. Cable operators used various types and sizes of coaxial
cables end-to-end in their network infrastructures, though they too were upgrading more head
end-to-neighborhood “miles” with fiber optics and using converters to interface with
neighborhood-to-premise coaxial runs.
Fiber optic strands were developed from glass and plastics technologies and adapted to
transmit optical telecommunication signals. Plastic fiber was originally cost effective for short
distance connections and low throughput applications, but glass fiber with its higher throughput
capacities, smaller strand sizes, and greater transmission distances superseded both plastic fiber
and coaxial cables. Fiber cables could host a few strands to hundreds of strands each. Fiber
optics, first deployed commercially by AT&T and GTE in 1977 (Stix, 2001), were increasingly
used in long haul and middle mile network segments, and were gradually being utilized in more
last mile segments and premise networks. As of 2010, copper wirelines were the most common
way of carrying wireline telecommunications with a share of about 65%, compared to 20% for
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coaxial and 12% for fiber (Ricknäs, 2010). Signal regeneration equipment was required at
certain intervals to extend reliable transceiving distances, although with improvements in glass
purity and other network equipment, distribution distances kept increasing with consequent
reduced regeneration costs.

Networking
Communication devices were usually produced to network together with other devices.
Such networking required interfacing ports and communication standards that matched or
adapted to those in each device to properly transceive data amongst them. Generally end-to-end
networking using the same interface technologies and standards provides faster performances
compared to devices with different standards requiring intermediary converters and adapters to
network successfully. If only two devices were to be networked, they could be directly
connected to each other if each device had at least one interfacing port. If a device had two or
more ports, it could be “daisy-chain” networked to the addition devices. However having the
devices provide multiple ports to interconnect multiple devices became somewhat inefficient
when the number of potential networked devices was scaled upward, so dedicated networking
equipment was created to handle the networking responsibilities instead.

Facilities
“Facilities” were locations with structures to house telecommunications equipment, staff,
users, etc. by providers, end users, or shared by both. Providers typically used facilities called
Network Operation Centers (“NOCs”) that served as headquarters/control centers for the main
networking equipment. NOCs could connect to regional offices serving major cities or multiple
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states, central offices serving smaller towns, and field facilities including shelters, cabinets,
vaults, boxes, etc. serving neighborhoods and end users’ facilities. Some providers built new
facilities, leased rooms and whole floors in office buildings and high-rises, and repurposed other
buildings to host various equipment and administrative functions.
End users and third parties providing networking services to end users could use their
production facilities to house networking infrastructure, their uses, and users, in addition to some
of the aforementioned facility types used by providers. Some end user facilities featured
specialized application setups such as automated machinery, robotics, telecommuting, telework,
videoconferencing, distance learning, point-to-multipoint (i.e., digital projectors in theaters), 3-D
and interactive telepresence rooms, etc. Other facilities housed various sized server farms,
supercomputers, etc., while those functions were increasingly integrated into cargo shipping
containers able to be transported where needed if adequate network connections were available.
Providers sometimes leased available facility spaces to end users, known as “Co-Location”,
where end user equipment could be directly connected to providers’ backbones.
Facility types ranged from security protection levels shared with the rest of the
production or end user activities to buildings designed and constructed to be practically bombproof (although the 9-11-2001 World Trade Center collapse affecting Verizon’s New York City
NOC likely caused rethinking of locations being in or next to potential targets without adequate
redundancy) and other facilities setup in underground tunnels, mines, and similar relatively
inaccessible locations.
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Neutral Central Offices and Carrier Hotels
A facility owned by a provider and used as their control center without being shared with
other providers and users was usually considered to be their private NOC. However other
facilities owned by providers and third parties and shared with other providers and/or high end
end users were variously called “Neutral Central Offices” and “Carrier Hotels”. Those facilities
offered tenants access to multiple providers, co-location, regeneration, regional and networkwide NOCs, among other functions. Facilities ranged among regular repurposed office
buildings, specialized constructs, and hardened nuclear bomb shelters/national defense control
centers deeply embedded within the Earth that offered the utmost in protection for mission
critical functions (Buckley, 2000).
The more successful shared facilities were located in close proximities to multiple fiber
backbone lines. Switch & Data Facilities marketing VP Leslie Bateman said, “It is important
that the facility is strategically located close to where the fiber is. This is typically near the
central office of the incumbent carrier and never a big physical distance away.” (Colocation
chain stores, 2000). There was no guarantee a backbone provider would connect to the facility.
John Payne [sic - more likely Telseon CEO and president John Kane] said, “Just because I have
fiber in the street near your facility does not mean I can or will connect to you. You could be
misleading my customers, saying we are somehow going to work together.” FIBERWORKS
CEO and president Scott Burkholder said, “One of the greatest challenges is that neutral
[facility] providers are making choices based on the close proximity of fiber backbone facilities.
The fact that they are close does not mean they can gain access to these facilities.” Shared
facilities also had to ensure that their tenant providers had good peering agreements, or else an
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affected provider’s traffic throughput rates could be slowed if it had to use less indirect routing
over the public network (Buckley, 2000).
The primary concern for high end end users such as application service providers, LECs,
CLECs, and emerging throughput traders was service, and constructing their own network
backbones often was not a feasible option so such neutral colocation sites became more attractive
to them (Buckley, 2000). Payne [sic] said, “Having the ability to go to a central point and peer
with whomever you want is a major value-add.” Equinix CTO Jay Adelson said, “From a
content perspective, performance is significantly enhanced by being right next to a backbone
provider. It’s not subject to points of failure present in the current model of doing business over
the Web.” Yipes Communications CMO Ron Young said, “Why wouldn’t you want to connect
to all these other sources of bandwidth?” (Buckley, 2000) . Bateman said the major appeal of a
neutral colocation facility was provider choice and the ability to interconnect with a wide range
of suppliers. “The selling point is not so much the neutrality but the choice. They want to be
able to choose to get connectivity from any carrier. They don’t want to be forced into using the
capacity of the colocation facility owner.” (Colocation Chain Stores, 2000).
In one facility type case, Switch Communications acquired what was once Enron’s Las
Vegas multiple-provider high speed service trading hub cheaply, giving them direct access to
more than 20 primary backbone providers in a single location. Switch then tied this vast network
to existing data center hosting facilities, which attracted numerous high end end users. Switch
CEO Rob Roy said, “Enron wanted to expand from trading energy. They wanted to use the same
type of conceptual algorithm and go trade bandwidth.” Enron spent $Ms creating a single
facility that would serve as a hub for all the major U.S. carriers. Those providers’ lines would
connect into the Enron building, and Enron would move their throughput around like a
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commodity. Roy said, “I don’t think that was ever going to be real, but they thought it was.”
Enron had already built most of the infrastructure for the facility and had interested major
providers in accessing it, though just as the rest of its business started to collapse into eventual
bankruptcy. Thereafter the facility was placed up for sale. Roy said, “We were the only ones
that bid on it. It should have been the $200B companies that owned it. We got it for a
Cinderella story type of figure.”
Roy said the 407K square foot “SuperNAP” facility was the most energy efficient, tightly
packed data center on the planet, and expected it to serve Fortune 100 companies, almost every
technology firm, and major media conglomerates. The facility had screens dedicated to tracking
weather across the globe, 15 more that monitored hundreds of security cameras, another one that
tracked power and networking grids, and “global terrorist activity”. Switch offered users direct
access to Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, Cox, XO, Qwest, Time Warner, Global Crossing, and Level 3
among others, offering throughput rates that rivaled major hubs in New York and Los Angeles.
Roy said this gave Switch unique pricing and capacity advantages by underbidding other more
expensive facilities and creating more competition among the providers.
We built this huge valve system, and we plug all the carriers - 10Gb/sec and
40Gb/sec - into our big gateway. Our biggest customers are saying we are selling space
to them at 44% less than all of their connections. And my agreements are not just about
[Las] Vegas. I can order a link in Germany cheaper than anyone else can. I can do this
because we have some of the world’s biggest companies looking to get into the
SuperNAP. And the carriers are hearing about this and seeing the volume of bandwidth
these customers want. And I can go and price out that bandwidth with a bunch of
different carriers. So, Carrier X comes and says, “Okay, we’ll play ball.” You know,
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you can take wholesale, and we’re 30% below that. We are just alone in a very unique
spot in the world because of the Enron building. We have clients that come in and save
more on connectivity than they pay for the entire data center in a month. So, it almost
makes their data center free.
Roy’s SuperNAP model was possibly just the starting point for Switch, as its investors urged him
to build ten more similar centers worldwide (Vance, 2008).
In a similar model, major end user Google purchased a carrier hotel that afforded it with
direct access to the multiple providers located within the facility.
Originally known as the Inland Freight Terminal, the 2.3M square foot 111 Eighth
Avenue building in New York City was designed to relieve congestion around West Side
piers by serving as a “post office for freight,” as Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt said when
he broke ground for the project in 1931. Atop this terminal, the Port of New York
Authority, as it was then known, built offices and industrial lofts. When the Port
Authority of NY and NJ moved its headquarters to the World Trade Center in 1973, the
subsequent owners leased space to various commercial ventures (Dunlap, 1997).
The structure sits almost directly on top of where the Hudson Street/Ninth Avenue
fiber highway makes a dog-leg to the right before heading north-east toward the Upper
West Side. The building’s previous owners, a consortium led by Taconic Investment
Partners, knew that proximity to the fiber lines would be attractive to companies, so they
tricked out the building with something called a network-neutral “Meet-Me” room, which
is literally a room filled with networking equipment that allows the tenants to connect
(peer) with each other - and the fiber-line. Thus, 111 Eighth Avenue has become known
as one of the most important so-called telecom carrier hotels on the Eastern seaboard, if
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not the entire U.S. Google, which had upgraded its NYC presence from its first office at
a Starbucks on 86th Street, was leasing space in the facility, but in late 2010 purchased it
outright for ~$1.9B, and had Taconic continue the leasing and management operations of
the building (Gustin, 2010).

End User Devices and Uses
End users were utilizing an increasing number of devices, device types, and applications.
IMS Research, which tracked the installed base of equipment that could access the Internet,
reported “Sometime this month, the 5Bth device will plug into the Internet. And in 10 years, that
number will grow by more than a factor of four. Today, there are over 1B computers that
regularly connect to the Internet.” (Cox, 2010). The following were some examples of devices
and applications with ever improving technologies, more features, more powers, more
throughput, and more storage requirements that continued to test end users’ and providers’
network capabilities when interconnecting and networking them, especially for interactive and
symmetric throughput operations. Access and service to these more technologically
sophisticated end users was therefore of increased importance moreso than to previous
telephone- and/or television-only users.
Computers and servers were becoming faster to process more information, and were
being equipped with an increasing number of CPU “cores” in each unit. Optically-based CPUs
promised greater processing powers and throughputs than electronic CPUs particularly if such
units could be networked optically end-to-end. Individual computers could be connected
together and controlled with custom software to create clustered supercomputers with
capabilities on par if not exceeding traditional supercomputers. High end end users had
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estimated server counts including Google with 450K units (although that number was at least
three years old dating from 5-14-2009), Microsoft with 218K c.mid-2008, eBay with likely more
than 50K due to its 8.5PB data load, Hewlett Packard with 380K (Miller, 2009), and Facebook at
180K c.8-15-2012 (Miller, 2012).
Digitizing scanners and digital cameras produced digital still images from object views.
Consumer models over time featured improved resolutions to equal or surpass 35mm
photography at 13.3-20 megapixels per photo with faster digitizing times while dropping in
price. Both means required users to manage increasingly large file sizes and the increasing
number of images easily being produced. Other emerging digital camera technology featured
multiple lenses per device, multiple simultaneous view focuses, and multi-gigapixel file sizes.
Digital video cameras were likewise developed to mimic motion picture cameras.
Initially used for broadcast television productions, they evolved into more portable units and
incorporated recording live video streams to various media types in analog and digital formats.
Technological improvements included higher resolutions, faster frame/second rates, more
individual recorded colors, and connectivity to data networks where video was available as a file,
played from the file source upon demand, or able to be viewed live. Digital video was displayed
in devices including large screen displays, multiple individual displays forming one screen, video
projectors, videoconferencing, videocameras, and video streaming.
End users were recording and sharing more events in their lives using various multimedia
digital devices, and increasingly doing so 24/7/365. Microsoft researcher Gordon Bell conducted
a MyLifeBits project to scan, capture, and log all personal data he generated in his daily life
since 2001, including websites he visited, photos and videos taken, documents written and read,
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telephone conversations, automatic photos taken with a SenseCam strung around his neck, and
music listened to (Leckart, 2009).
More data was being created by end users and their devices, with increasing amounts
requiring longer term storage particularly by commercial users for legal and regulatory reasons.
A 2010 IDC report (financed in part by storage systems provider EMC Corp.) said in 2010 the
volume of digital information created and duplicated in a year would reach 1.2ZB, and estimated
that the number of files to be managed would grow by a factor of 67 between 2009 and 2020.
IDC’s 2007 report predicted that the volume would reach 988EB by 2010, indicating that the
growth had exceeded their projections (Miller, 2010).
Google added new information to its estimated 900K servers c.2010 (Koomey, 2011) at
the rate of hundreds of thousands of GBs daily, and was increasing its capacity to index on the
order of 100PBs (Gohring, 2010). Google’s YouTube video sharing website expanded its
capability to host 4096x2304 pixel resolution (“4K”) videos, although users were warned that to
watch those videos they would require “ultra-fast high-speed broadband connections.” (Sarukkai,
2010). In 2010 the European Laboratory for Nuclear Research’s Large Hadron Collider particle
accelerator generated 1.25GB of data per second that was collected and distributed to researchers
worldwide through the LHC Computing Grid composed of more than 100K processors at 130
organizations in 34 countries (Ohio Supercomputer Center, 2010).
Videogame systems were utilizing custom hardware consoles essentially as powerful as
regular computers. Videogame titles were featuring increasingly sophisticated software to
generate extensive virtual worlds and simulations that required higher display resolutions,
multiple viewing dimensions, and faster rendering engines for better performances and to more
closely imitate reality.
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Social Networks evolved from the early CompuServe and former market leader MySpace
to current favorites Facebook and Google+ with hundreds of millions of users. The sites also
offered digital photo and video sharing services that required vast data storage and throughput
needs.
"Telepresence" can be defined as a virtual environment for users to experience being
fully present at a live real world location remote from one's own physical location, which could
further reduce the need for actual travel to those locations. Variants included advanced
videoconferencing with some systems using holographic 3-D displays and multipoint-tomultipoint connectivity, telecommuting, and telemedicine applications such as video
consultations between doctors and patients and remote surgery. Educational providers including
preschool-12, adult and higher education, and R&D efforts were likely to benefit from using
telepresence technologies.
As sophisticated systems get better and less expensive, the movement of highquality telepresence into the mainstream of education could have social, economic, and
pedagogical impact on students, faculty, and administrators. It promises to open new
kinds of shared instruction, as niche courses can be offered at associated institutions or at
main and satellite campuses simultaneously. Decreased costs and increased access to
facilities by various academic disciplines and campus groups have the potential to open
up new uses and new audiences.
Telepresence (could) merge with virtual worlds, resulting in a robust hybrid
system that can support avatars, mobile media, simulated environments, and other
augmented reality. Broader course offerings will be enabled as mobile telepresence
comes online. Students in criminology could join detectives at crime scenes, for
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example, without the risk of contaminating the area. Botany students might join curators
at botanical gardens in distant cities. Artists-in-virtual residence might demonstrate their
craft for students in their fields. The technology could see increased use in research,
perhaps incorporating teleoperation so that researchers at remote locations can
manipulate items in live-lab scenarios.
If only a few students in a department want to study an obscure language or
uncommon dialect, they might be able to join classes at partner colleges or universities
via telepresence or, where feasible, join native speakers. Similarly, the technology holds
promise for demonstrations in areas such as dance, drawing, and design, as well as
presentations in laboratories and kitchens. Mobile options could extend the audiences for
field studies, allowing those on-site in remote rainforests, botanical gardens, or
archeological digs to examine specimens and artifacts. Telepresence can be blended with
virtual or augmented reality in building and architecture courses where demonstrations of
techniques or explanations of the tensile strength of materials might take place in highdefinition virtual construction labs that accommodate both on-campus and remote
viewers.
Costs, particularly for high-end systems, can be an obstacle … institutions must
(also) ensure that adequate bandwidth is available. When lower-cost, high-performance
suites emerge that put telepresence systems in the hands of new types of users,
experimentation should yield novel uses and reveal even more vivid and compelling
learning engagements. (7 things you should know about … Telepresence, 2009).
The amount of throughput for some telepresence functions could require Tb/sec to Pb/sec rates.
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Direct Neural Interconnection technology is progressing in connecting living organisms’
brains and nervous systems together and/or to computers via wireline networking. Although in
its infancy, the amount of eventual throughput required will be enormous as larger brains are
successfully interconnected.
The developing fields of Quantum Computing will create new computers based upon
quantum physics using “qubits” instead of “1” and “0” bits for greatly improved processing
powers. The related field of Teleportation could enable remote “reproduction” of products.
Already the networking and routing needs for those applications were being anticipated.

Upstream Networks
End users were most likely interested in connecting their own devices and premise
networks to other nearby and remote end users possessing similar devices and networks to access
and share information and communications to (except in particular cases) avoid being “islands”
not networked to other end users. To do so, end users could acquire, construct, operate, and
maintain their own rights of way, infrastructure, and facilities, or they could subscribe to
telecommunication providers that specialized in distributing those services to end users.
Outsourcing various telecommunication functions to providers and third parties usually saved
end users in costs, expertise, responsibilities, etc., and did not require separate individual
networks connecting each end user desiring access to another select end user. Numerous types
of networks have since evolved and scaled to connect up to multitudes of end users with various
uses. Some of the high end academic, research, and governmental networks included National
Research And Education Networks, the Internet, Internet2, National LambdaRail, TeraGrid, U.S.
Unified Community Anchor Network. Such high capacity networks were considered to be
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strategic infrastructure, intended to contribute to high and sustainable economic growth and to
core aspects of human development (N. Anderson, 2009).
Although the Internet was increasingly multi-purposed, other networks were dedicated
more to entertainment services. Disney/ESPN began streaming live and stored content online,
which then evolved into a model where it requested ISPs to subsidize select “value added” online
programming provision from ISP subscription fees whether the ISPs’ subscribers viewed the
programming or not, else the ISPs were blocked from accessing those feeds. ESPN also
provided Microsoft’s video game console Xbox 360 with a free ESPN3 stream to Xbox users
that also subscribed to its value added membership service Xbox Live (Stetler, 2010). The
model was similar to the cable and satellite television models where a portion of subscribers’
fees went to each channel carried by the distributor, with some content providers demanding
higher fees than others. Netflix also distributed various information via physical media,
downloading, and online streaming to end users available for viewing on a multitude of device
types.
Videogame consoles and computers running videogames were increasingly reliant upon
faster speed Internet and networking with fewer delays to interconnect game servers and other
game players. Some game providers’ facilities required server farms to keep up with the
increasingly fast processing and throughput demands with minimal delays to achieve seamless,
life-like play. In addition to playing games, Sony also contracted with Major League Baseball’s
live video streaming service viewable on its PlayStation 3 console (Stetler, 2010).
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Telecommunication Market Issues
U.S.-based telephony and cable systems started with numerous providers that eventually
consolidated into fewer providers per market while being granted sanctions by governments as
natural utilities. Although the AT&T breakup resulted in new entrants into the long distance
market segment, the local exchange market monopolies were essentially preserved with local
system and service provision continued by regional Bell Operating Companies. Those RBOCs
eventually reconsolidated horizontally and vertically by acquiring certain distressed long
distance providers in that market. The market effects of consolidation then re-emerged. “At the
physical layer, the transition to broadband has been accompanied by a more concentrated market
structure for physical wires and connections, and less regulation of the degree to which owners
can control the flow of information on their networks.” (Benkler, 2006, pp.24-25). The
following issues briefly examined in this section were considered to be significant problems in
the local and last mile telecommunications markets, some of which can be attributed directly to
those markets’ reconsolidation.

Wireline Telecommunication Market Goals
Maslow proposed a personal needs hierarchy (Maslow, 1943). The needs to manually
move and communicate should qualify as “Physiological Needs - Other Physical Activities”, and
immediately thereafter should also be required the needs of technology-assisted mobility
(transportation) and technology-assisted communications (telecommunications). Any lack of the
more basic needs would require attention moreso than the other needs such as
telecommunications, except that technology and technology-enhanced distribution is
increasingly aiding the other basic needs. Contemporary economies, governments, and societies
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would most likely cease to function without the availability of distribution systems, thereby
greatly affecting personal needs. Distribution services (in particular access to the Internet) were
being increasingly regarded as end users’ inherent rights. If individuals, businesses,
governments, organizations, etc., sought to continue their existences and advance their positions
in respective market sectors, their basic needs must be attained and their growth continued.
Establishing goals could assist with those needs and desires.
A primary goal should be perfect competition. “The textbook case of perfect competition is an
ideal model of a competitive market.” (International Telecommunication Union, 2011).
Mathiessen stated, “The (perfect market economy model) demonstrates that what is good for
providers and consumers is also good for society.” (Mathiessen, 2011). However, perfect
markets and perfect competition in reality are obviously not achievable. “Perfect competition
rarely (if ever) occurs in practice. It is more an ideal than a market reality, and so is not useful as
a standard for analyzing the performance of real world markets.” (International
Telecommunication Union, 2011) However, can the necessary conditions to achieve a perfect
market also be used as the basis to achieve a more perfect telecommunications market or more
closely approximate one?
MIT researcher and onetime Internet chief protocol architect David D. Clark said if a new
Internet architecture is desired, the job must start with the setting of goals. "My goal in calling
for a fresh design is to free our minds from the current constraints, so we can envision a different
future. The reason I stress this is that the Internet is so big, and so successful, that it seems like a
fool's errand to send someone off to invent a different one." He said whether the end result
would be a whole new architecture - or just an effective set of changes to the existing one - may
not matter in the end. Given how entrenched the Internet (structure) was, the effort would have
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succeeded if it at least got the research community working toward common goals and helped
"impose creep in the right direction." (Talbot, 2005). Thus to help achieve a perfect market,
restructuring the market and its participants may be a solution.

Economic and Financial Issues
A number of significant economic and financial issues were involved in the provision of
telecommunication systems and services in the local and last mile markets.

Subsidized Business Models
Some providers competed in markets against other providers that were using crosssubsidized, advertising, loss-leader, and similar business models to absorb service provision
costs and shift them to their other provided products and services. A typical example included
free wireless Internet provided by restaurants, airports, and other establishments as a public,
value-added service for the customers of their core business. Such competition was not
“standardized” – fair and equally head-to-head per service – and involved the virtual bundling of
two or more services by combining the prices. Other for-profit providers in the same market
were thus placed at significant competitive disadvantages against those subsidized models,
particularly when the competitor was better financed or more diversified to handle loss leaders,
unless they too engaged in similar practices.
Anderson posed that government taxation was a type of subsidization that resulted in a
“Free” business model. “As the nation-state emerged in the 17th century, so the notion of
progressive taxation, by which the rich gave more so the poor could pay less and receive services
for free. This establishment of government institutions to serve the people created a special kind
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of Free: You may not pay for government services yourself, but society at large does, and you
may never know exactly which of your own tax dollars come back to you directly." (C.
Anderson, 2009, p.37). He then noted such subsidization techniques could reduce product and
service prices significantly if not to zero, while those costs could be transferred and assessed
elsewhere. “The most common of the economies built around Free is the three-party system.
Here a third party pays to participate in a market created by a free exchange between the first two
parties.” (C. Anderson, p.24). “Economists call such models ‘two-sided markets,’ because there
are two distinct user groups who synergistically support each other: Advertisers pay for media to
reach consumers, who in turn support advertisers. Consumers ultimately pay, but only indirectly
through the higher prices on products due to their marketing costs.” (C. Anderson, p.25). “From
the point of view of the monetary economy it all looks free - indeed, it looks like unfair
competition - but that says more about our short-sighted ways of measuring value than it does
about the worth of what's created.” (C. Anderson, p.27). “Today, we know that the most
disruptive way to enter a market is to vaporize the economics of existing business models.
Charge nothing for a product that the incumbents depend on for their profits. The world will
beat a path to your door and you can then sell them something else. Just look at free longdistance calling with mobile phones, which decimated the fixed line long-distance business, or
think what free classifieds do to newspapers." (C. Anderson, p.43). He then advised providers
that “Sooner or later you will compete with free. Whether through cross-subsidies or software,
somebody in your business is going to find a way to give away what you charge for. It may not
be exactly the same thing, but the price discount of 100% may matter more.” (C. Anderson,
p.242).
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Other subsidization models included service and content providers injecting advertising
and similar techniques into data traffic, resulting in increased throughput on networks and
requiring more network equipment to adequately handle loads. Likewise some providers were
analyzing traffic (i.e., deep packet inspection) for advertising and subsidization purposes,
creating privacy concerns especially when such observations were unbeknownst to end users.

End User Creamskimming
Wholesale providers' strategies had been to concentrate service provision primarily for
more highly capitalized, high-end end users vs. lower capitalized middle- and smaller-end end
users, thus "creamskimming" customers. According to Metcalfe's Law, providers should want as
many end user subscribers (connections) as possible to increase the overall value of the network.
In reality it seems those providers adhered to Odlyzko and Tilly’s strategy (Odlyzko & Tilly,
2005), and instead wanted as many higher-end end user subscribers as possible so as to charge
them premium rates, thus skewing the overall network value and usefulness away from lowerend end users. Commercialized urban, populated, and wealthy areas were also more likely to
have access and service prioritization than did depressed urban, rural, sparsely populated, and
marginal areas had, again to reduce the risk of uncertain revenue returns. These access and
service redlining decisions in turn hindered rural areas' economic retention and development
efforts vs. local, regional, and global competition in other market segments, cost of living
improvements, and their potential long-term survival.
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Barriers to Entry
Traditionally the arguments against more perfect competition centered on barriers to
market entry including the significant costs for competitors constructing their own local and last
mile systems from scratch. “Building (wireline) networks … requires large fixed and sunk
investments. Consequently, the industry will probably always have a relatively small number of
facilities-based competitors. Bringing down the cost of entry for facilities-based wireline
services may encourage new competitors to enter in a few areas, but it is unlikely to create
several new facilities-based entrants competing across broad geographic areas.” (U.S. Federal
Communications Commission, 2009, p.36). If every (provider) has to dig its own holes, the
price of entry is too high and competition falters; over time, innovation lags, and the goal of
broader and better access suffers (Benkler, 2010). The idea is that the cost of replicating the
underlying physical plant: digging trenches, laying ducts, pulling copper/cable/fiber to each and
every home is enormous; it therefore deters competitors from entering the market in broadband
services (Benkler, 2009, pp.11-12). However a competitor better capitalized to absorb the initial
losses or using a cross-subsidization model could potentially implement a system and
successfully compete in an established market.

Multiple Telecommunication Markets Provision
If a provider has an advantage in or has cornered one market segment, a possibility exists
for it to take advantage of or corner another market segment, with increasing potential effects to
end users. Level 3 Communications was a competitive provider in the long distance, Tier I ISP,
and city-wide fiber networking markets. Its CEO James Q. Crowe hinted though that Level 3
could look to acquire providers with large urban area local networks. "Our feeling is we're a
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logical consolidator. If you own just long distance and you don't own local you're going to have
trouble managing your costs." (Verma, 2010). Conversely as mentioned, some local providers
have acquired upstream providers (such as Verizon buying MCI Inc.) for increased vertical
integration.

Identifying Telecommunication Market Type Problems
As discussed, telecommunication markets may have providers (i.e., Served Markets) or
may not (i.e., Unserved Markets). Served Markets may be considered Under-Served, Partiallyor Quasi-Served, or Fully-Served based upon the number of active providers in a market. UnderServed and Quasi-Served Markets may be restricted due to oligopolies, duopolies, or monopolies
per the provided modes and/or services (i.e., an LEC and cable provider both offering high speed
Internet service). Fully-Served Markets may exist if there are competitive providers for all
available modes and services.

Provision Taxation
Real and personal property taxation regulations and assessments upon providers’ systems
varied in each of the U.S. states and often by local governments for system and service
provision. A taxation issue arose when local governments decided to provide systems and
services in competition to private sector providers. Normally government infrastructure
providers were exempt from taxes, such as for streets. Some legislation was being proposed and
enacted to force local governments to likewise be liable for telecommunication provision taxes.
However would those governments also have to pay taxes if they provided only ROW,
infrastructure, and certain facilities, but opened up their systems to one or more providers to
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offer service competitively without competing against them for service provision? In a related
railroad industry model, some rail lines were publicly owned, but their government owners did
not desire to provide carriage service on them, so they franchised the service provision to private
railroad companies. Often the agreements were “net leases”, where the railroad companies also
assumed all taxes, liability, maintenance, and other rail line responsibilities. Note that even
though the rail line was public, taxes were still being assessed against it. Was this because the
line was franchised (quasi-privatized) to a sole private carrier – in essence a governmentsanctioned monopoly for a public utility common carrier? Alternatively if the rail line was selfadministered by the government for equal access to and use by all railroad companies and other
qualified users, should all users instead be considered competitive “private carriers” or “for-hire
carriers” without the government provider nor the line users being assessed taxes, just like
private- and for-hire truck carriers did not pay public utility real and personal property taxes for
using public roads? Although the business and governance model of a local and last mile
telecommunications system could be changed to one where a government provided the system
and multiple providers (but not the government) offered competitive service over the system to
end users, taxation authorities (and their respective legislative bodies) might first have to revise
the tax codes to eliminate real and personal taxes on such a system construct to ensure similar
modal taxation equality.

Provision Pricing
Service pricing depended largely upon the amount of competition in the
telecommunications markets, with those markets being more competitive likely to have lower
prices than those that were less competitive. “Competition” was also dependent upon the
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amount of competition in competing telecommunication modes (i.e., cable vs. DSL) vs.
competition in the same mode (i.e., multiple providers equally using a shared fiber optic system).
Who owned the system in either case – be it a private sector provider, government provider, PPP,
etc., and whether they assessed third party providers access leases that ranged among for-profit,
non-profit, or subsidized models ultimately resulted in varying pricing to end users.
Governments subsidized some system provision and/or service provision also creating pricing
inequalities particularly if select providers received the subsidies vs. all providers in a market.
Even then the true price for provision would have been shadowed and cross-subsidized by other
government enterprises, funds, taxes, etc., and potentially could have been hard to “de-bundle”
and account for especially if those other budgets became tight.

Telecommunications Market Competition
The FCC believed “competition is crucial for promoting consumer welfare and spurring
innovation and investment in broadband access networks. Competition provides consumers the
benefits of choice, better service and lower prices.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission,
2009, p.36) Benkler discussed the evolving philosophy of telecommunications market
competition.
In the U.S., AT&T became a de facto monopoly in the second decade of the
century. The theory throughout this period was one of natural monopoly. Because the
fixed investments necessary to create a telecommunications network were so high, while
the marginal costs to serve each subscriber over time relatively lower, and because it was
valuable to subscribers to be connected to all other subscribers, it was thought to be most
efficient to have a single network connect everyone, and then subject the carrier to
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regulation to assure that it would not abuse this monopoly by charging high prices for
poor service.
By the end of the twentieth century this model was globally seen as a failure. The
state-run telecommunications carriers were seen as inefficient and bloated. In the U.S.,
the Bell System repeatedly outwitted the FCC and the Department of Justice, preventing
competitors from entering into competitive lines of business that depended on the core,
hard-to-replicate facilities of the local copper loop, and continued to capture rents that, in
theory, should have been regulated away (Benkler, 2009, pp. 80-81).
Regarding international competition, the ITU noted “In a number of countries, the
Internet market, and particularly the backbone infrastructure and international gateway, remain
under the monopoly of the incumbent telecommunication operator. Limited competition and
scarce international Internet bandwidth tend to keep prices for Internet access high and often
unaffordable in the area of fixed broadband access.” (International Telecommunication Union,
2010, p.201). Domestically, the FCC reported “The U.S. market structure is relatively unique in
that (end users) in most parts of the country have been able to choose from two wireline,
facilities-based broadband platforms. Approximately 4% of residential end users units were in
areas with three wireline providers, 78% had access to two wireline providers, about 13% had
access to a single wireline provider, and 5% had no wireline provider, although rural areas were
less likely to have access to more than one wireline broadband provider than other areas. In
general, broadband subscribers appear to have benefited from the presence of multiple
providers.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.37). However Benkler
responded, “(High speed service) affordability is the hard part - because there is no competition
pushing down prices.” (Benkler, 2010).
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Telecommunication Service Issues
“The delirious chaos of the open Web was an adolescent phase subsidized by industrial
giants groping their way in a new world. Now they’re doing what industrialists do best - finding
choke points. And by the looks of it, we’re loving it.” (Anderson & Wolff, 2010). A number of
these real and arbitrary “choke points” often resulted in significant service issues.

Provider Control Over Systems and Services
The U.S. Supreme Court once ruled that providers’ networks are private property, and as
such those providers were entitled to control over their systems and services. Benkler noted,
“Existing local (incumbent providers) argue that they deserve control over a market because
they’ve sunk enormous amounts of money into digging trenches and laying cables for their
telecommunications network. And to be fair, it is expensive.” (Benkler, 2010). Government
regulation of sanctioned natural utilities was thus required as a primary means to control market
prices in lieu of competitors providing their own separate equivalent mode systems and services.

Out-of-Routing
One potential practice of provider control was indirect traffic “out-of-routing”, which
could cost end users more for the additional route mileages, additional equipment utilization,
potentially more delays, and increased contingency risks. Sometimes ISPs did not exchange
traffic directly with their competitors because of tariffs, pricing anomalies, or corporate politics,
etc., and instead interchanged traffic with other ISPs in “Tromboning” routing arrangements
where traffic between two cites in one country flowed (often out-of-route) through other nations’
routers (Rerouting the web, 2008).
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Similarly, railroads found that controlling traffic routing could be used for network and
equipment rationalization, prioritization of certain services, and increased pricing power. In the
case of the former Pittsburgh-St. Louis “Panhandle” main rail line, Conrail c.1983 decided to
consolidate its various main rail lines west of Pittsburgh and Buffalo onto only a few remaining
routes, excluding the Panhandle’s route. Direct Pittsburgh-Mingo Jct., OH Panhandle traffic was
first re-routed to Pittsburgh-Rochester, PA-Mingo Jct., and the bypassed former main line
segment from near Pittsburgh-Weirton, WV was later liquidated. Conrail diminished and
eliminated 99.8% of the Panhandle’s remaining traffic between Pittsburgh-Columbus by rerouting it to its Pittsburgh-Rochester-Crestline, OH-Columbus line, or allowing truckers to carry
it via adjacent roads and highways (including the now congested I-70) to help them justify
abandonment to the U.S. ICC. Conrail also considered abandoning that Alliance, OH-Chicago
“Ft. Wayne Line” route, and tried shifting the Panhandle’s and Ft. Wayne Line’s traffic to the
even longer Pittsburgh-Cleveland-Columbus and Pittsburgh-Cleveland-Chicago routes. The
direct Pittsburgh-St. Louis route was ultimately replaced with the much less efficient PittsburghCleveland-Indianapolis-St. Louis route, leaving the Pittsburgh-Columbus-Indianapolis corridors
largely unserved by intercity rail for the first time since the U.S. Reconstruction era. Conrail
officials apparently admitted later their rationalizations and abandonments were mistakes, but the
damage to the rail network and the high costs to replace it lingered on even after Conrail was
split up and acquired by CSX and Norfolk Southern.

Telecommunication System Technical Issues
A number of technical issues were involved with the provision of ROWs, infrastructure,
and certain facilities for local and last mile telecommunications systems.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

76

Peering Interconnections
Although numerous networks, particularly the Internet, consisted of interconnected
networks, the terms and conditions for interconnections were not always equivalent. Larger
providers could discriminate against smaller providers, forcing them to seek other networks and
routes for their traffic. The FCC recognized the problem, but had little authority to regulate
peering.
The FCC should clarify interconnection rights and obligations and encourage the
shift to IP-to-IP interconnection where efficient. For consumers to have a choice of
service providers, competitive carriers need to be able to interconnect their networks with
incumbent providers. Basic interconnection regulations, which ensure that a consumer is
able to make and receive calls to virtually anyone else with a telephone, regardless of
service provider, network configuration or location, have been a central tenet of
telecommunications regulatory policy for over a century. For competition to thrive, the
principle of interconnection - in which customers of one service provider can
communicate with customers of another—needs to be maintained. There is evidence that
some rural incumbent carriers are resisting interconnection with competitive
telecommunications carriers, claiming that they have no basic obligation to negotiate
interconnection agreements. In particular, the FCC should confirm that all
telecommunications carriers, including rural carriers, have a duty to interconnect their
networks (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.49).
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Last Mile Segments
The “last mile” - typically the network segment from a provider’s central network office
in the local market to an end user’s premise - was an example of necessary provider
intermediation because in most cases end users were not located immediately adjacent to the
other intended end user or to the provider’s main network switching equipment. Thus an
additional link was required to “remotely” connect end users to a provider on one end of a route,
and from a provider to the intended end user on the other end of the route.
In some cases the last mile segment could become a “bottleneck” in end users’ supply
chains, WANs, etc., especially if the provider’s network equipment was inferior or inefficient
compared to the end users’ own equipment. Larger end users were increasingly concerned with
those bottlenecks that restricted last mile throughputs to their connecting end users. “Google is
also concerned about the speed limitations imposed by wires that run to the home … that would
deliver Internet content to residential subscribers at speeds of 1Gb/sec.” (Heinrich, 2010). The
consensus of opinions has discouraged multiple competitive intra-modal systems in a market as
being duplicative and inefficient vs. a single system owned and operated by a natural utility
sanctioned monopoly provider. Somewhat better-served markets had separate multi-modal last
mile systems such as for both telephony and cable. However each of these modes were often
still monopolized, and although those markets may have had multi-modal duopolistic
competition for say Internet, it was usually not enough to persuade the providers to continuously
upgrade their network equipment to help eliminate the throughput bottlenecks. Competitors with
potentially better network technologies seeking access to incumbent providers’ local market
systems for last mile access to end users (without building their own last mile systems) may have
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also experienced bottlenecks if the providers’ systems were not able to properly accommodate
the better equipment.

System Rationalization
System Rationalization was a strategy where a provider abandoned, spun off, or
liquidated various unwanted or inefficient portions of its system such as rights of way,
infrastructure, and/or certain facilities. Providers often eliminated select duplicated and
overlapping elements especially after mergers and acquisitions with other providers to increase
their overall efficiencies and reduce overhead, labor, costs, etc. System liquidations could
eliminate potential future competition from the provider’s former service area thus affecting end
users' choices of providers, reducing or restricting services, or losing all access to any area
systems. End users could then face workarounds including the need to redefine their business
models, relocate to served areas with more competitive markets and sufficient services, construct
and administer their own systems to network traffic with other remaining providers, or cease
business altogether.

End User Use Empowerment
Some end users were installing their own miniature wireline systems and last miles to
other adjacent end users, just as some higher end end users were constructing whole end-to-end
WANs independent from existing private providers’ systems. Benkler noted the impetus.
The combination of observations regarding market concentration and an
understanding of the importance of a networked public sphere to democratic societies
suggests that a policy intervention is possible and desirable. The relevant intervention is
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to permit substantial segments of the core common infrastructure - the basic physical
transport layer of wireless or fiber and the software and standards that run
communications - to be produced and provisioned by users and managed as a commons
(Benkler, 2006, p.241).
My point here … is to highlight the implications of the emergence of a last mile
that is owned by no one in particular, and is the product of cooperation among neighbors
in the form of, “I’ll carry your bits if you carry mine.” At the simplest level, neighbors
could access locally relevant information directly, over a wide-area network. More
significant, the fact that users in a locality co-produced their own last-mile infrastructure
would allow commercial Internet providers to set up Internet points of presence anywhere
within the “cloud” of the locale. The last mile would be provided not by these competing
Internet service providers, but by the cooperative efforts of the residents of local
neighborhoods. Competitors in providing the middle mile could emerge, in a way that
they cannot if they must first lay their own last mile all the way to each home. The users,
rather than the middle-mile providers, shall have paid the capital cost of producing the
local transmission system - their own cooperative radios. The presence of a commonsbased, co-produced last mile alongside the proprietary broadband network eliminates the
last mile as a bottleneck for control over who speaks, with what degree of ease, and with
what types of production values and interactivity (Benkler, 2006, p.404).

Government Involvement in Telecommunication Markets
The ITU once called for greater government involvement in telecommunications markets,
“In order to make services more affordable and increase the spread of the Internet and
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broadband, governments need to encourage greater market liberalization in the Internet market,
and ensure particularly facilities-based competition.” (International Telecommunication Union,
2010, p.25). Government involvement evolved and occurred in various forms.

Government Agency WANs
Most government agencies and institutions as end users created and utilized their own
WANs for internal MIS/IT needs, and found that their proper utilization could assist with
additional missions, including economic development, societal well being, education, and
helping to address the other needs listed in Maslow's needs chart. Such WANs were typically
dedicated to production and services (in this case government administration functions), and if so
desired could interface with public end users at certain designated points via websites and other
portals, while keeping general and unauthorized end users out of certain designated areas. In
many cases, Internet service was also provided on the same WANs.
Thus with telecommunications technology being utilized by other end users for various
purposes, with certain economic and societal problems being traced to issues within the local and
last mile telecommunications markets, and with prodding from networking and equipment
producers to multi-purpose their products beyond in-house MIS/IT (and in return increasing
those producers' profits), governments were not surprisingly tempted to additionally provide
external telecommunication systems and services as competitive providers. For example, most
municipalities owned and administered their own rights of way to provide government
enterprises including streets and sidewalks. Some of those municipalities providing electric
power additionally owned electric poles located upon their rights of way, and public power
providers were increasingly encouraged to offer MAN provision using those poles to co-host
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aerial MAN lines. “As of October 2009, there were 57 fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) municipal
deployments, either in operation or actively being built, in 85 towns and cities in the U.S. These
deployments collectively serve 3.4% of the FTTP subscribers in North America.” (U.S. Federal
Communications Commission, 2009, p.153). In those situations, private telecommunication
providers desiring to serve the municipal markets had to lease public right of way easements to
host their infrastructures upon, and if they did not construct their own poles they had to lease
access upon the municipality’s poles. Issues occurred if the municipalities charged private
providers higher pole access rates than they charged their own telecommunication provision
enterprises, with the advantage that providers were more willing to pay those lease rates than
construct and administer their own new support infrastructures. Some municipalities bundled
and cross-subsidized their electric and telecommunication enterprises (and possibly the street
enterprises that were responsible for maintaining the rights of way), which likely resulted in
unfair competition vs. private providers.
However after the Nixon, Attorney General Of Missouri v. Missouri Municipal League,
et al. (Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 2004) case, numerous states restricted or prohibited
political subdivisions from provision (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2009, p.153).
The FCC thus recommended that Congress should authorize political subdivisions to provide
systems and services, particularly if “local entities … decide to offer services when no providers
exist that meet local needs. These local entities do so only after trying to work with established
carriers to meet local needs. In the absence of (government subsidies to private providers), they
should have the right to move forward and build networks that serve their constituents as they
deem appropriate.” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, p.153).
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University of Wisconsin Internet Provision.
A number of universities utilizing Internet services were also ISPs to their users, other
state and local agencies, and in certain cases to the public, where they might have competed
against private providers. WiscNet was a non-profit state-level spinoff from CSNET - an
affordable IP-based infrastructure that linked to computer science departments across the U.S. and contracted with UW's Division of Informational Technology to administer its system.
WiscNet received additional NSF grants to extend Internet provision to all WI colleges,
universities, 75% of all state school districts, 95% of all state libraries, and to local governments.
Like CSNET, WiscNet became a model for other educational systems across the country, for
example in Ohio where Ohio State University’s Ohio Supercomputer Center was similarly a
WAN provider and ISP for state and local agencies, with the potential to offer ISP to the public.
In 10-2010, the Wisconsin State Telecommunications Association denounced a UW plan
to use federal stimulus funds to expand WiscNet's presence in four WI communities as
competitors to the incumbent private sector providers. WSTA Executive Director William
Esbeck said, “A duplicate network will increase costs for everyone and impact the ability of local
telecommunications providers to invest in their communities. With scarce state resources, do we
really need UW using government money to stifle private sector investment and threaten local
jobs and businesses? UW does not belong in the telecommunications business.” WI Statute
§16.972(2)(a) (2011) required that no state agency:
… may offer, resell, or provide telecommunications services, including data and voice
over Internet services, that are available from a private telecommunications carrier to the
general public or to any other public or private entity.
However §16.972(2)(b) (2011) was an exception to (a) as departments could:
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… provide such computer services and telecommunications services to local
governmental units and the broadcasting corporation and provide such
telecommunications services to qualified private schools, tribal schools, postsecondary
institutions, museums, and zoos, as the department considers to be appropriate and as the
department can efficiently and economically provide.
WSTA advocated proposed WI state legislation containing the following positions.
•

Required that WiscNet separate itself from the UW Division of Information Technology.

•

Barred WiscNet from accepting any funds from UW, including $1.4M for FY 2012-13.

•

Prohibited UW from accepting National Telecommunications Information Agency service
provision stimulus grants.

•

Prohibited UW from joining with any entity that offered service to the general public.

•

Prevented the WI Board of Regents or UW System from providing telecommunications
services “that are available from a private telecommunications carrier to the general public or
to any other private entity” to anyone except the UW system itself.

•

Prohibited the UW System from “becoming or remaining a member, shareholder, or partner”
with any entity that “offers, resells, or provides telecommunications services to members of
the general public.”

•

Forced WiscNet clients to instead use Badgernet - WI's state WAN primarily provided by
AT&T.
State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Evers said, “If our schools and libraries

must use other Internet providers, most will pay at least 2-3 times more than what WiscNet now
charges.” UW responded to the "duplication-of-services" charge by stating that 100Mb/sec
BadgerNet service was $6K per month, and 1Gb/sec was $49.5K per month – “still … too high.”
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Unlike WiscNet, clients would have been charged for their throughput use under BadgerNet.
UW Chief Information Officer Ed Meachen said WiscNet cost the UW system $2M annually vs.
BadgerNet’s comparative $8M. In addition, the higher service charges would have made UW’s
access to Internet2 unaffordable (Lasar, 2011).

Government System Provision
van Schewick said an alternative solution (vs. waiting for providers to roll out advanced
telecommunication networks) may be to think about public provision of infrastructure (van
Schewick, 2010, p.370). Wyckoff elaborated on a similar public infrastructure provision
proposal for U.S. rail lines during the Penn Central bankruptcy crisis - decoupling track
ownership (the predominantly fixed-cost portion of railroading) from operating companies
(Wyckoff, 1976, p.128) – that could possibly be emulated for certain telecommunications
systems and services.
I propose that the federal government undertake the project to purchase major
segments of railroad track and right of way for the purpose of developing a modern, highspeed railroad track system for public use. This would mean the purchase of some of the
existing track and right of way, although that is not mandatory. The railroad would be
allowed to continue to own and operate as a private right of way any of its track.
Similarly, the federal system would not be obligated to buy undesirable track. The
railroads would be responsible for development of classification yards and track
connecting their own roads [rail networks] with the federal track system. Traffic control
through signaling systems would be provided by federal traffic controllers in a role
similar to that of the air traffic controllers of the FAA (Wyckoff, 1976, p.130). What I
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am considering under this alternative is not simply the old proposition of the passive
purchase of the roadbed [sic, Wyckoff here refers to roadbed collectively being the right
of way and track vs. the industry’s technical term for a certain portion of the earthwork
supporting the tracks] as a means of creating a capital infusion for sick railroads. (The
public tracks) would be made available to private carriers, as well as authorized for-hire
carriers as alternative routes of convenience (Wyckoff, p.129).
Wyckoff compared the required investments in rail rights of way and infrastructure vs.
those for carriage operations.
The greatest concern to me in examining the nature of the railroad management
task is the massive fixed cost associated with track ownership and maintenance. In many
respects, it is the ownership, construction, and maintenance of private rights of way by
railroads that make them natural monopolies and drive them towards increasingly larger,
but less manageable, enterprises (Wyckoff, 1976, p.130). It is relatively easier for
railroads to attract capital for rolling stock [i.e., rail vehicles] than for improvement of
roadbed. Given the present financial conditions of many railroads that most need track
improvement, a lender is wise to demand the security of the pledge of easily retrieved
property. The minimum security might be something that the lender can physically take
possession of and make alternative use of in case of the failure of the lendee. Rolling
stock certainly meets this requirement much better than improvements in roadbed. It is
questionable whether a prudent private lender would consider track improvement as a
reasonable risk at any interest rate without adequate guarantees from the federal
government (Wyckoff, p.129).
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He then discussed the market advantages of separation vs. right of way and infrastructure
+ carriage provision.
Once the ownership of the right of way is separated from the operations, it
appears that many markets can support several competitors because of the reduced fixed
costs. The best way to reduce the variable costs of a short-haul carrier are to reduce its
volume of transactions. The best way to reduce the costs of the long-haul carrier is to
increase its freight density. Both are possible once railroading is shifted from a fixedcost-oriented to a variable-cost-oriented business. Charges for the use of this track
system would be made on a user-tax basis, again shifting fixed costs of railroading into
variable costs, more like the costs structure of the motor [commercial trucking] carriers.
As it would be a government-provided facility, it makes sense for several operators to use
it jointly. In fact, there are several instances in which railroads are already exchanging
trackage rights to each other [i.e., line and facilities leasing in telecommunications]
(Wyckoff, 1976, p.130).
By creating a public track system, there is the opportunity to salvage the concept
of private enterprise in the operation of for-hire transportation. Certainly many railroads
do need cash inflow to supply working capital, rolling stock, and improvement of
classification and assembly yards. The purchase of some portions of the track to resupply it to the railroads in an improved condition on a pay-as-you-go basis would
generate necessary cash flow. This will also secure assets for the government in the
event the railroads do eventually fail (Wyckoff, p.131).
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Such railroad company failures often saw the abandonment of their rights of way and tracks,
resulting in constricting the scale of the overall rail network. Wyckoff then compared
transportation business and governance models.
Such a system would mirror the concept of the well-designed, safe, high-speed,
super-highway system (Wyckoff, 1976, p.129). This proposal of nationalization of tracks
is certainly preferable to nationalization of railroads, including tracks and operating
companies. The federal government has demonstrated greater competence as a developer
and provider of facilities than as a manager of operating organizations (Wyckoff, p.130).
Also, the government has had success in such development projects that were too large
an undertaking for any single firm or group of firms in the private sector. The Federal
Highway System is a good case in point. Other examples of the skill of the federal
government in providing transportation facilities that are then used by firms in the private
sector and providing private and for-hire transportation are the federal airways and inland
waterways. The record of the government acting as cashier for and developer of large
transportation facilities has been excellent (Wyckoff, p.131).
Wyckoff concluded noting the proposal’s increased potential for competition.
With the separation of the track ownership and operating company ownership, the
barriers of entry for the protection of the existing natural monopolies are no longer as
justified. So this may only be a disadvantage to the existing business entities that
certainly would like to perpetuate themselves (Wyckoff, 1976, pp.132-133).
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Mixed Economies
As listed previously, government agencies had already engaged in other distribution
enterprises. Contentions occurred when government agencies used their WANs and network
equipment to likewise enter telecommunication markets and provide various services as
"enterprises", thereby creating mixed economies. Government agencies could not tolerate
unserved markets, which invited their intervention and provision. Market deficiencies in earlier
U.S. history were addressed with government agency-sponsored rural electrical and “good
roads” programs. For under-served and quasi-served markets affected by market cornering,
oligopolies, duopolies, or monopolies, government agencies could decide to compete against
incumbent providers for telecommunication service provision, even if those providers were
franchised. A quasi-served market competition scenario might have involved a government
public MAN offering high speed Internet vs. an ISP offering dial-up speed Internet via an LEC's
telephone system. Fully-served markets ideally would not have required government
intervention, yet their market entry was always a reserved option with certain inherent
advantages governments. Those advantages would most likely have achieved governments’
missions and market goals, albeit enjoying unfair market competition. While governments could
enter a telecommunications market to provide a sole service to achieve their missions and goals,
they risked becoming more Socialistic when they additionally expanded into multiple markets
and offered converged service packages.

Government Enterprise Cross-Subsidization
Some governments providing their own telecommunication systems financed them with
cross-subsidizations from other enterprises. Dover, OH and Provo, UT as to be discussed later in
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further detail bundled their telecommunication systems into their electrical power system
enterprises to cross-subsidize their construction, financing, debt ratings, and risks. Electric
power systems and telecommunication systems were technically distinct modes of distribution,
as much as say municipal water/sewer departments were from municipal street departments.
Dover and Provo end users subscribing to private telecommunication providers nonetheless
subsidized the public MANs with their public power subscriptions, and public power users not
subscribing to any telecommunication services were still subsidizing the MANs. In Dover since
only select commercial end users were being offered MAN service, all other electric end users
were subsidizing them. When Provo's telecommunication enterprise bonds were scheduled for
retirement, the excess revenues thereafter were to be transferred to their general fund vs. being
dedicated to system cost reductions, system upgrades, contingency funds, redundant routes, etc.
The general fund was used to cross-subsidize other municipal enterprises, services, and
entitlement programs, thereby increasing their reliance upon the MAN enterprise's success and
revenue generation. Dover's contingency plan in case of catastrophic systemwide line breaks
was to ask for technical assistance from the City of Wadsworth, located 43 miles away with a
minimum 75 minute drive time (pending good weather conditions including through secondary
back roads). Their plan could be considered another type of cross-subsidization with another
municipality, as both were members of AMP-Ohio, an organization acting as a cooperative/wholesaler/lobbyist for member public power municipalities.
If governments that desired becoming competitive providers in their local
telecommunications markets had established them as separate independent enterprises, bond
counsels may have recommended against those projects if incumbent private providers were
already present in and serving local markets; thus bundling the systems under the public power
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or other existing municipal enterprises was most likely necessary to avoid counsels’ negative
opinions and credit ratings. Further risks were possible with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Nixon v.
Missouri Municipal League ruling (Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 2004) that authorized
states to prohibit their political subdivisions from public provision, which if enacted by states
and enforced upon municipalities with existing MANs might force those enterprises to cease
provision. Further effects could include the municipality privatizing their systems, retiring any
remaining system construction debts from other enterprises, default risks, state and/or federal
bailouts, etc. An opinion requested from the State of Ohio Auditor by this author regarding their
recognition of municipal electric power and telecommunication systems being considered
distinct enterprises with separate independent funds has to date gone unanswered.

Government Oversight of Telecommunications Markets
U.S. Congressional, FCC, and state telecommunications policies were in a constant flux
of being enacted, revised, and overturned by courts ad nauseam. van Schewick noted how the
U.S. legal system affected technological development and implementation, and often did not
maintain equal pace with technological developments with subsequent effects upon market
participants.
Technical systems may effectively displace laws, and changes in technology can
undercut a law's effectiveness even if the law's text remains unchanged (van Schewick,
2010, p.26). Laws can affect the technical environment by regulating technical systems,
or by encouraging the development of specific technologies by letting public entities
participate in standard setting, funding the development of desired technologies, or
restricting public procurement to the technologies the state wants to foster. By imposing
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constraints, the architecture of a complex system affects the economic system for its
development, production, and use - that is, the actors who will develop, produce, or use
the system, the relationships among them, the governance structures they use to interact
with one another, and the behavior of these actors. And by changing existing
architectures or creating new ones, economic actors can change the constraints that
architecture imposes (van Schewick, p.28).
Benkler opined upon the telecommunications market regulation mindset c.2006.
Much of the formal regulatory drive has been to increase the degree to which
private, commercial parties can gain and assert exclusivity in core resources necessary for
information production and exchange. At the physical layer, the shift to broadband
Internet has been accompanied by less competitive pressure and greater legal freedom for
providers to exclude competitors from, and shape the use of, their networks (Benkler,
2006, p.384).
The critique of concentration in this form therefore does not undermine the claim
that the networked information economy, if permitted to flourish, will improve the
democratic public sphere. It underscores the threat of excessive monopoly in
infrastructure to the sustainability of the networked public sphere. The combination of
observations regarding market concentration and an understanding of the importance of a
networked public sphere to democratic societies suggests that a policy intervention is
possible and desirable (Benkler, p.241).
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U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 Issues.
Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society discussed portions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that sought to create and increase market competition using
“forced open access”, and the subsequent legal challenges against those provisions.
The most innovative idea at the core of the 1996 Act was that in order to enable
competition to develop, incumbents would have to open up access to components of their
networks to competitors. The Act introduced unbundling, interconnection, collocation,
and wholesale access as elements of open access. Unbundling in the 1996 Act initially
had little to do with Internet access. It dealt mostly with letting new entrants enter
telephone markets.
By the fall of 2001 (under the G.W. Bush Administration) a new FCC had
changed course. The FCC passed a series of decisions that abandoned the effort to
implement open access, and shifted the focus … from the idea of regulated competition
within each wire - competition over the copper plant of the telephone company and over
the coaxial cable of the cable company - to competition between the owners of the two
wires. The theory was that two competitors with a strong base in a technology they own
were enough to discipline each other, and much preferable to the uncertainties of
unbundling and the price regulation and continuous monitoring of anticompetitive abuses
that it entailed. The two facilities-based competitors would drive each other to invest,
would discipline any monopoly pricing, and would not suffer the negative incentives of
knowing that some of their investments in upgraded networks would go to subsidize their
competitors. The model of inter-modal competition (competition between firms, each of
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which uses a different technological mode to provide its service) seemed to work well
(Benkler, 2009, pp.82-83).
If a provider was required by say a government to open its network for access to and use
by third party providers, the incumbent provider could potentially ration certain services and
impose restrictions to discourage, inhibit, and possibly eliminate the competition. The USSC’s
Brand X ruling however restricted the U.S. federal government from mandating such forced
open access, although left the decision to each state whether to impose such access requirements
or not.
Benkler also discussed the various back-and-forth rulings regarding the 1996 Act’s
authorization of municipal telecommunications provision.
The incumbent broadband providers have not taken kindly to the municipal
assault on their monopoly (or oligopoly) profits. When the City of Abilene, TX, tried to
offer municipal broadband service in the late-1990s, Southwestern Bell persuaded the
Texas legislature to pass a law that prohibited local governments from providing highspeed Internet access. The town appealed to the FCC and the Federal Court of Appeals
in Washington, D.C. Both bodies held that when Congress passed the 1996
Telecommunications Act, and said that, “no state … regulation … may prohibit … the
ability of any entity to provide … telecommunications service,” municipalities were not
included in the term “any entity.” As the D.C. Circuit put it, “any” might have some
significance “depending on the speaker’s tone of voice,” but here it did not really mean
“any entity,” only some. And states could certainly regulate the actions of municipalities,
which are treated in U.S. law as merely their subdivisions or organs. Bristol, VA, had to
fight off similar efforts to prohibit its plans through state law before it was able to roll out
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its network. In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the practice of
state preemption of municipal broadband efforts and chose to leave the municipalities to
fend for themselves. A coalition of Missouri municipalities challenged a Missouri law
that, like the Texas law, prohibited them from stepping in to offer their citizens
broadband service. The Court of the Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the
municipalities. The 1996 Act, after all, was intended precisely to allow anyone to
compete with the incumbents. The section that prohibited states from regulating the
ability of “any entity” to enter the telecommunications service market precisely
anticipated that the local incumbents would use their clout in state legislatures to thwart
the federal policy of introducing competition into the local loop. Here, the incumbents
were doing just that, but the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit decision.
Without dwelling too much on the wisdom of allowing citizens of municipalities to
decide for themselves whether they want a municipal system, the court issued an opinion
that was technically defensible in terms of statutory interpretation, but effectively invited
the incumbent broadband providers to put their lobbying efforts into persuading state
legislators to prohibit municipal efforts. After Philadelphia rolled out its wireless plan, it
was not long before the Pennsylvania legislature passed a similar law prohibiting
municipalities from offering broadband. While Philadelphia’s plan itself was
grandfathered, future expansion from a series of wireless “hot spots” in open area [sic] to
a genuine municipal network will likely be challenged under the new state law. Other
municipalities in Pennsylvania are entirely foreclosed from pursuing this option. In this
domain, at least as of 2005, the incumbents seem to have had some substantial success in
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containing the emergence of municipal broadband networks as a significant approach to
eliminating the bottleneck in local network infrastructure (Benkler, 2006, pp.407-408).

Government Provision Opposition
A government’s active provision of telecommunications systems and/or services in a
market may have elicited opposition to their involvement for various reasons. Models that
featured a government being the sole provider of both systems and services were essentially
public monopolies, and while likely welcomed by participants in markets that were unserved by
private sector providers, incumbent providers in other served markets usually opposed them.
Such government provision was also opposed by providers in competitive markets, while similar
provision in more uncompetitive markets as an attempt to break up cornering, monopolies, etc.,
was also opposed by the market leading providers. Private providers generally argued that
government provision was unfair competition and unnecessary market intrusion, citing their own
usually for-profit return on investment requirements, taxable corporation statuses, usually worse
debt ratings with higher borrowing costs, and their sunk costs in constructing their own systems.
Providers inherently wanted to protect their market shares, subscriber bases, system values, and
merger and acquisition value potentials from unnecessary competition. End users in unserved
markets or affected by uncompetitive provision likely supported government provision, though
objections were possible particularly if users were forced to use the government service or a
government’s select provider vs. other private providers they had used previously, particularly if
bundled service packages were involved.
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Benkler discussed a number of political subdivisions that went beyond provision of their
own MIS/IT systems and entered local telecommunications markets as competitive providers of
systems and/or services.
One alternative path for the emergence of basic physical information transport
infrastructure on a non-market model is the drive to establish municipal systems. These
proposed systems would not be commons-based in the sense that they would not be
created by the cooperative actions of individuals without formal structure. They would
be public, like highways, sidewalks, parks, and sewage systems. The basic thesis
underlying municipal broadband initiatives is similar to that which has led some
municipalities to create municipal utilities or transportation hubs. Connectivity has
strong positive externalities. It makes a city’s residents more available for the
information economy and the city itself a more attractive locale for businesses. The
initial drive has been the creation of municipal fiber-to-the-home networks. The town of
Bristol, VA, is an example - … the residents of the town, fed up with waiting for the local
telephone and cable companies, built their own, municipally owned network. The idea in
Chicago is that basic “dark fiber” - that is, the physical fiber going to the home, but
without the electronics that would determine what kinds of uses the connectivity could be
put to - would be built by the city. Access to use this entirely neutral, high-capacity
platform would then be open to anyone - commercial and noncommercial alike (Benkler,
2006, pp.405-406).
Benkler then noted the opposition to those and other projects mounted by incumbent providers as
previously discussed U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 section (Benkler, 2006, pp. 407408).
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Of interest in those cases (and in general) was exactly what provision from the
government the private providers opposed - rights of way, infrastructure, facilities, services, or
any market entry at all. A question is would providers oppose an alternative model where a
government provided rights of way, infrastructure, facilities, and open access to all providers
equally, together with public last miles to municipal end users who could choose among
providers, similar to say a municipality’s street enterprise that was openly accessible for use by
all qualified vehicle operators? If a municipality were unserved, or was technologically deficient
(i.e., a provider’s system in the market was unable to provide high speed Internet) and the
municipality’s system was technologically superior and could provide high speeds, the provider
might be somewhat open to the government buying out its existing system if it could use the
government’s system too since it would not have to build a newer, higher-tech system solely by
itself. The loss of customers to the new competition might still be a pricing power issue, and the
loss of its system plus its captive customers would reduce its merger and acquisition value
potential too. However if a market were already served with a high speed service provider and a
government chose to provide a high speed openly accessible system, the incumbent provider
would likely oppose the government’s system and any new competitors that used it to provide
their services. The incumbent might relent though only if the government bought out its system
at a certain price that could be at market rates depending upon how advanced its technology
utilization was, the subscriber base count, and other valuation factors.
Some school districts and other local government agencies reliant upon public utility
common carrier real and personal property taxation assessments as part of their general operating
budgets could oppose the decrease or loss of those taxes if a telecommunications market
reorganization was implemented. Any resulting shortfalls would have to be compensated for in
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other ways, including government enterprise cross-subsidies, various tax increases, decreased
government services provision, reliance upon more state and federal subsidies, etc. In a similar
example the West Virginia Turnpike once compensated counties that were supposedly denied the
benefits of displaced local traffic re-routed onto its interstate. The benefits of market
reorganization therefore had to offset tax loses, perhaps in reduced governments-as-end users’
telecommunication costs and their greater utilization of online services.

Telecommunications Market Provision Privatization
Most telecommunication provision in the U.S. has traditionally been by private providers.
Benkler argued that privatization of public system and service provision led to market
consolidation by private providers.
The result of the push toward private provisioning and deregulation has led to the
emergence of a near-monopolistic market structure for wired physical broadband
services. By the end of 2003, more than 96% of homes and small offices in the U.S. that
had any kind of “high-speed” Internet services received their service from either their
incumbent cable operator or their incumbent local telephone company. Less than 2% of
homes and small offices receive their broadband connectivity from someone other than
their cable carrier or incumbent telephone carrier. More than 83% of these users get their
access from their cable operator. Moreover, the growth rate in adoption of cable
broadband and local telephone DSL has been high and positive, whereas the growth rate
of the few competing platforms, like satellite broadband, has been stagnant or shrinking.
The proprietary wired environment is gravitating toward a high-speed connectivity
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platform that will be either a lopsided duopoly, or eventually resolve into a monopoly
platform (Benkler, 2006, pp.152-153).
However when those services were publicly provided, the government agency was essentially a
public monopoly, as it was unusual for multiple government agencies to offer competing systems
and/or services against each other.

Government Apathy
While there were issues with various government solutions, some problems may have
been caused or continued by government officials reluctant to have their offices explore
telecommunication market solutions. As explained by an anonymous regional government
official (who conferred with local government officials on a daily basis) to this author, those
officials acted more as politicians who hesitated to make what they perceived to be risky
decisions for fear those solutions could fail and would reflect negatively upon them come a
future election day. The official also stated their academic and/or business backgrounds often
did not include beyond a basic knowledge or appreciation of distribution market technologies,
nor related issues of the day. Some however were willing to learn, but others were not or did not
have time to do so and instead relied upon incumbent providers and hired consultants who could
shoulder the blame should a solution fail even though they were still paid (often with
government funds) for their efforts. Industry lobbyists also influenced government officials as
witnessed by the author at numerous public meetings, hearings, and conventions sometimes
sponsored in part by telecommunication providers. Verizon recommended government
subsidization of existing wireless market providers (where those markets often lacked robust
competition) vs. increased regulation (and by inference government market provision) since
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numerous studies showed the benefits of deregulation in other countries (U.S. Federal
Communications Commission,2009). Large providers could follow-up their recommendations
with lobbying of key legislators and judges for sympathetic legislation and rulings that could
further help entrench their market positions. Lesser-capitalized competitors were often not in
similar positions of power to lobby effectively for government-mandated market competition.
Some progressive communities were actively interested in the telecommunications
market, while others were catching up after hearing about the benefits that advanced
telecommunications provided. However the non-adopters risked being uncompetitive much less
remaining relevant and potentially dying out much like ghost towns when their minerals and
other area natural resources ran out, particularly in the face of significant international
competition for faster throughputs at cheaper rates. In another case, one former mayor
proclaimed telecommunication provision was the sole responsibility of the incumbent LEC and
as such he had no interest in municipal involvement in the local market. Meanwhile the
neighboring municipality was busy establishing its own MAN and hoping to provide competitive
telecommunication services to its business and residential end users. Many communities,
including Lorain County, OH as evidenced in their 2002 Digital Economy Task Force broadband
report, and in personal discussions with officials from the Ohio cities of Steubenville and
Zanesville and the villages of Bratenahl and Sugarcreek had no idea their jurisdictions hosted or
were immediately adjacent to major Tier I intercity backbone lines. This was akin to them not
knowing say the Autobahn was located in or nearby their towns, even though the fiber lines were
buried and marked with numerous small “Do-not-dig-here” warning signs with the providers’
names along their routes. The political subdivisions could be excused as the Tier I providers did
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not actively wholesale market access of and service to lower-end end users and left that market
to retail ISPs.
Governments have claimed to dislike dysfunctional markets, yet rarely have they
proposed substantive, alternative, potentially more optimal solutions to achieve supposedly
desirable market goals. They seemed to tolerate if not advocate or sanction monopolization just
short of market cornering vs. more perfect competition, accepting it as merely natural or as a
necessary evil. The laissez-faire attitude may favor what Hayek termed a "catallaxy" - a market
where “spontaneous order” emerged when no centralized control source (government) overrode
decisions of individuals pursuing their own ends (von Hayek, 1989). Perhaps the ideologies of
the political parties in control of governing agencies at the time eschewed market involvement
much less oversight, with some extremists questioning the need for governments at all.
The FCC seemed complacent with the market structure and competition.
The lack of a large number of wireline, facilities-based providers does not
necessarily mean competition among broadband providers is inadequate. While older
economic models of competition emphasized the danger of tacit collusion with a small
number of rivals, economists today recognize that coordination is possible but not
inevitable under such circumstances. Moreover, modern analyses find that markets with
a small number of participants can perform competitively; however, those analyses do
not tell us what degree of competition to expect in a market with a small number of
wireline broadband providers. Given that approximately 96% of the population has at
most two wireline providers, there are reasons to be concerned about wireline broadband
competition in the U.S. Whether sufficient competition exists is unclear and, even if such
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competition presently exists, it is surely fragile (U.S. Federal Communications
Commission, 2009, p.37).
Benkler critiqued the FCC’s stance with the following excerpts.
It does not address the source of the access problem: without a major policy shift
to increase competition, broadband service in the U.S. will continue to lag far behind the
rest of the developed world. The plan acknowledges that only 15% of homes will have a
choice in providers, and then only between Verizon’s FiOS fiber optic network and the
local cable company. (AT&T’s “fiber” offering is merely souped-up DSL transmitted
partly over its old copper wires, which can’t compete at these higher speeds.) The
remaining 85% will have no choice at all.
The FCC gave in, deciding that competition between one telephone incumbent and one
cable incumbent was enough. Senior FCC staff members have essentially conceded that
lobbying pressure from the monopolies is too strong even to begin exploring (an
alternative solution of) open access right now (Benkler, 2010).
Governments not continuously advancing their telecommunication markets risked falling
behind competitively to others that were making such investments. Australian Prime Minister
Julia Gillard said her country could not sit back and let others build infrastructure similar to its
proposed National Broadband Network to achieve an advantage. She said, "Singapore, Korea,
and Japan have the benefits of this technology," Opposition Leader Tony Abbott "wants to shun
the technology", that he did not understand the NBN, and that his thinking was limited to only
that of downloading music and movies. “It showed how little he understands modern health care
and education.” PM Gillard said how foolish it would have been to say typewriters and fixed
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line phones were good enough, and those advocates were “condemning Australia". (LeMay,
2010).
Various studies indicate the U.S. lagged among developed nations in high speed
provision. Google CEO Eric E. Schmidt and other technology and government leaders pointed
to the trailing high speed performance as a danger to American competitiveness that threatened
to saddle the nation with an “innovation deficit” compared with other countries (Lohr, 2010).
Regardless, when presented with projects where such advancements had been made, some critics
doubted whether those improvements were too much too soon. Higher-speed Internet service,
experts agreed, was an important national goal, but it was less clear whether moving quickly to
very-high-speed service was worth the cost. Much of the economic gain could be achieved and
consumer demand met by moving on a “more measured path”. Some experts said the demand
for 1Gb/sec service could be minuscule. Nonpartisan research group Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation president Robert D. Atkinson said, “I can’t imagine a for-profit
company doing what they are doing in Chattanooga (offering symmetrical 1Gb/sec for
$350/month), because it’s so far ahead of where the market is.” (Lohr).

Select Telecommunication Projects
A sample of numerous recent telecommunication system projects provided under various
domestic and international governance and business models were analyzed in terms of local and
last mile market competition goals.
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ACCESS/Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority System
In Ohio, 26 Columbiana and Mahoning County school districts, two educational service
centers, 20 non-public schools, and two Special Education Regional Resource Centers
coordinated to form the Area Cooperative Computerized Educational Service System
(“ACCESS”). (http://www.access-k12.org 2010). ACCESS was one of 23 governmental
computer service organizations serving more than 900 educational entities and 1.4M students in
the state. Information Technology Centers (ITCs) provided IT services to school districts,
community (charter) schools, joint vocational, career and technical schools, educational service
centers, and parochial schools. The ITCs, service organizations, and their users formed the Ohio
Education Computer Network. Such sites in conjunction with the Ohio Department of Education
comprised a statewide system to provide comprehensive, cost-efficient accounting and other
administrative and instructional computer services for participating state entities (State of Ohio
Auditor, 2010).
ACCESS constructed a 344-mile SONET-based WAN to serve its member schools and
institutions (Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority, 2004), which was later upgraded to a four
loop, 10Gb/sec Ethernet WAN with 1Gb/sec interconnecting each members’ facilities.
(http://www.access-k12.org/15681092714358197/site/default.asp 2010) A 2004 proposal by the
Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority sought to lease for $1.2M with an option to purchase
two strands of ACCESS’s fibers made available for commercial use containing at the time
360Gb/sec of capacity. CCPA was to construct a new or retrofit one of their existing facilities
for use as a NOC for $3M available for other end users to co-locate their network equipment to,
and as a potential new business incubator with direct connection access to on-premise providers
utilizing the ACCESS network (Columbiana County (OH) Port Authority, 2004) CCPA later
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acquired two more ACCESS strands for free as part of the lease, which were then used by a
NOC provider that had located into the port authority's industrial park for increased connectivity
to its end users (Giambroni, 2011).

Municipal Electric Enterprise-Subsidized MANs
The following cases were examples of municipalities that provided their own public
electric power and additionally entered the local and last mile telecommunications markets by
establishing cross-subsidized public MANs.

Dover (OH) MAN.
The City of Dover, OH which generated and distributed its own electric power to
municipal businesses and residents, added Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(“SCADA”) telemetry services to its grid for improved system monitoring and reliability. The
city's electrical consultants recommended using new fiber optic cables for the SCADA network
to also remotely monitor and control a secondary substation located across town from the power
plant’s NOC. SCADA signals had low bit rates easily handled by copper lines or dialup ISP
service to control and monitor relatively few electrical equipment units. The consultants though
further recommended Dover consider acquiring and installing cables containing many more fiber
optic strands than required to host SCADA for potential use as a future public
telecommunications MAN. Dover City Council agreed and approved a municipal bond issuance
for both projects to be repaid by electrical and MAN subscriptions (Mizer, 2002). Dover's MAN
infrastructure was based upon a design recommended by the same consultants for the City of
Wadsworth, OH and other municipalities featuring aerially-mounted multi-strand fiber optic
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cables bracketed to power poles arranged in various looped routes around the city, with hybrid
fiber-coaxial cable network equipment to serve end users, similar to cable operators’ cable
modem service. Dover's electric enterprise owned and operated the power poles and pole rights
of way that hosted the power grid and street traffic control signal infrastructures. Extra pole and
right of way space was available for lease to other providers and end users for their system
infrastructures. The MAN infrastructure was to be owned and operated by the electric enterprise
utilizing their rights of way and poles.
Dover's MAN provided WAN, dark fibers, and retail ISP to the city’s various
departments for their MIS/IT and Internet needs, to the Dover City School district’s facilities,
and to select lineside industrial and commercial end users within the jurisdiction. In a State of
the City review, Dover Mayor Richard Homrighausen discussed the MAN project.
One of the more major accomplishments during my term has been the installation
of Dover’s fiber optics system. The city has over 3.1 miles of 48-strand fiber optic cable
and an additional 7+ miles of 96-strand fiber optic cable. At present, the city is using the
fiber to power our telecommunications infrastructure, as well as about a dozen businesses
within the community. For over eight years, the Dover City Schools have had the benefit
of being connected to our fiber optic system, at no charge, for their telecommunications
services as well as for the use in their distance learning lab. This past year the city of
Dover, in conjunction with the Tuscarawas County Community Improvement
Corporation, consummated a high-speed connectivity agreement with the State of Ohio
and their Ohio Supercomputer Network. This connection makes Dover the only
municipality in the State of Ohio to have such a connection. This also gives Dover a
competitive edge over other communities in our area in the way of attracting business and
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industry, since we are the only community that can meet the ultra high-speed
telecommunications demands of today at tomorrow’s high speeds. Additionally, this
connection is allowing Dover to serve as the telecommunications “head-end” for the
CIC’s tech park project in [adjacent city] New Philadelphia – and any other business,
industry, and educational institutions along the way that are able to connect to the fiber
the county is installing to the park.
Q. What do you consider to be the major disappointments of your administration
over the past 16 years?
A. While Dover’s fiber optics initiative is listed above as a major
accomplishment, at the same time it is a major disappointment in that we have not moved
forward with deploying the fiber throughout the city for all residents, business, and
industry to take advantage of. I had thought that by this time we would have available a
“triple play” fiber program where residents, business, and industry would have voice,
video, and data services available over our fiber optic cable. Even though it is
disappointing that we are not yet able to provide these services city-wide, our plans are to
move in that direction. We are fortunate to be in the position to even offer these services
and I would rather take the slow approach to get everything right than to forge ahead and
do something that we will be sorry for in the long run.
Q. What are your forecasts and predictions for 2008?
A. We plan on requesting proposals and bidding the engineering services for the
full deployment of Dover’s fiber optics system with the intent to service the entire
community with this cutting edge technology (Q&A with Dover Mayor Richard
Homrighausen, 2008).
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The Dover MAN was reportedly connected to only a T1 backhaul service, as no private
wholesale providers were available locally (or possibly willing) to provide faster services and
network interconnections. Dover City Schools were subscribing to six LEC T1 circuits at the
time, which would have taxed the MAN’s capacity if they switched entirely over to service from
the MAN. However as Homrighausen discussed, OARnet later branched from their neighboring
New Philadelphia POP a few miles southwest of Dover to provide the city’s MAN and its end
users with state agency WAN connectivity and faster Internet service.
Dover’s MAN competed against previously established LEC Verizon, cable operator
Adelphia, and local wireless providers Tusco.Net, Wilkshire.Net, and Lightspeed Wireless in the
same municipal market, offering much the same telecommunication services and speeds, WAN,
and in the wireline cases dark fiber availability. Why bond counsel recommended the city
construct the new system and provide similar services in a rather well-served market, potentially
hampering repayments of their bonds thus requiring cross-subsidizations from other municipal
enterprises if not additional taxes and privatization of city assets, was unknown. Homrighausen
prohibited WISP Lightspeed Wireless from collocating antennas for its regional network on city
infrastructures, as they represented market competition to their MAN. This restriction hampered
Lightspeed and other WISPs from utilizing the MAN as a potential backhaul for their system to
other upstream providers. Dover tried using proposed zoning changes to force residents and
businesses building new homes and facilities to construct and finance their own connections to
Dover's MAN, even if those end users planned to subscribe to services with other providers, or
did not desire accessing such services at all. The measure was later tabled by council if not
dropped entirely.
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As noted, Dover used their public power business and governance model as being the
sole producers and distribution providers of power to its businesses and residents to help justify
their MAN project. The State of Ohio General Assembly once proposed an anti-competitive
telecommunications law to prohibit public MANs from competing vs. private providers, but
continued to authorize public power providers to lock out private power providers from
accessing and serving the same markets.

Provo (UT) iProvo MAN.
The City of Provo, UT’s Energy Department - Telecommunication Division constructed
and owned a public MAN initially intended for SCADA and WAN for municipal department
MIS/IT needs, though it was expanded into a FTTP/FTTH MAN that afforded open access for
various competitive providers for WAN and IP services to end users. Retail provider Veracity
offered MAN end users symmetrical 10Mb/sec and 100Mb/sec system-wide, bundled service
packages only, and required end users use custom network equipment. Another retail provider
Mstar Metro offered end users $40/month symmetrical 10Mb/sec and also required end users use
custom network equipment. LEC/IXC Qwest and cable operator Comcast were still providing
Provo end users services via their own independent systems, but both were invited by the city to
access and use the MAN as part of their network for competitive service provision.
To construct the system, Provo issued a type of municipal bonds.
Zion’s Bank, the City’s financial advisor on the project, recommend that the City
issue Sales Tax Revenue Bonds to finance iProvo because it obtains the highest possible
bond rating, the lowest premium for bond insurance, and possibly eliminates the need for
a funded debt service reserve, which if waived by the rating agency would lower the
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amount of bonds to be issued. They also examined other financial instruments and
determined these other options would leave the City with the same level of responsibility
for the bonds while adding to the overall cost of the project. The total bonding amount is
expected to be $39.5M (http://www.provo.org/util.iprovofaq.html 2010).
The Energy Department cross-subsidized the MAN enterprise. After the bonds were to be
retired, MAN revenues received from leasing capacity to competitive providers were then
earmarked for the City’s general fund (http://provo.org/util.iprovofaq.html 2010) where they
would theoretically be used to subsidize other municipal enterprises and services.

Chattanooga (TN) MAN.
In 1935 the City of Chattanooga, TN established the non-profit municipal utility and
enterprise fund Electric Power Board for the sole purpose of providing electric power. In 1938
EPB received its first power transmitted by the federal government-owned independent
corporation Tennessee Valley Authority, and shortly thereafter began reselling that electricity to
169K customers in the surrounding 600 square-mile area (http://epbfi.com 2011). The TVA
when created restructured a portion of the U.S. electric power market in the Tennessee River
valley region. As a power supplier (power generator + distributor), regulatory agency, and
economic development agency, the TVA forced a number of private power providers (power
generators + distributors) that had previously controlled nearly all of the production +
distribution markets out of business. In 2009 EPB residential electric rates were $0.0947 per
kWh, 18.5% less than the national average, with the TVA setting the wholesale electric rates.
Those low electric rates likely encouraged EPB to further expand into telecommunications
provision (Electric Power Board, 2009).
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In 1999, EPB received approval from the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to provide
telecommunications services, in 2002 it received approval from the State of Tennessee to provide
Internet services, and in 2007 the Chattanooga City Council authorized EPB to provide
telephone, Internet, and video services to users via its MAN (http://epbfi.com 2011). EPB via its
MAN offered naked symmetrical 1Gb/sec service for $350/month
(https://epbfi.com/enroll/packages/# 2011), in addition to bundles including a digital television
package with 300+ channels, a digital recording unit, 55 digital music channels, 60 HDTV
channels, and on demand channels among other features, and digital telephony service with local
and long distance (the premium package included free unlimited long distance) and other add-on
services (http://epbfi.com 2011). Business service rates were slightly higher than residential
rates due to potentially higher throughputs, and were determined by EPB representatives on a
per-case basis. EPB assessed no throughput caps, issued end users static IPs, and permitted end
user hosting. AT&T, Level 3, and Sprint supplied the MAN with upstream service. The EPB
system was constructed in a served market, and cable provider Comcast did protest their entry.
None of the incumbents were using the EPB system as part of their own system, and were still
assessing their users higher rates than EPB was for similar IP services (K. Mena personal
communication, 2011, December 20).
EPB CEO Harold DePriest did not expect immediate demand for the 1Gb/sec service,
and when asked why EPB offered it he replied, “The simple answer is because we can.”
DePriest added the higher speed service could be provided at minimal additional expense once
the fiber optic MAN was installed and the network equipment was functional. “We don’t know
how to price a gig. We’re experimenting. We’ll learn. The overriding consideration is that this
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is a real tool for economic development for our community. It is the basis for creating the
products and services of the Internet of the future. And it’s in Chattanooga today.” (Lohr, 2010).
EPB’s telecommunication enterprise was bundled with its electric power enterprise,
which was a retailer/reseller of TVA-generated power. The telecommunications service was
piggybacked on top of the EPB electric grid’s SCATA network, which was the initial reason for
installing the fiber optic cable to users. EPB was awarded a $111M U.S. Energy Department
grant thereby accelerating its “smart-grid” plan, but DePriest said the federal funds did not
subsidize the high-speed Internet service (Lohr, 2010). The two services likely did crosssubsidize each other, as neither were structured as stand alone independent enterprises
(http://epbfi.com 2011).

Dublin (OH) DubLink
In 1996, the City of Dublin, OH appropriated $96M for street and right-of-way
improvement and beautification projects to help resolve traffic problems created by increased
sprawl, but hesitated in seeing their finished work torn up by future utility installations,
potentially numerous times by multiple telecommunication providers. Telecommunications
systems provision therefore factored significantly into their planning process (Intelligent
Community Forum, 2011). Dublin thus assembled a team comprised of a telecommunications
attorney, a telecommunications engineer, and the city service director to develop a business and
governance model for the project, and they suggested a number of options.
•

A publicly-owned utility that would provide telecommunications services.

•

No government regulation whatsoever.

•

A PPP model to provide telecommunications services.
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A PPP model to provide conduit infrastructure but not telecommunications services.

The publicly-owned utility option was dismissed as Dublin lacked the expertise to provide
complex telecommunication services. The city, while willing to take some risks, was not willing
to assume the financial and managerial risks of owning (i.e., owning ROW, infrastructure, and
facilities) and operating a telecommunications company (i.e., administering the system and
assumedly providing carriage services). The “No Regulation” option was dismissed because it
would not help achieve the goal of preserving the city’s expensive right-of-way improvements,
even though the option could encourage more rapid deployment of telecommunications services
(Dunn & McDaniel, 2011). The team considered establishing a competitive provider to deliver
all telecommunications services, but the city was unwilling to bear the risks of building and
operating a company, among other complexities. The legal counsel advised it might also run
counter to the 1996 Telecommunications Act by stifling provision competition (Intelligent
Community Forum, 2011). It was also difficult for them to devise a regulatory scheme that
prevented private providers from constructing infrastructure in the city’s rights-of-way that did
not violate the 1996 Act or antitrust laws.
The team therefore decided that creating a conduit system was the best choice. The plan
conceptualized that the city or some private entity would build a conduit system throughout the
high-density business district where virtually all the initial demand for competitive services
would initially occur. The system would feature conveniently placed manholes, a ring design,
and redundant building entrances extending from the manholes. Providers would not be
permitted to cut into streets or build in city rights-of-way, and would be required to lease space
from the conduit system. Lease rates would have to be low enough so that no provider could
complain that the rates were a barrier to entry, as prohibited by the 1996 Act (Dunn & McDaniel,
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2011). Dublin contracted with the Fishel Company to construct the DubLink buried conduit
system within its business district, and franchised them as the conduit provider for 25 years with
an additional 25 year renewal option. Fishel leased the municipal right of way and owned the
conduit system, which they made openly accessible for providers and other users that included
SBC/AT&T, Teleport Communications Group, Time Warner Communications, ICG, and
NextLink Ohio. Fishel self-financed construction of the $10M system, and assessed users $7.27
to $9.80 per foot annually ($38,385.60 to $51,744.00 per mile respectively), with those rates
regulated by the City. The 30.5 mile system featured 1.25” and 4” buried conduits, with the
larger ducts containing innerducts within them, and reportedly 12 1.25” conduits installed per
trench.
The network saved users time and money by providing an existing infrastructure within
the business district so that users could lease rather than construct their own lines and systems
(DataCenter.BZ, LLC, 2009). A few competitive providers opposed the DubLink system
ordinances claiming the lease rates were too high and that they could build their own systems
cheaper and more efficiently as demand warranted. Dublin City Council was not convinced, as
they were essentially proposing to do what Dublin wanted to prevent - haphazardly cutting
expensive streets and rights-of-way with considerably short planning horizons and self-serving
fiscal concerns (Dunn & McDaniel, 2011). Incumbent LEC SBC Ameritech required two policy
positions: its existing systems needed to be “grandfathered” in place rather than be forced to join
with the conduit system, and that it retained the right to build systems anywhere and whenever it
wanted. Dublin Council then passed a right-of-way control ordinance that established a
“DubLink District” encompassing the entire business district of the city. All new
telecommunications infrastructure construction within the district was banned, and providers
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desiring to deploy systems were required to use the DubLink conduit system. Dublin agreed to
“grandfather” Ameritech’s existing facilities and exempt them from the DubLink regulations,
giving them various advantages over Fishel and competitors forced to use DubLink. It also
authorized any provider to build its own systems if there was no DubLink conduit in that
location, provided that it also allowed DubLink conduit to use the same trench (Intelligent
Community Forum, 2011). Dublin waived Fishel’s franchise and other fees in exchange for free
conduit access. The city itself offered no services to end users except access to certain
governmental services for public use. For other services, it leased either conduit space or used
its own dark fiber to providers serving the local market (The invisible bridges of Dublin, 2011).
Dublin partnered with the Ohio Supercomputer Network in the Central Ohio Research
Network to provide advanced computing power and robust fiber infrastructure that connected
area governments, schools, and businesses to Ohio colleges, universities, major research
institutes, and Federal laboratories. It also provided capacity to the Online Computer Library
Center, which supported more than 69K libraries in 112 countries, and had partners with two
carrier hotels in Columbus to give DubLink users low-cost access to Tier I and other providers
(Intelligent Community Forum, 2011). Dublin was further considering deployment of a
“DubLink II” network for high-speed services to its residential areas situated outside of the
DubLink area (Dunn & McDaniel, 2011). Dublin provided transit to the Columbus Fibernet and
received capacity on that network in return (Intelligent Community Forum, 2011). The CFN
duct system consisted of 70 miles of 20 1.5” innerducts connecting the downtown commercial
business district with high-speed users outside of I-270 and high tech business parks in the
Columbus suburbs of Dublin, Easton, Gahanna, Hilliard, Polaris, Westerville, and Worthington
(http://www.columbusfiber.net 2011). In 2009 DataCenter.BZ, a Tier IV data center located in
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Columbus, agreed to bring DubLink’s dark fiber to its facility located in nearby Worthington.
The benefit was direct fiber connectivity to the data center, enabling DataCenter.BZ users to
cross-connect to the provider of their choice, and utilize the data center’s other services that
included collocation, physical security for IT equipment, Tier IV power, 24 x 7 managed
services, virtualization, and cloud computing. DataCenter.BZ president Gordon Scherer said,
“Not only is this an economical way for companies to privately connect to IT and
telecommunication solutions, it eliminates the restriction of bandwidth that is often created by
telecom carriers, or any solution that isn’t operated over dark fiber. Utilizing dark fiber,
businesses have complete control over their bandwidth and can increase or decrease their speeds
based solely on the equipment they choose to operate. Companies will be able to access the best
pricing available from the carrier(s) of their choice, forcing the providers to compete in order to
win the business.” (DataCenter.BZ, LLC, 2009).

Butler County (OH) Fiber Network
The Butler County, OH Fiber Optic Initiative was a project to provide the county and
Miami University with a fiber optic network, and was thereafter expected to connect with and
serve most of the county’s other communities. The network featured 100 miles of 96-strand
fiber cables routing throughout the county. Butler County originally owned 12 of the strands,
Miami University leased 12 strands, provider iFiber of Middletown, OH leased two strands for
five years, and a Columbus, OH-based investor owned the balance. Six more strands worth
approximately $1M were purchased and donated to Miami University, giving them connectivity
to the State of Ohio’s OARnet/Third Frontier Network. iFiber open accessed and sublet their
leased strands to competitive third party providers including DONet, Nuvox, and Inter-Tel. The
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project was jointly financed by Butler County, Miami University, and Cincinnati Bell, with one
source stating the project cost $10M, while another listed the county’s investment at $2.75M
with $100K annual costs for operation and maintenance services provided by Cincinnati Bell
(http://www.butlercounty.biz/Fiber.htm, http://www.ifiber.net 2006).
A 2010 update on the network reported Butler County paid $5.7M for the system. Of the
96 strands, the county owned 34 and leased 12 of them to Miami University. Butler used 16 of
its strands to provide high-speed Internet connections to 38 county government sites, while its
remaining six strands were not used. Other network owners included iFiber (30 strands);
Cincinnati Bell Telephone (12 strands); NI Solutions (12 strands); Miami University (6 strands);
and the City of Hamilton, OH (2 strands). MU’s network connected its main Oxford, OH
campus with its branch campuses in Hamilton, Middletown, and West Chester Township, OH.
Butler County IT director Greg Sullivan said Butler County’s WAN improved communications
between county government offices as well as between county offices and state offices in
Columbus, and allowed the county to provide connections to its emergency communications
center and Emergency Management Agency. “It has raised the quality of life in Butler County.
There are still a lot of advantages for us to use this network.” The county had explored
providing connections to residential users but found the cost was prohibitive, according to
County Commissioner Chuck Furman.
Butler County financial director Bob Lowery said the network cost the county $274K a
year, and its debt for the system c.2010 was about $4M. The county received $300K annually in
lease payments from MU, but those only partially offset the $214K a year the county paid
Cincinnati Bell to maintain the network and the $350K a year required for debt payments.
Lowery pointed out that if the county didn't have its own network, it would be paying Cincinnati
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Bell or another provider for similar service, and he didn't know how much that service would
cost but it probably would be less than $274K. The financial challenges raised questions about
what the county should do with its one-third ownership of the system. Commissioner Furmon
said, “We need to know if we should keep the system and expand it. Or should we cut our losses
and sell it for what we can get out of it and move on?” County Commissioner Don Dixon said,
“There's no way for taxpayers to get their money back. We need to deal with this issue, because
it's a constant financial drain.” He also said there was no interest from the private sector in
buying any of the 34 county-owned strands. Further complicating matters, Dynus Corp., which
was trying to acquire a contract to improve the network, took out $6.5M in loans in the county's
name without the county commissioners' knowledge. Over the past 2.5 years, the subsequent
scandal resulted in the criminal convictions of three Dynus officials, former Butler County
Auditor Kay Rogers, and the indictment of former Butler County Commissioner Mike Fox
(Kemme, 2010).

North Georgia Network
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $7.2B for expanding
high speed telecommunications access, with the first $4.7B directed to the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) to provide high speed
access to underserved communities and public institutions, and stimulate demand for high speed
services in general. Local groups could apply for BTOP funding for “last mile projects” to bring
high speed Internet service to census blocks where a majority of users were not served by
higher!speed service or had less than 3Mb/sec speeds. Much like the U.S. Rural Electrification
Administration, the goal of the government’s programs was to subsidize infrastructure in
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underserved and rural regions and create jobs during the economic downturn then. At the time,
the programs distributed approximately $200M in grants and loans for infrastructure buildouts
including a “$33.5M grant with an additional $8.8M in matching funds to deploy a 260!mile
regional fiber!optic ring to deliver gigabit broadband speeds, reliability, affordability, and
abundant interconnection points for last mile service in the North Georgia foothills.” (Chettiar &
Holladay, 2010, p.36). In 2009 the North Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc. was the first
applicant to receive a stimulus grant for an 80% match to their 20% investment in the “North
Georgia Network” to help develop a new technology-based economy for GA’s 12 northern
counties. The project proposed to build 135 miles of new fiber connecting to 125 miles of
existing fiber to create a middle mile ring. NGN was a member-owned cooperative, with part
owners including the Habersham Electric Membership Corp. and the Blue Ridge Mountain
Electric Membership Corp. Both electric utilities had already constructed locally-based fiber
infrastructures and were to be further involved in the NGN (North Georgia Network
Cooperative, Inc., 2009).
The NGN featured dual-route redundancy and supported last mile fiber to the home.
“NGN is an open network that will feature approximately 2,600 interconnection points along the
route, where independent service providers will be encouraged, on a non-discriminatory basis, to
interconnect with the system in order to build out their own fiber services to end users.
Interconnection for independent service providers will be enabled through an access company
that will be a member and owner of NGN. The plentiful interconnection opportunities will result
in an abundance of broadband capacity, give consumers a choice of providers, and bring pricing
in the region down to the more affordable levels typically enjoyed in non-rural areas” (North
Georgia Network Cooperative, Inc., 2009). NGN was fully symmetrical
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(http://northgeorgianetwork.com/technology/ 2011) and provided a minimum 1Gb/sec at the
connection points (NGN Trailwave Technology Overview, 2011).

Australia’s National Broadband Network
Australia had slower and more expensive telecommunications access than many other
developed countries c.2008, and officials warned the country might have become less
competitive without faster, nationwide coverage. About 64% of homes had high speed service,
although Australia’s vast distances and its inhospitable terrain made full penetration difficult.
The Australian government then proposed a A$9.4B (US$8.8B) high-speed fiber optic-based
network with minimum speeds of 12Mb/sec to access 98% of Australian homes. The network
architecture for the last mile would have either delivered fiber to neighborhood "nodes" in each
street or directly to end users’ premises (Thieberger, 2008).
In 2009, Minister for Broadband, Communications, and the Digital Economy Sen.
Stephen Conroy announced sweeping reforms to Australia’s existing telecommunications
regulations as the government also rolled out its upgraded $43B National Broadband Network to
bypass incumbent Telstra's existing copper system and go straight to end users’ premises, and
moved Telstra towards becoming part of the NBN. The following was paraphrased from the
official announcement.
The reforms would drive future growth, productivity and innovation across all
sectors of the economy by:
•

Addressing Telstra’s high level of integration to promote greater competition and
consumer benefits.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION
•

121

Streamlining and simplifying the competition regime to provide more certain and
quicker outcomes for telecommunications companies.

•

Strengthening consumer safeguards to ensure services standards are maintained at a
high level.

•

Removing redundant and inefficient regulatory red-tape.
Telstra was one of the most highly integrated telecommunications companies in

the world across the fixed-line copper, cable, and mobile platforms. Sen. Conroy said,
“The reforms address the structure of the telecommunications market and provide Telstra
with the flexibility to choose its future path. It is the Government’s clear desire for
Telstra to structurally separate on a voluntary and cooperative basis.” The reforms would
also promote competition and strengthen consumer safeguards. Sen. Conroy continued,
“The existing telecommunications anti-competitive conduct and access regimes have
been widely criticized as being cumbersome, open to gaming and abuse, and provide
insufficient certainty for investment.” Since the commencement of the regime in 1997
there have been more than 150 telecommunications access disputes compared to only
three access disputes in other regulated sectors, including airports and energy sectors.
The legislation addressed Telstra’s vertical integration by allowing the provider to
voluntarily … structurally separate. If Telstra chose not to structurally separate, the
Government could impose a strong functional separation framework on Telstra. The
legislation required Telstra conduct its network operations and wholesale functions at
arm’s length from the rest of Telstra; provide equivalent price and non-price terms to its
retail business and non-Telstra wholesale customers; and such equal treatment be made
transparent to the regulator and competitors. The legislation addressed Telstra’s
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horizontal integration by promoting competition across telecommunications platforms.
Telstra would be prevented from acquiring additional spectrum for advanced wireless
broadband while it remained vertically integrated and owned a hybrid fiber coaxial cable
network and maintained interest in provider Foxtel. The legislation authorized the
Minister to remove either or both of the second and third requirements if Telstra
structurally separated. The legislation also reformed the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (“ACCC”) so it could address breaches of competition law and
conduct damaging to the telecommunications market. Failure by Telstra to meet the
minimum performance benchmark requirements would expose Telstra to a civil penalties
of up to $10M (Conroy, 2009).
Sen. Conroy added, “These historic fundamental reforms address the long-standing inadequacies
of the existing telecommunications regulatory regime," and said Telstra had been too highly
integrated for too long, and previous governments from both sides of politics had failed to reform
the telecommunications sector (Rodgers, 2009).
The proposed A$43B NBN would provide service to approximately 93% of the
population. NBN would give competitors an even platform to compete over, with many of the
smaller, more nimble companies backing themselves to be able to outmaneuver Telstra if its
dominance of the infrastructure was ended (Bathgate, 2010). NBN was c.2013 providing
100Mb/sec downstream and 40Mb/sec upstream, with prices ranging from A$40 to A$164.95
per month and data limits on all plans. As more end users subscribed to NBN over time, those
prices were projected to decrease, with wholesale prices in regional and metropolitan Australia
set at the same rate. NBN’s initial pricing objective was to pay off the network and to gain a 7%
return on investment for the government (Taylor, 2012). Mike Quigley, CEO of NBN Co. - the
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company building the NBN - said NBN would eventually launch 1Gb/sec services in the future.
"We will have one consistent set of products across the whole national footprint. And that means
consistent ubiquitous service up to 1Gb/sec. Everyone keeps talking about 100Mb/sec. But
that's obviously when we're talking about residents. For business, we are allowing for a certain
percentage in our dimensioning to structure point-to-point services up to 1Gb/sec." (Taylor)
Quigley said increasing the speed would not add to the $43B construction price tag and the fiber
could be upgraded to provide even faster speeds in coming years. The faster capability was
already built into the equipment, which the company was installing in homes, and Quigley said
he decided to enable it after discussions with ISPs and the competition watchdog. NBN Co.
would offer unlimited download capacity at 1Gb/sec wholesale rates to retail ISPs, but provider
Internode said it was not reasonable to give consumers unlimited downloads (Battersby & Sharp,
2010). Minister Conroy also stated that when a consumer purchased speeds of 50Mb/sec or
100Mb/sec that is what they would get consistently - those speeds represented a consistent rate
and not peak speeds (LeMay, 2010).
The NBN proposal implementation was affirmed after the Labor Party took control of the
Australian government in 2010. Member of Parliament Tony Windsor said, “In relation to the
NBN there will also be equity in terms of wholesale pricing across country areas.” MP Rob
Oakeshott added, “And it will be a roll-in, not roll-out – it’s now a broadband roll-in,” referring
to a system buildout strategy where rural areas would receive NBN fiber services first vs.
metropolitan areas. Ovum research director David Kennedy added, “Under Labor's policy,
where we’re clearly heading is a structurally separated industry. While both of them agree on
the need to tighten competition rules on Telstra, they don’t agree about whether - Telstra in
particular and the industry in general - should be structurally separated. Labor would take us
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strongly in that direction.” Quigley retorted to opponents of the government network, “NBN can
provide an acceptable return for the government. Taxpayers will get their $27B investment back
with interest and they will get a network they can use for decades. This is, I believe, a much
better option for the Australian public than giving billions of dollars of taxpayer funding to
subsidize commercial companies to marginally improve today’s broadband networks.” (Pitcher,
2010).
The Alliance for Affordable Broadband, comprised of a group of providers and other
interested parties, proposed an alternative "NBN Version 3" model and denoted a number of
principles upon which the Australian Government should structure its NBN policy. AAB’s
numbered issues that differed from the Government’s policies were paraphrased as follows.
1. The Australian government’s primary role should be setting policy frameworks that
incentivize providers to build systems themselves. Governments should assist or
directly invest in universal service as private providers typically could not provide
100% service coverage.
2. Providers were better managers of capital and technology risk than governments
were (a direct contradiction to the Australian Labor Party's policy that its country’s
telecommunications market had failed). Infrastructure-based competition - not
infrastructure monopolies with retail competition - was the preferred business and
governance model. Existing infrastructure competition should be preserved - such as
metropolitan hybrid fiber-coaxial networks - and stranding or crowding out such
infrastructure assets by the NBN was opposed.
3. A national fiber-only network was unnecessary. For the short to medium term,
globally, there was no demonstrated mass requirement for “up to 1Gb/sec” speeds to
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homes and small offices/home offices. The greatest priority instead should be
serving markets, not faster service to those markets that were already served.
9. A market based approach would be the best solution. An alternative national
broadband network called “NBNv3” could include fiber-based network segments for
areas of demonstrated need provided there was a commercial return on investment, or
where there was a demonstrated and justifiable improvement in productivity and/or
social equality to justify taxpayer contributions.
10. A public/private business and governance model should be explored for NBNv3,
which, where practical or endeavored to include and recognize competitive
providers’ existing network investments and incentivized providers to upgrade their
networks and rollout services.
14. Any substantial investment by taxpayers for any national network(s) must be subject
to serious investigation and independent cost estimations, cost-benefit analysis,
genuine industry and public consultation, as well as a review of its impact on the
Australian competitive telecommunications landscape (Ashton, et al., 2010).
Critiques of AAB’s proposal included its exclusion of FTTH, significantly limiting its capacity
to deliver speeds of 100Mb/sec or higher. Telecommunications analyst Paul Budde said, “The
future as everybody around the world agrees is FTTH and so you need to develop a plan that in
the end will lead you to FTTH. It will be a backwards step." Optus spokesman Maha
Krishnapillai warned there were questions over whether AAB’s plan would limit competition
and entrench Telstra's market dominance. “What it doesn't do is fundamentally reshape the
game, which is the ability for Telstra to continue to control access to that last mile.” (Coalition
broadband plan causing concern, 2010).
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In August 2011, ACCC said Telstra's separation plan could not progress in its current
form and called for certain changes, though analysts said only minor delays to the restructuring
effort were expected. Arnhem Investment Management fund manager Theo Maas said ACCC's
concerns focused mainly on the transition period during which Telstra would convey its fixedline assets to NBN. "With NBN being a 10-year process, Telstra will have reasonable power to
disadvantage competitors from access to their old copper network during the roll-out period."
(Bendeich, Somasundaram, Paul & Thieberger, 2011) Telstra then advised its shareholders
ahead of an October 2011 vote on its plan to convey its fixed-line assets to NBN that it would be
$5B better off in working with NBN than competing against it. Independent investment and
advisory group Grant Samuel & Associates Pty Ltd. said, "Overall, the advantages of the
proposal outweigh the disadvantages. Accordingly … the proposal is in the best interests of
Telstra and its shareholders.” The endorsement came after ACCC called for changes in the terms
of Telstra's plan. Shareholders were waiting to vote for the company's plan to separate its fixedline assets, looking to end two years of uncertainty that sent its shares to record lows sparked by
the Labor government's shake-up of the industry. Tyndall Investment Management analyst
Michael Maughan said, "The majority of the market seems to be in favor of the deal. In fact, you
could argue the share price has performed better the more certain the deal has become.” Telstra
CEO David Thodey said the board was unanimous in advising shareholders to back the plan.
"We think it is the better overall financial outcome. It does give us a more stable regulatory
environment and greater strategic flexibility going forward.” Grant Samuel valued the payments
Telstra would receive from the government for its infrastructure assets at A$12.8B (US$13.7B).
The only alternative for Telstra would have been to compete against NBN, which would have
required it to increase investment in its own networks and face losing access to newer
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government network technologies. Grant Samuel estimated Telstra would save A$3.5B by not
having to invest in its own networks, while it would lose A$11.6B in cashflows. Altogether, the
company would be A$4.7B better off by cooperating with NBN Co. than competing against it.
Grant Samuel considered the implications of the network failing or being abandoned, and
concluded that Telstra would also be better off under this scenario than one where it chose to
compete with a successful network (Paul, 2011).

Canada
In December 2008 the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
issued an order that gave wholesale ISPs access to the faster networks of major providers
including Bell and Telus, but in 2009 the Canadian government ordered CRTC to reconsider the
decision by Industry Minister Tony Clement (CRTC approves usage-based internet billing,
2010). The government relented to lobbying from the large providers and ordered the review on
the grounds that CRTC had failed to consider a number of issues including how the matching
speeds would diminish the large providers’ incentives to invest in new infrastructure, and
whether there was sufficient competition to protect end users without the requirement of
matching speeds. Smaller ISPs including Teksavvy and Execulink had argued that without
requirements to offer matching speeds, the large providers would put them out of business. Bell
and Telus were offering connections of up to 25Mb/sec and 15Mb/sec respectively over newer
fiber-based networks, but smaller providers could typically offer speeds of no more than
5Mb/sec over older copper-based infrastructures. In August 2010, CRTC confirmed that Bell
and Telus must offer smaller wholesale ISPs that rented portions of their networks whatever
speeds the big providers themselves sold to their own retail customers, despite the previous
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disagreement from the government. CRTC said the requirement was necessary to maintain
competition and reasonable prices for high speed services. CRTC also authorized large
providers to charge smaller ISPs an extra 10% mark-up to use their newer infrastructures to help
recoup the costs of their investments. CRTC chairman Konrad von Finckenstein stated, “Access
to broadband Internet services is a key foundation for the digital economy. The large telephone
and cable companies are bringing their fiber networks closer to Canadian homes and businesses,
which allows for faster Internet connections. Requiring these companies to provide access to
their networks will lead to more opportunities for competition in retail Internet services and
better serve consumers.” Teksavvy CTO Marc Gaudrault said regarding the additional provision
preventing ISPs from circumventing download limits or throttling imposed on uses such as P2P
by large providers, "The CRTC's approach will entrench the duopolistic nature of the
communications wireline services industry in many important markets and stifle the ability of
competitors to provide new and innovative services. In this environment, it will be very difficult
for competitors to attract the capital necessary to innovate, grow, and contribute to the greatest
extent possible to the competitive landscape and increase consumer choice." Bell Senior VP of
regulatory and government affairs Mirko Bibic said the decision discouraged investment in its
networks and showed there was a lack of clarity in public policy. The allowed 10% mark-up "is
mere tinkering and does not create an environment which allows us to maximize the returns on
our very significant fiber network investments. We need to know, which is it? Do we want as
much network investment in Canada as possible, or not? Last year, (the Canadian Government)
Cabinet sent this issue back to the CRTC for reconsideration. Clearly, this isn't the decision
Cabinet was looking for." CRTC also said it would consider the phase-out of mandated Internet
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access when alternatives such as wireless and satellite became more accepted as substitutes
(Nowak, 2010), which could risk reversion back to modal monopolies or duopolies.
In May 2010 CRTC approved Bell Canada's request for usage-based billing vs. unlimited
downloading on both its wholesale users that rented its lines and retail end users based upon how
much they download each month. Bell however was required to usage-base bill all of its retail
end users before it could usage bill its wholesale users. The CRTC also required Bell to make
any "usage insurance plans," which gave its own retail customers extra monthly usage for a small
fee, available to wholesale ISPs. Bell was to then charge wholesale ISPs a flat fee for connecting
to its network and for a set monthly usage limit per end user. Beyond those set limits, users
would be charged per GB, depending on their connection speeds. It argued that usage-based
billing was necessary to control the congestion caused on its network by heavy downloaders.
CRTC commissioner Candice Molnar dissented on the ruling saying the requirement on Bell to
move all of its customers off unlimited downloading plans was unnecessary because a vast
majority were already on usage-based services. Small ISPs regarded the CRTC's approval of
Bell's plan as inevitable, but opposed it saying it would make them indistinguishable from Bell.
ISPs including Teksavvy offered plans with hundreds of GBs of usage, whereas Bell's most
popular services limited users to 50GB or 75GB. Teksavvy president Rocky Gaudrault said,
"The rates are absolutely atrocious. How the hell are we doing above one dollar for extra usage?
It's in the thousands of multiples beyond what the costs are," and added that Bell also continued
to have an advantage over smaller ISPs as it was able to offer superior speeds (CRTC approves
usage-based internet billing, 2010).
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Sweden
A 2004 updated Swedish IT policy bill noted three central objectives.
•

IT must contribute to a better quality of life and help improve and simplify everyday life for
people and companies.

•

IT must be used to promote sustainable growth.

•

An effective and secure physical infrastructure for IT, with high transmission capacity, must
be available in all parts of the country so as to give people access to, among other things,
interactive public e-services.

The plan called for the government to take responsibility in organizational, logistical, and
technical issues in order to meet the coordination objective (Benkler, 2009, p.217). Increasing
demands for more robust telecommunication systems were driven by the need for greater
capacity, which was a result of end user demands for telecommunication services. High speed
service was required by nearly every household, business, and public sector service
(http://www.stokab.se 2011). Certain provider-owned networks or markets where the traditional
telephone network was the only alternative were utilized to their maximum capacities and could
not cope with additional end users, which in certain innercity areas caused a shortage of services
that previously had only been a problem in sparsely populated areas (http://www.stokab.se
2011).
In 1999 the Swedish government committed over EU!600M for the installation of a
national backbone (Benkler, 2009, p.218), and in 2000 Sweden’s IT Bill 1999/2000:86 set the
goal of “an information society for all.” (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.20) The
National Rural Development Agency led an effort to eventually rollout advanced services via
provider-neutral networks to rural areas and small towns, and required state-owned corporations
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including the government-owned power company Svenska Kraftnät to build a fiber optic
backbone infrastructure to 289 municipalities comprising about 70% of the country’s population.
Government program grants were limited to communities with no existing providers, the
procurement process had to be open and provider-neutral, and municipalities had to provide at
least 10% of the cost of building the network (Atkinson, et al., pp.29-30). Tax break subsidies
were also used to incentivize buildouts (Benkler, p.218), and other government subsidies to
municipalities guaranteed municipal investments in case no private providers wanted to offer
services (Benkler, p.121).
In February 2007 the Swedish telecommunications regulator Post och Telestyrelsen
(“PTS”) announced a “Proposal for Swedish Broadband Strategy” for all Swedish customers to
have high speed access of at least 2Mb/sec by 2010, and for most if not all end users to have a
choice of several providers. To achieve this, PTS proposed minimum service requirements for
infrastructure supported by government funds, imposed regulations to ensure networks were
open to competition, encouraged municipalities to work together to provide networks, and
treated Internet access as a universal service (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G2).
Municipalities also helped reduce difficulties in obtaining permits to site equipment and duct
access (Benkler, 2009, p.165). However the Swedish IT Policy and Strategy Group questioned
whether it was economically feasible for government-supported providers to create parallel highspeed broadband infrastructure in rural areas (Atkinson, et al., p.30).
Sweden’s broadband regulatory policy was influenced by its government-sanctioned
fixed telephony monopoly Telia (later TeliaSonera) (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G2),
which in 1996 had a 71% share of the telecommunications market after the Swedish market for
local, long-distance, and international telephony was liberalized in 1993 opening the
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telecommunications markets to competition (Benkler, 2009, p.215). Because the Swedish
government also controlled other communications infrastructures such as power, railroads, and
broadcasting, it had a precedent to involve itself in administering distribution networks.
However, Sweden had since deregulated these markets but did retain ownership of some
infrastructures remaining subject to competition through access regulations or parallel privatelyowned infrastructures (Atkinson, et al., p.G2).
In 2000 PTS required TeliaSonera to unbundle its local loop to allow non-discriminatory
access to competing service providers (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.34, p.G3). In 2002
the Swedish government owned 45.3% of TeliaSonera and Finland owned 13.7% (Atkinson, et
al., p.G2), and in 2003 the government owned 78% of the country’s high speed network
infrastructure (Atkinson, et al., p.G2). Since incumbent provider TeliaSonera owned the
majority of Sweden’s telecommunications infrastructure, it had the advantage of being able to
bid low for rollout projects as it could simply upgrade its existing network, and thus won 65% of
the bids. Other providers were government-owned energy and broadcasting companies, allowing
them to offer lower service prices since they did not have to meet the revenue expectations of
TeliaSonera being a publicly-traded company (Atkinson, et al., p.G2). Government ownership
of TeliaSonera was a key consideration in Sweden’s high speed strategy because increased
competition required competing DSL providers to be able to access TeliaSonera’s network at the
local loop. Thus, the Swedish government’s strategy included policies to ensure that
TeliaSonera’s competitors were afforded access to its network on terms that didn’t favor
TeliaSonera’s retail operations and were available at reasonable interconnection rates (Atkinson,
et al. p.G3).
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The 2003 Electronic Communications Act further strengthened and expanded the
regulatory authority of PTS to intervene when providers with significant market power were
hindering competition for high speed services, and it essentially sought to open markets
primarily controlled by TeliaSonera (Benkler, 2009, p.216). In 2003 PTS required TeliaSonera
to lower its prices for competitors to access its local loops because the company had been using
discriminatory pricing practices, for example favoring some providers over others. In 2004, PTS
determined that TeliaSonera had significant market power and required it to meet all reasonable
requests from competing operators for access. TeliaSonera appealed the decision in court, but in
2007 the Supreme Administrative Court ruled for PTS. In 2005, PTS determined that
TeliaSonera must also offer naked DSL, allowing end users to access fixed telephony and
Internet services from different providers (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G3). PTS then
forced TeliaSonera to accept functional separation in 2007 (Benkler, p.213).
The market that currently deals predominantly with access to TeliaSonera's
metallic loop is not a functioning marketplace … the authority can conclude that there is
neither sufficient transparency nor equal treatment in the market. The current situation
falls far short of the goals of effective and competition-neutral access, nor does it
establish adequate conditions to gradually loosen the regulation to promote competition
on the route to more sustainable competition. [PTS proposed as a remedy] that the ability
of the public authority to impose functional separation on a dominant stakeholder should
be introduced, meaning that the parts of the operation representing bottleneck resources
should be separated from the rest of the organization (Benkler, p.219).
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In 2008, TeliaSonera formed TeliaSonera Skanova Access to provide wholesale services,
and during the same year the government empowered PTS to require functional separation
(Benkler, 2009, p.92).
As a result of the Swedish government’s strong regulatory policies, the country had one
of the most active unbundled local loop markets. The first major competitor to TeliaSonera was
Bredbandsbolaget (“B2”). A strategic partnership with the National Swedish Rail
Administration gave it an advantage as it could use the railway’s communications infrastructure.
B2 concentrated mainly on providing Ethernet and DSL services, beginning with 10Mb/sec and
later offering 100Mb/sec (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G3), but it used little of its own
network infrastructure and focused largely on urban apartment dwellings where it served more
end users at lower costs (Atkinson, et al., p.35). In 2003 the other major competitor Bostream
leased TeliaSonera’s network to provide DSL services, though in 2004 B2 acquired Bostream,
giving B2 23% of the market. By 2007, TeliaSonera’s market share shrank to 38%, B2 had 18%,
Com Hem had 17%, and Glocalnet had 7% (Atkinson, et al., p.G3). Telenor became the second
largest broadband provider at 21.5%, competing with TeliaSonera throughout the country by
buying several other providers, some of whom relied exclusively on unbundling to startup and
build their customer bases (Benkler, 2009, p.91). However some competitive providers that
appeared to be facilities-based competitors were mostly using the incumbent’s or municipality’s
networks (Atkinson, et al., p.34). As reflected in the prices and service options, the level of
competition in Swedish markets was strong, and the rise in high speed users coincided with a
continued increase in the number of independent ISPs competing for residential and business end
users, which cut into the incumbent’s market share (Benkler, p.213).
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A more popular business and governance model was the requirement that large providers
provide services on a wholesale basis to multiple retailers. Most municipal networks such as (the
State of) Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency and the (Province of) Alberta
SuperNet operated on a wholesale basis and allowed competitors to resell the network to end
users. Sweden followed this model in encouraging their municipalities to construct fiber
networks (Windhausen, 2008, p.52). Municipalities, housing associations, and local utility
providers built many of the country’s fiber networks and then opened them up to providers
including ISPs, cable, and telephone companies (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.G3).
Those networks created more competition in local markets and lowered service prices, while end
users received access to “future!proofed” fiber optic platforms, greater service choices, and
competitive prices (Windhausen, p.50). The City of Stockholm created the municipally-owned
corporation Stokab after Telia refused to offer fiber capacity (Benkler, 2009, p.218), and hoped
the new provider would more rapidly introduce advanced telecommunications services to its end
users (Windhausen, p.50). Stokab was tasked with developing a competition-neutral
infrastructure able to meet future communications needs, stimulate competition, promote
diversity, offer end users freedom of provider choice, and minimize the need for infrastructure
excavations (http://www.stokab.se 2011). The project started in 1999 and grew to 1.2M kms of
dark fiber (Press, 2009a) installed in commercial districts and large industrial areas (Atkinson, et
al., p.G3) that reached every block in the city (Press, 2009b). Stockholm did not serve end users
— ISPs leased access to the network on a competition-neutral basis.
Municipal networks can play an important role in enhancing competition in fiber
networks. If these develop, governments should encourage them to be open networks,
that is providing dark fiber to service providers rather than becoming themselves service
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providers. Nor should the existence of a municipal network providing dark fiber mean
that investment in other fiber networks in that municipality should be prevented (Press).
Stokab leased its dark fibers to various providers and users including telecommunication
providers, ISPs, cable TV companies, mobile telephony providers, network capacity providers,
banks, insurance companies, retailers, media companies, universities, urban networks, property
owners, and computer and IT companies (Windhausen, p.50). ISPs, including the incumbent
telephone and cable companies, owned and operated relatively cheap network equipment that
was frequently upgraded as the technologies improved (Press, 2009b). Stokab CEO Jörgen
Kleist said regarding their system, “Because new players on the market need neither to invest in
new infrastructure nor to lease it from their competitors, the barriers to establishing themselves
in Stockholm become low. With a fiber connection, residents are not only given access to a
long-term viable connection with high transfer capacity, but, even more importantly, to an
increasing range of options when it comes to service suppliers. In order to provide residents with
the greatest possible freedom of choice, it is important that property owners also build fiber
networks within their properties that make possible direct connection between the operator and
the household via fiber.” (http://www.stokab.se 3-2011).
Some Swedish end users received 100Mb/sec service in locations that switched to fiber
optic networks (Windhausen, 2008, p.16). However 75 year old Karlstad, Sweden resident
Sigbritt Löthberg received the world's fastest Internet connection at 40Gb/sec - the first time ever
then that a home user accessed such a high speed. Karlstad Stadsnät network official Hafsteinn
Jonsson said, “This is more than just a demonstration. As a network owner we're trying to
persuade Internet operators to invest in faster connections. And [Ms. Löthberg‘s renowned son
and Cisco technician] Peter Löthberg wanted to show how you can build a low price, high
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capacity line over long distances." (Sigbritt, 75, has world's fastest broadband, 2007).
Interestingly, many Swedish end users still kept their dial up account – which was very cheap if
not free – even when they subscribed to higher speed services (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund,
2008, p.G3).
Regarding Sweden’s models, Press concluded, “Many factors determined the cost of
Internet connectivity, but the ownership model was significant, and it seemed the Stockholm
model was superior to those in the U.S.” (Press, 2009b). Benkler et al. noted, “In … Sweden,
unbundling and open access worked exactly as they ‘should’ have, according to the underlying
theory that supported unbundling. Innovative entrants opened up markets; some continued to
operate; others were bought out by pan-European or pan-Nordic players and became the basis for
entry by those players. The risks - that incumbents would disinvest, that entrants would never
graduate to independent competitors - did not materialize.” (Benkler, 2009, p.90). Atkinson,
Correa, and Hedlund added, “One reason Sweden and certain other European nations adopted
this model was because providers were prohibited from attaching their cables aerially onto poles.
The cost of laying cables underground was quite high and in many cases borne by the
governments. The inherent costs in deploying telecommunications infrastructure, including high
speed networks, reinforced the argument that telecommunications providers had natural
monopoly characteristics, thus encouraging multiple independent deployments could lead to a
waste of resources (Atkinson, Correa, & Hedlund, 2008, p.28).

Amsterdam’s CityNet
Amsterdam's CityNet project sought to connect 37K households throughout the city, with
long term plans to pass all 400K households. The network was to be point-to-point FTTH,
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where about 10K households would each be connected directly by its own fiber to each Internet
points of presence (POP). The system was designed to operate in three distinct layers. The first
layer was the “passive network infrastructure” that included ducts, fiber, and street cabinets. The
second layer was the active wholesale layer that included network management, control, and
maintenance systems such as switches, routers, and optical splitters, all managed and maintained
by a wholesale network operator contracted by the city. The third layer was the retail layer that
consisted of providers who would buy capacity on a non-discriminatory basis from the two lower
layers and provide retail services to end users. Each provider invested in their own service
platform - equipment, services, and billing/customer care.
The passive layer was owned by the Glasvezelnet Amsterdam partnership (“GNA”),
whose members included the City of Amsterdam with a one-third share; five social housing
corporations (being a non-profit model for housing ownership of apartment buildings and owned
about one-third of the apartments in the covered area) with a one-third share; and two one-sixth
shares were split between two for-profit investors ING real estate and Dutch open fiber networks
provider Reggefiber. The shares reflected the actual share of investments made by each of the
parties in the !18M project. GNA bid out construction to bury the ducts and pull the fibers, and
bid for a concessionaire to operate the wholesale layer. Telcom Italia’s subsidiary BBned was
awarded the contract, and was to invest in the active wholesale layer components that it would
then own and operate while also operating, but not owning, the passive layer. BBned was
required to pay fees per connected household to GNA, and to sell wholesale access services to
third party service providers on an open access, nondiscriminatory basis. The retail providers
would then sell services to end users and pay fees to GNA. BBned also had retail affiliates that
would sell services too (Benkler, 2009, p.166).
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CityNet managing director Herman Wagter said, “In the switch house [central office] or
interconnection point, we provide for different racks for different operators, because on a line by
line basis customers could sign up for different combinations of offerings.” (Slater & Wu, 2008,
p.7). In a 2010 interview, Wagter further elaborated upon CityNet’s technology that provided
for open access.
Unlike in the U.S. and Japan, stringing fiber along poles is not an option in
European capitals. Every fiber cable must be buried below the pavement, then
distributed inside a building to apartments; no wires can be exposed on the outside. The
density of these old cities is quite high, and real estate is expensive, leaving little room
for cabinets with active equipment on the street level. The majority of the housing
consists of multi-dwelling-units (“MDUs”) with up to 500 individual apartments per
building.
When the design of the Amsterdam fiber network started in 2005, it became clear
that there was little experience in the market with this type of deployment. Contractors
were used to either putting copper wires or coax lines in new buildings, or digging long
stretches of big high density polyethylene (“HDPE”) tubes for backhaul purposes. Most
fiber packaging was optimized for backhaul and for metro networks; few products were
specifically designed for fiber-to-the-home in these conditions. The experience in
Amsterdam and other European cities has resulted over the years in products like
miniature direct burial cables, special high-rise cables with break-out windows to allow
very fast builds inside MDUs, fibers that can bend sharply, easy-install Fiber Termination
Units (“FTUs”) inside apartments, and so on.
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Deploying buried cables to every apartment in a dense city is a disruptive process.
A point-to-point fiber topology runs individual fibers from each apartment back to the
local aggregation point (think of the phone system model); it's the most flexible and
future-proof topology. Point-to-point will support all known technologies (GPON, active
Ethernet, lambda, RF video overlay, and others) by patching individual fibers in the
aggregation point. It allows for easy unbundling of individual lines.
So [GNA] decided to go for point-to-point in Amsterdam: it did (and does) not
make sense to be “penny wise and pound foolish,” by saving on fiber upfront but running
the risk of having to redo the outside fiber plant in a decade or two. Paying a slightly
higher cost (estimated at 5% or less of the total CAPEX budget for the project) for more
fiber length and more connectors/patches was considered an acceptable insurance
premium against potential premature technical obsolescence.
The second decision was to build an open access, passive fiber plant that would
support multiple ISPs in competition. In practice this translates to:
•

Unbundled dark fiber access lines, which can be rented individually by an ISP who
wants to serve that particular customer.

•

ISPs can get access to APOPs to install their line cards and related equipment, patch
in their customer access line, and connect to their own backhaul network (Wagter,
2010).

The E.C. sanctioned Amsterdam's investment in GNA determining that the
municipality’s investment was similar to what a private company might have invested in the
project. E.C. Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes commented, “Business activities of
public authorities in the liberalized electronic communications sector have to be analyzed
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carefully because of the potentially distortive effect of any state aid on the business of private
operators, especially in metropolitan areas. However, in this particular case, our investigation
found that the municipality of Amsterdam invests on market terms and that several private
parties make significant investments in the project." (http://www.citynet.nl 2011) The E.C.
reviewed the following issues.
•

The co-investment by two private companies, on equal terms, one a real-estate development
firm that had plausible reason to invest in improving the broadband infrastructure of its real
estate holdings, and the other a company specializing in open fiber infrastructure.

•

The fact that the investment was in passive elements, which were expected to last for thirty
years and therefore could be sustained with the relatively lower rates of return expected by
GNA.

•

The fact that the City of Amsterdam was to be reimbursed all of its pre-project investments,
with interest, as part of the project costs, all of which were intended to be paid from user fees
paid by the wholesale users, and ultimately by the retail subscribers.

•

A close review of the business plan: the E.C. submitted the GNA business plans to one
independent review by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the Dutch authorities submitted a
report from a consulting firm and Delft University, both of which confirmed that the GNA
business plan was sound, that the internal rate of return for the project was “within the
market expectations for companies active in the telecommunications market,” and that it was
robust to a wide range of sensitivity tests based on penetration rates, cost evaluations, and
other market contingencies (Benkler, 2009, p.167).

The public-private model however became more private than public (Benkler, 2009, p.121) when
Reggefiber, as part of its joint venture with incumbent KPN, bought out most of the shares of the
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city and the social housing corporations, raising its ownership stake to 70% in 2009. By then the
project was planning to roll out to 100K more homes beginning in the summer of 2009 (Benkler,
p.167).

Mexico
In early 2013, Mexico was undertaking rapid restructuring of its telecommunications
markets. America Movil owned by Mexican telecomm tycoon Carlos Slim had market shares of
70% of mobile phone subscribers and 80% of landlines (Cattan & Martin, 2013). Rival Televisa
had about 60% of the broadcast TV market (Graham & Gutierrez, 2013). Mexican President
Enrique Pena Nieto said the lack of competition “reduces productivity in Mexico, limiting its
capacity to grow and generate better-paying jobs.” Communications and Transportation Minister
Gerardo Ruiz Esparza said the proposed Federal Telecommunications Institute would be able to
regulate competition and “will be able to mandate the divestiture of assets of market participants
to the extent necessary to eliminate anticompetitive effects.” (Cattan & Martin). Congressman
and member of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution Julio Cesar Moreno said, "In our
country there is just one territory and it is not the territory or property of any one telephone
company. Neither can we continue being held hostage to monopolists.” (Graham & Gutierrez).
The goal of the legislation was to create more competition in the country’s
telecommunications industry (Cattan & Martin, 2013). The bill sought to boost foreign
competition and give regulators the power to force firms to sell assets if they had more than 50%
of the market (Alper, 2013). In the lower house, PRI lawmakers sought to amend the bill
ensuring that Mexico followed a reciprocal approach to opening up its market to foreign
investment. The size of holdings foreign firms could take in Mexico would not be allowed to
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exceed the share Mexican firms could hold in that country's market. The bill also proposed
allowing foreign investors to take up to 49% ownership of TV or radio broadcasters, pending a
review by a foreign investment commission. Some major economies did not allow foreign firms
such a large holding share. Some lawmakers opposed a provision that the president had to be
consulted on telecommunications concessions. A separate provision of the bill pledged to create
a new independent telecommunications regulator (Graham & Gutierrez, 2013). The regulator
would possess the power to set maximum prices for provider interconnections, currently
considered to be a severe obstacle to competitors in the fixed-line and wireless markets. The bill
also permitted existing television networks — the duopoly consisting of Televisa and TV Azteca
- offer their free over-the-air programming at no cost to cable operators, which will allow Slim to
compete against his rivals for the first time. America Movil could then offer “triple play”
bundled service packages including television, Internet, and phone (Estevez, 2013).
America Movil accounted for more than 15% of the Mexican stock market (Bases, 2013)
and had lost about $19B year-to-date in market value (Alper, 2013). Its shares fell 22% in the
year to date on investor fears that new regulations would force them to sell assets. BullTick
Capital Markets head of research Alberto Bernal said, "It is complicated news for American
Movil itself in the short-term, but clearly this is a positive development from the standpoint of
potential growth.” (Bases, 2013). However America Movil stood to gain more by entrance into
the paid TV sector - from which it had been barred by Mexican regulators - than it might lose by
ceding its shares of the telephone and Internet markets. Also, Standard and Poor's cited
promising chances for the government to complete its reforms, which would likely lead to an
upgrade of its low investment grade rating of BBB (Graham & Gutierrez, 2013) decreasing its
borrowing interest rates.
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Slim said he welcomed the plan as a boon for competition. "The telecommunications law
… coincides with everything this (broadband commission of the International
Telecommunication Union) has sought: universal service, better prices, higher speeds, and
convergence.” Asked whether he thought the bill would increase foreign and domestic
investment, Slim said "Hopefully." (Alper, 2013). Slim said that the work of the Commission
would “pressure” governments to provide “universal access” to their people and called for an
increased investment in broadband around the world. To do this, governments needed to work
with the private sector and learn from other best practices around the world (Estevez, 2013).

Google Fiber
Major end user Google had been purchasing dark fibers and remotely locating more of its
servers further downstream to increase provision efficiency. However the local and last mile
markets were still bottlenecks inhibiting end users’ access to Google’s services. Google then
announced it would provide ISP service via fiber in select markets. Experts considered two
possible reasons why Google was launching a fiber network. Google wanted to see what end
users would do with a gigabit network connection, and Google’s YouTube was streaming movies
and TV shows, so the service would benefit from faster network speeds and fewer delays.
Others speculated that Google’s move was its answer to attacks on network neutrality by
providers including Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T who complained about the price of upgrading
and maintaining their network, and wanted to charge large end users like Google premium rates
to allow end users faster access to its sites. Google might have wanted to prove that faster
networks could be provided at more reasonable prices (Merrell, 2012).
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Independent telecommunications analyst Jeff Kagan said Google’s entry into the market
would bring true competition through price cuts from providers that would be terrified of
Google's potential success. Consumers wanted lower prices to combat what has been a doubling
of cable TV prices every ten years, he said. "It has been falling on deaf ears with the cables
companies until competitors started coming in. If Verizon and AT&T were the only competitors,
I'm afraid that wouldn't be enough to change things. Now that Google is making waves this is
where the cable TV industry is either going to be fixed or stay broken." Both Google and Apple
caused similar large impacts when they moved into the wireless market where neither had any
previous experience in before. Kagan said, "Now they are one and two in that market. They
could do the same thing with television. And if they do, it's going to throw Comcast and Cox
and other cable providers into a whirlwind, a death spiral, as their customers leave. This is what
we could see in the next few years." That potential scenario could be the only way to lower
prices for consumers, said Kagan. "If and when [Google] gets this right, it's going to send
quakes of terror through the cable TV industry." (Weiss, 2012). Forrester Research analyst
Charles Golvin said, "In general, efforts like … Google Fiber that create new models for
bringing higher speed broadband to customers are good for the market and for disrupting what is
primarily a duopoly in broadband access in most markets.” (Farivar, 2012). However, Google is
likely not interested in being an ISP, but rather in fostering a competitive climate in which
ultrafast service becomes the norm (Hardy, 2012). It may have just wanted to encourage existing
ISPs to offer higher speed services across the U.S. (Finley, 2013a).
Google chose the Kansas City area as the place to start their Google Fiber project after
asking communities across the nation if they'd want to be the test site for the project. Google
Access general manager Kevin Lo wrote, "More than 1,100 cities raised their hands, and those of
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you in Kansas City, KS and Kansas City, MO won us over with your enthusiasm for better, faster
web connections. Google Fiber works better when communities are connected together. So
we’ve divided Kansas City into small communities we call ‘Fiberhoods.’ We’ll install only
where there’s enough interest, and we’ll install sooner in fiberhoods where there’s more interest
(Weiss, 2012).
Google chose an aerial installation for the fiber lines upon public power poles. CapStone
Investments senior Internet analyst Rory Maher said, “Kansas City owns a lot of the
infrastructure needed to build out the fiber network.” In the portion of the metro area located in
the State of Kansas, the majority of power poles were controlled by the Board of Public Utilities
rather than by private providers. Thus Google likely had an easy time negotiating with BPU for
the right to string wires across their poles, and reportedly paid 50% less per pole than its
competitors. Poles in other towns were usually owned by private providers, thus Google chose
not to negotiate with them (Koerner, 2013, pp.28-29) initially in those areas. Broadpoint Amtech
analyst Benjamin Schachter estimated that Google’s Kansas City network could cost over $1B to
build. GigaOM reported though that Google saved on its deployments in various ways, such as
piggybacking on existing power line infrastructure and building its own network equipment
(Finley, 2013a). The fiber network facilitated data at speeds more than 100 times faster than
what most U.S. end users had at the time, according to Google (Weiss, 2012). Google executive
chairman Eric Schmidt said Google was delivering 760Mb/sec to and taking 720Mb/sec from
end users (Hardy, 2012).
Google offered three service plans to end users.
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For $120 per month, end users received unlimited data up to 1Gb/sec upload and download
speeds, and Google's IPTV service — a Nexus 7 tablet, TV Box, Storage Box, Network Box,
and 1TB of storage on Google Drive on a two-year contract.

•

For $70 per month, end users received unlimited data on up to 1Gb/sec upload and
download, the Network Box, and 1TB of Google Drive storage.

•

For $0 per month (but including the $300 upfront construction fee payable in $25 monthly
installments), end users received up to 5Mb/sec download and up to 1Mb/sec upload, with
unlimited data and the Network Box included. Google promised to keep this option free for
at least seven years. The latter package was targeted to Kansas City residents who may not
have had high speed services already (Taylor, 2012).

A difference in Google Fiber’s deployment from other competitors’ roll outs might have
been its incentive to pay for the rollout by encouraging end users who wanted service to
encourage their neighbors to sign-up in advance, thereby lowering the risk of deploying to a
particular neighborhood (Finley, 2013a). If between 40 and 80 people in one area registered in
six weeks, Google would then roll out fiber to their locale. During the introductory period for
two of the plans, Google waived a $300 down payment requirement for end users to have the
fiber installed (Taylor, 2012). Lo said neighborhoods with higher numbers of pre-registrations
were the first ones to get the services. Google said, "The first homes will get service shortly
after the rally ends, and all qualifying neighborhoods will receive service before the end of
2013." As part of the program, Google said it would also connect community buildings
including schools, libraries, and hospitals with free Gigabit Internet if the fiberhoods reached
their pre-registration goals (Weiss, 2012).
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As previously discussed, gigabit speeds enabled new uses for end users. Google
executive chairman Eric Schmidt said, "All of the distinctions, like HD, DVD, that we grew up
with, go away. You really imagine that your computer is really in a data center.
Teleconferences will become holographic. People take advantage of this kind of increase."
Google found the more people that were on the Internet, the more they searched for things,
which benefited Google's core advertising business. Schmidt said Google Fiber changed the
landscape of cities where it was deployed. "There are all sorts of bizarre things. We started
wiring one neighborhood, and a whole bunch of start-ups bought houses in the neighborhood so
they could get faster bandwidth.” Schmidt added that although the project was "good for real
estate values, I'm not sure that's (a) sustainable real estate strategy." (Hardy, 2012). Lesa
Mitchell, vice president at the multi-$B non-profit Kauffman Foundation that was aiding local
start-ups and officials turn around Kansas City, said “What Google is providing is a catalyst.
This infrastructure is enormously important to create a ripple effect of entrepreneurial activity.”
(Google’s Kansas City experiment begins to yield start-ups, 2013). Fiber to the Home Council
of the Americas President Heather Burnett Gold said of the gigabit rollout, “It will spur
innovation. It’s like improving your highways. It’s something you need to do.” (Canon, 2013).
GigaBit Squared president and co-founder Mark Ansboury believed that the more important
issue might be inaction. “Not having this infrastructure is why certain businesses haven’t moved
in, or have left.” (Finley, 2013a).
Startups and other ventures in Kansas City were exploring the consumer applications of
gigabit connections, such as gaming and streaming media (Finley, 2013b). Kansas City Public
Library officials were investigating virtual software checkouts. Traditionally, end users required
a computer with sufficient processing power. Then the software of choice could cost say another
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$300. But with the high speed connections, the library could instead keep the software on its
servers and let end users remotely access and use it. On ordinary Internet service, working
remotely with such bulky programs and large files was impractical. Kansas City Public Library
digital branch manager David LaCrone said over gigabit connections, “It’s just putting the
software in front of you. You’d see your 8-year-old computer do amazing things.” Google said,
“We’ve heard from graphic designers, video producers, transcriptionists, people who work from
home, students and lots of other folks who are obviously benefiting from faster speeds right now.
We’ve been really excited about some of the ideas we’ve seen coming out of KC, and we can’t
wait to see those ideas develop into cool new products.” U.S. Ignite executive director Bill
Wallace said, “So far, developers have been working in an environment of scarcity. Only in the
last couple of years have developers begun to imagine an environment of abundance.” (Canon,
2013). In other examples, 18-year-old game developer Nick Budidharma drove with his parents
from Hilton Head, SC to live in a “hacker home” connected to Google’s Fiber network. Synthia
Payne relocated from Denver to launch a start-up company to let musicians jam real-time online.
Their sleepy weekly gathering for Web entrepreneurs recently attracted a standing-room-only
crowd of 260 businesspeople, investors, and city officials (Google’s Kansas City experiment
begins to yield start-ups, 2013).
In response to Google’s market entry, Time Warner Cable in Kansas City placed posters
in its headquarters there asking employees to provide any information they heard about Google
Fiber (Merrell, 2012). Time Warner Cable chief technology officer Irene Esteves downplayed
the importance of offering service to compete with Google. “We’re in the business of delivering
what consumers want, and to stay a little ahead of what we think they will want. We just don’t
see the need of delivering that (gigabit service) to consumers.” Esteves thought only business
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customers would need that kind of service, and she noted that Time Warner already offered
gigabit to businesses in some markets. She did say that if demand and applications increased,
Time Warner would be interested in offering faster service to communities.
Some thought however it might have been too late for Time Warner and other
incumbents to match Google. Experts believed that their reluctance had less to do with a lack of
customer demand and more to do with protecting their high margin ISP businesses. Bernstein
Research analyst Craig Moffet said Time Warner Cable made approximately 97% profit on its
existing services (Finley, 2013b). Verizon began offering FiOS fiber-based Internet in some
states in 2005 and stated its investment was $23B. But some questioned the claim, and investors
were uneasy about their investment all along. Verizon later confirmed that it would not expand
FiOS service to other states or roll out to additional neighborhoods (Finley, 2013a). FiOS was
also more expensive than Google Fiber (Finley, 2013b). DSL Reports author and ISP industry
watcher Karl Bode believed Verizon had a change of heart regarding FiOS. “I think ex-Verizon
CEO Ivan Seidenberg was very bullish on fiber. But after retirement, he was replaced by
executives who wanted to focus more heavily on wireless, given the lower cost of deployment
and the absolute killing that can be made charging users a significant amount per gigabyte.”
Bode also blamed “money men”. “Investors in this country are simply too myopic to wait the
required length of time to see adequate returns. These services are certainly profitable, they’re
just not profitable enough quickly enough for short-sighted investors.” Bode added Verizon was
neglecting not just FiOS, but all of its other fixed line services in favor of wireless services. “I
think both Verizon and AT&T have made the decision to hang up on any further fixed line
broadband competition and are happily letting those users flee to cable. “Cable in turn will help
them by directing their users to wireless services. We’ve effectively just seen the birth of a
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significantly less competitive broadband market where cable has a monopoly on fixed line
broadband, and nobody appears to have noticed.” Ansboury also said, “Competitors (such as
Verizon) have been overbuilding, investors are wondering where the returns are. What you’re
seeing is an entrenchment, companies leveraging what they already have in play.” (Finley,
2013a).
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
The study’s research question was investigated by conducting an experiment emulating
various wireline telecommunications local and last mile market segment constructs addressing
the question’s equal open access and competition concerns. The experiment could have been
tried and tested upon live real world networks, but researchers experimenting with protocol
improvements inadvertently disrupted the Internet (McMillan, 2010). The more specific the
design of an experiment, the more improved the quality of the data it should obtain. Thus for the
feasibility of this study, smaller scale versions of sample contemporary local and last mile
markets were modeled and emulated using standard network technology and off-the-shelf end
user equipment in a laboratory-like environment to possibly predict effects prior to any real
world implementation.
Modeling and emulation have been acceptable for use in other experiments. “Modeling”
was an attempt to precisely characterize the essential components and interactions of a subject
system – a representation of an object, system, or idea in some form other than that of the entity
itself (Cook, 2001, p.8). A model was a physical, mathematical, or logical representation of a
system, entity, phenomenon, or process intended to promote understanding. Models described
how a simplified version of real world activity would perform, and could test hypotheses at a
fraction of the cost of actually constructing the activities that the models simulated. One primary
benefit of a model was that researchers could use a simple approximation of a system/process
and gradually refine the model as their understanding of the system/process improved thus
enabling them to achieve good approximations of very complex problems quickly. Models
became increasingly accurate with additional refinements (Björlin, 2005, p.16).
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Dynamic modeling (a.k.a. “Simulation”) was a software representation of the dynamic or
time-based behavior of a system. While a static model involved a single computation of an
equation, dynamic modeling was iterative and constantly recomputed its equations as time
changed. Dynamic modeling could predict the outcomes of possible courses of action and
account for the effects of variances or randomness (Björlin, 2005, p.16).
Simulation was the process of designing a computerized model of a system (or process)
and conducting experiments with the model for understanding the behavior of the system,
evaluating various strategies for the operation of the system, and determining real-world
interactions. A simulation allowed a researcher to develop a logical abstraction (an object), and
then examine how an object behaved under differing stimulus. Changes to the subject could then
be implemented, tested, and evaluated in the simulation, which was easier, cheaper, and faster
than creating many different physical subjects, each with only slightly different attributes. A
simulation could be of benefit if it was impossible (or impractical) to construct an actual working
subject to test changes. Before a simulation could be of benefit, a model of the system had to be
developed to allow the simulation developer to construct the simulation. In a perfect world, the
subject of a simulation would have precise rules for its attributes, operations, and interactions
stated in natural language, or preferably in mathematical rules (Cook, 2001, p.8). Network
simulation provided a controlled and repeatable environment for modeling and testing computer
networks (Taleb, 2005, p.1) and different components such as hosts, routers, hubs, proxy caches,
links, protocols for computer communication, and applications using the network components
(Xu, 2006, p.1). Network simulation had long been the method of choice for testing various
Internet protocols and applications. Network performance research could be performed on a
laboratory network testbed consisting of co-located hosts and routers (Taleb, p.1). Large
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network simulation models usually modeled network topology by assuming a number of endnodes and a number of routers, with each end-node connected to only one router to represent the
last hop link from the network to the end host, and the routers were interconnected to represent
the backbone network (Xu, p.12). However, network simulation could be a very timeconsuming and expensive solution as researchers had to purchase a lot of hardware and configure
the network. Performing different types of experiments on the testbed needed much time since
each experiment could require a reconfiguration of the network. Moreover, the performance of a
small network testbed could greatly differ from the performance of Internet-scale networks.
(Taleb, p.1) In some cases however, network simulation might not have been the appropriate
tool for analyzing Internet-scale networks (Taleb, p.2).
Network “emulation” was a … powerful networking research tool … that enabled the
testing of real network protocols and applications under a controlled simulation environment
(Taleb, 2005, p.2). Emulation testbeds were used instead of simulators to conduct experiments
with real hardware and software (Chertov, 2008, p.4). A network emulator allowed real network
traffic to interact with traffic generated from a simulation environment, and the simulated
network could be easily reconfigured to reflect different network characteristics (Taleb, 2005,
p.5). The advantage of using a network emulator as opposed to a simulator was that an
emulation environment afforded much higher fidelity since the emulation testbed used real
devices with limited resources, real applications, and operating systems … to faithfully represent
every host in an experiment - provided that it was correctly configured to avoid artifacts
(Chertov, p.16). Simulators and emulation testbeds though did not always faithfully represent
router characteristics, and few testbeds had real routers because the number/type of routers and
ports were limited thus imposing limitations on the experiment topology scale. The routers had
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to be emulated by computer workstations, hence sacrificing fidelity and potentially inducing
artifacts (Chertov, p.4). Chertov reported his trials demonstrated that a regular commodity
workstation running Linux could outperform low to mid-range Cisco routers (Chertov, p.16).
To collect network traffic data for his simulation experiment, Zhou used both passive
data collection sensors (”sniffers”) installed at each node or at the main network gateway, and
active data collection by sending packets out and measuring the responses to the packets (Zhou,
2005, p.20). The instruments used in simulations and emulations presented concerns regarding
experimental verification and validation. Björlin said if a model was going to be credible and a
predictor of future behavior of a system/process, it had to pass a rigorous verification and
validation process. “Verification” meant the model was behaving exactly as intended by the
researcher after rigorous reviews of code and/or mathematical/logical proofs, inputs, and outputs.
“Validation” meant the model was replicating the behavior of the system that it was modeling
(Björlin, 2005, p.16), referring also to “External Validity” - generalizability, reliability, and
reproducibility of the findings of the study under specific conditions. Chertov noted a key
advantage of using such emulation testbeds was that the results were reproducible, allowing for
detailed comparisons and careful sensitivity analysis. (Chertov, 2008, p.15). Cook elaborated
upon validation and verification for simulations.
Validation of the model is required. These steps are just as important in a
simulation as they are in any system. A system that is not validated has not been fieldtested against the real world and could produce invalid results. Abstraction and
validation are equally necessary to create a reliable model that correctly reflects the real
world, and also contains all attributes necessary to make the model a useful tool for
prediction. This validation must take place at two different times. The model must be
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validated against the real world. Then the model must be validated again after the
simulation has been created. The simulation outputs will help revalidate the model
against the real world. The second validation focuses on validating the simulation against
the model, with little emphasis on revalidating the model against the real world (Cook,
2001, p.8).
First the model is created and validated. Next the simulation is created, verified,
and validated. Only then can meaningful results be obtained and carefully examined
against reality. Tests must be performed to ensure that the model and simulation
accurately represent the real world before the simulation can be used to predict behavior
(Cook, 2001, p.10).
Reviewing and validating the model prior to and also after the simulation is
created is recommended. A reevaluation of the validity of the model after coding is
required. The creation of a valid model requires experts who understand the workings of
the physical system. The experts must be available not only to help create the model, but
also for all phases of verification and validation. If expertise is absent during verification
and validation, only verification will be performed. This will result in a system that is
consistent and internally correct, but also one that might not actually correspond to (and
therefore cannot be used as a reliable predictor of) the real world (Cook, p.9).
Xu pointed out that larger scale simulations would produce more meaningful validation,
since conclusions from smaller scale simulations might not be valid when scaled. Such large
scale network research would demand the ability to simulate large networks (Xu, 2006, p.2). A
potential challenge was to reduce the simulation resource requirements that larger simulations
could fit into a single workstation without sacrificing the accuracy of the results. Certain
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simulation details could be rationed to reduce resource requirements, but the validity of the
simulation results could become questionable because of the loss of accuracy (Xu, p.3).

Design
The design of the study’s experiment involved several phases. Samples of actual
hypothetical local and last mile wireline telecommunications markets were modeled into
diagrams and grouped into related types of scenarios. Various factors including access
restrictions, market control, and end user choices were then added to each of the scenarios’
conditions. Scaled-down emulations of each scenario model were then designed requiring
network equipment, personal computers, and software. Additional computer workstations
serving as emulated end users were to serve as the instrument. The workstations were to
generate trace file data for verification and validation purposes and store it for later export. A set
of non-technical observational questions pertaining to the scenario models and emulations
regarding governance and business models, politics, network theory, etc., to be answered during
the experiment was created to provide data for answering the research question. (Appendix B).
Data generated by the experiment and the questionnaire was designed to be exportable in digital
formats compatible for incorporation into this report.
Since the study did not involve human subjects, the West Virginia University
Institutional Review Board replied that their authorization for this particular non-human study to
be conducted was not necessary.
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Models
Modeling a census of the actual and hypothetical local and last mile wireline
telecommunication markets would ideally result in the most data results for optimum analysis.
However for the practical feasibility of this study, only a number of select topology samples
considered to be representative of contemporary local and last mile markets together with
additional hypothetical constructs based upon the literature review, conversations with industry
experts, and field observations were modeled into diagrams.
The models were categorized into 16 scenarios. In Part A of each scenario the first
model featured a construct of an end-to-end network - the Internet being one example. One or
two downstream end users had connections to one or more providers in the local market. In
some scenarios those providers were interconnected to each other, in others they were not. In
most of the scenarios the local market providers had access to the upstream Tier I provider,
although in a few cases a provider did not have that access available. The Tier I ISP then
connected to the Upstream End User’s router and workstation. Part B of the scenarios replicated
Part A, except an additional ISP was added to the local market to represent their entry and
potentially increased market competition and address the research question’s open access and
competition concerns. Some scenarios included additional construct variants of the first Part B
models featuring the competitive ISP’s optional access to the upstream Tier I provider, other
local market providers, and the downstream end user(s). Certain scenarios included a Part C
where the additional ISP represented Google Fiber. Not every possible model variant was
included in the later scenarios since there was obvious duplicity that would have rendered
identical results.
The models were then described with the following constructs and conditions.
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1. A local market served by only one private provider that provides its own system and carriage
service between upstream providers to local market end users.
2. A local market served by multiple providers that provide their own systems and carriage
services between upstream providers to local market end users.
3. A local market dominated by two duopolistic providers where all providers provide their own
systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users.
4. A local market dominated by a monopolistic provider where all providers provide their own
systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users.
5. A local market served by only a public MAN that provides its own system and carriage
service between upstream providers to local market end users.
6. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN that provide their own
systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users.
7. A local market including a public MAN dominated by two duopolistic private providers
where all providers provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream
providers to local market end users.
8. A local market including a public MAN dominated by a monopolistic private provider where
all providers provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to
local market end users.
9. A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN where all providers
provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market
end users, and where other private providers and the public MAN can optionally access and
use each others’ last mile systems to provide service.
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A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where two private
providers are the only last mile system and service providers. Other private providers
and the public MAN must access and use either or both of those private providers’ last
mile systems to provide service.

11.

A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where one private
provider is the only last mile system and service provider. Other private providers and
the public MAN must access and use the sole private provider’s last mile system to
provide service.

12.

A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public
MAN is the only last mile system and service provider. Other private providers must
access and use the MAN’s last mile system to provide service.

13.

A local market served by one private provider and a public MAN, where the public MAN
is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage service.

14.

A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public
MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage
service.

15.

A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN that is dominated
by two duopolistic providers. The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but
does not provide upstream carriage service.

16.

A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN that is dominated
by a monopolistic provider. The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but
does not provide upstream carriage service.
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Emulation
The emulation of the models in this experiment used networking equipment, computers,
and software configured to represent providers’ and end users’ systems within a “laboratory”
facility. Other appurtenances and accessories and technical assistance were required to support
the emulation.

Emulation Hardware
The emulation test bed used a number of small office/home office routers and off-theshelf personal computers to emulate providers’ and end users’ systems and workstations. The
scenarios required each provider have one router and one computer used for controlling and
monitoring the router. The test with the most extensive buildout required a total of nine routers
and computers, and the tests with the most number of connections between the routers required
those routers have six ports each plus one for their controlling computers.
Ten Netgear ProSafe FVS318G Firewall wireline-only routers with eight ports running at
1Gb/sec were acquired for use as the emulated routers. 15 used Dell Optiplex GX150 Pentium
III desktop computers each running at 930MHz with 256MB RAM, between 20-40MB hard
drives, one onboard 1Gb/sec Ethernet port, and one or two 1Gb/sec Ethernet PCI NICs were
acquired, nine of which were used for the router controlling and monitoring computers. Three of
the 15 computers were used for the one upstream and two downstream end user workstations, but
those did not have access to the router’s control functions. An Apple iBook running at 600MHz
with 384MB RAM and a 14GB hard drive was acquired for extra assistance in constructing and
spot checking the emulations.
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The acquired routers were all refurbished by the manufacturer. Based upon past
experience, any equipment that required repairs could possibly malfunction again, thus there was
some slight degree of risk to the reliability and functionality of the routers. Conversely, other
similar routers previously purchased new also failed for various reasons. The particular model of
Dell computers also had issues. It was learned after the computers were acquired that a lawsuit
filed in a U.S. federal district court accused Dell of using bad Nichicon Corp. capacitors in its
Optiplex desktop series computers and covering up the problems. Some leaking capacitors
caused various problems that resulted in the computers malfunctioning, which Dell tried to
blame on end user overuse of the processors (Vance, 2010). The routers and computers were
monitored throughout the experiment for their proper functionality. The extra routers and
computers were held in hot standby reserve in case of contingencies.

Emulation Operating Systems
The firmware used by the Netgear FVS318G routers was version 3.1.1-08. The operating
systems installed on the Dell Optiplex 150GX units used for controlling and monitoring the
routers was Red Hat Enterprise Linux derivative Community ENTerprise Operating System,
a.k.a. CentOS, version 5.8. One Dell unit for testing and other purposes had Windows XP SP2
installed, and the iMac laptop used for similar purposes had OS 10.4.11 installed.

Emulation Software
The experiment required a number of software applications to emulate providers’ and end
users’ routers and workstations. To access the routers’ internal web-based management software
for control and monitoring, WWW browsers CentOS-based Mozilla Firefox ESR 10.0.12 and
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Windows XP-based Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 were used on the Dell computers, and Apple
OS X-based Safari 4.1.3 was used on the iBook.

Appurtenances and Accessories
Other items required and/or helpful to construct and conduct the experiment included
monitors, mice, and keyboards for each computer, ANSI/TIA-568-B.2-1 Ethernet-based
Category 6 cables with all segments kept shorter than the standard’s 100m maximum length,
power cords, power strips, multiple power outlets, tables, and hand tools.

Technical Assistance
Construction, configuration, and operation of the emulation required the technical
assistance of a network consultant since the researcher was not literate in networking beyond
establishing basic one-router home networks.

Instrumentation
The instrument used in this experiment included most of the same hardware and
operating systems used for the emulation, with additional software to produce and report data.

Instrument Hardware
The instrument used most of the same hardware as listed in the Emulation Hardware
section. A Sony HandyCam DCR-TRV480 digital video camera and a Sony DSC-W150
Cybershot digital camera were available to record certain events during the experiment if
necessary. Memory sticks were used to transfer trace files and other data saved on those
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computers functioning as instruments to an external workstation for further processing and
incorporation into this report.

Instrument Operating Systems
The firmware used by the Netgear FVS318G routers was version 3.1.1-08. The operating
systems installed on the Dell Optiplex 150GX units used for the end user workstations was Red
Hat Enterprise Linux derivative Community ENTerprise Operating System, a.k.a. CentOS,
version 5.8. One Dell unit for testing and other purposes had Windows XP SP2 installed, and the
iMac laptop used for similar purposes had OS 10.4.11 installed.

Instrument Software
The instrument required a number of software applications to generate and record the
data from the three end user workstations. Windows XP-based software included Traceroute
application Tracert 5.1 and Ping application Ping 5.1. Apple OS X-based software included
Network Utility 1.4.2 featuring Ping and Traceroute.

Appurtenances and Accessories
Other items required and/or helpful to construct and conduct the experiment included
monitors, mice, and keyboards for each computer, Ethernet network cabling, power cords, power
strips, multiple power outlets, tables, and hand tools.
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Technical Assistance
Construction, configuration, and operation of the instrument required the technical
assistance of a network consultant since the researcher was not literate in networking beyond
establishing basic one-router home networks.

Procedure
The following procedure was used to prepare for and conduct the experiment. All of the
necessary hardware, operating systems, software, appurtenances, and accessories for the
emulation and instrument were acquired. One monitor, keyboard, mouse, and power cord were
connected to each Dell computer, and the power cords from the monitors and computers were
connected to power strips that were plugged into wall sockets. The computers were then booted
up and checked for their basic functionality. A couple workstations had problems, mostly due to
dirt in the cooling fans causing noise, sticky liquids in the keyboards, and debris caking inside
the mice. The affected components were cleaned and returned to service.
Due to the excessive cost of actual routers, an alternative using the free Vyatta routing
software, multiple NICs, and managed switches was considered. The option would have utilized
the Dell computers as routers with some basic capabilities on par with dedicated higher end
routers. However the software was quite involved and required Linux literacy, and fortunately
an affordable lot of ten refurbished Netgear routers became available and were acquired, thus the
PCs were relegated as controls for the routers and as end user workstations.
Operating system CentOS 6.2 was initially loaded on one computer, but the installation
failed after a number of attempts. Further research indicated the computers were not advanced
enough to handle that version, so the older CentOS 5.8 was instead loaded on the unit, and was
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successfully configured and deemed functional. A number of the other computers were loaded
and configured with the operating system, and then were connected to the Internet for upgrades
to the operating system that were downloaded and installed. One Dell computer was loaded with
Windows XP SP2 and was deemed functional. That unit was not connected to the Internet so as
to avoid acquiring viruses and the like. The iBook was acquired with its OS previously installed
and upgraded to the highest version available for its processor and model type. During the
construction of the experiment, one Dell unit overheated due to its fan thought to have been
previously cleaned seizing up and affecting the hard drive and RAM. The unit was pulled from
service and put on standby for parts. The iBook’s Ethernet port would only work with a specific
cable attached between it and the Upstream End User router.
The routers were connected to power supplies and booted up to check their
functionalities. The Dell computers running CentOS were attached to a port on each of the
routers to be used as configuration and monitoring terminals. Time with the consultant was
scheduled for consultation on configuring the routers and reviewing the construction and
operation of the emulation and instrument for each model. Data was generated from the research
filling out the observation questions for all of the scenario models.
The following sections detail the specific procedures for each scenario test.

Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by only one incumbent provider between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B,
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local
and last mile markets.
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Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 1.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Five computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, ISP2,
and Downstream End User.
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together per Model 1.1.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router.
c. Tier I ISP router-LEC router.
d. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
e. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 1.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
8. The procedure for Part B, Test 1.2 is as follows.
9. Disconnect the Upstream End User router and the LEC router from the Tier I ISP router.
10.

Network a switch to the Tier I ISP router.

11.

Network the Upstream End User router, LEC router, and ISP2 router to the Tier I router
switch.

12.

Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.2. Model 1.2 Test Topology.
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13.

Power up the units.

14.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and
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Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router.
15.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

16.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

17.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 1.2.

18.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 1.3 is as follows.
19.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

20.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.3. Model 1.3 Test Topology.
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21.

Power up the units.

22.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and
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Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router.
23.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

24.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

25.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 1.3.

26.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 2
In Scenario 2, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B,
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local
and last mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 2.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Seven computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
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b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router.
f. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
g. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
h. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
i. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.4. Model 2.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 2.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
8. The procedure for Part B, Test 2.2 is as follows.
9. Network the Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router together.
10.

Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.5. Model 2.2 Test Topology.
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11.

Power up the units.

12.

Configure the routers as needed.

13.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and
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Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router.
14.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

15.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

16.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.2.

17.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 2.3 is as follows.
18.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

19.

Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.6 Model 2.3 Test Topology.
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20.

Power up the units.

21.

Configure the routers as needed.

22.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC
router as an additional route.

23.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

24.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.3.

25.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 2.4 is as follows.
26.

Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

27.

Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.7. Model 2.4 Test Topology.
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28.

Power up the units.

29.

Configure the routers as needed.

30.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1
router as an additional route.

31.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

32.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.4.

33.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 2.5 is as follows.
34.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router
connection.

35.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.8. Model 2.5 Test Topology.
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36.

Power up the units.

37.

Configure the routers as needed.

38.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

39.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

40.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 2.5.

41.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 3
In Scenario 3, Part A will attempt to emulate a local market dominated by two private
duopolistic providers between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor
ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt
to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2. Note – only a representative sample of all of the
possible last mile connection combinations will tested.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 3.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Seven computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

185

b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Three computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User,
Downstream End User #1, and Downstream End User #2.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router.
f. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
g. CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2.
h. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
i. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation #1.
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Figure 3.9. Model 3.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 3.2 is as follows.
8. Network the Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router together.
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End
User Workstation #2.
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Figure 3.10. Model 3.2 Test Topology.
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10.

Power up the units.

11.

Configure the routers as needed.

12.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
13.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route.

14.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User Workstation #2.

15.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire.

16.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 3.3 is as follows.
17.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

18.

Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2
connection.

19.

Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together.

20.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together.
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Figure 3.11. Model 3.3 Test Topology.
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21.

Power up the units.

22.

Configure the routers as needed.

23.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
24.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route.

25.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User workstation #2.

26.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire.

27.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 3.4 is as follows.
28.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router
connection.

29.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation
#2 connection.

30.

Network the LEC router-Downstream End User router together.

31.

Network the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together.
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Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.12. Model 3.4 Test Topology.
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33.

Power up the units.

34.

Configure the routers as needed.

35.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Google router.
36.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the Google router as an additional
route.

37.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User Workstation #2.

38.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire.

39.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 4
In Scenario 4, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market
dominated by a monopolistic private provider between the upstream providers to the end users.
In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter
the local and last mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 4.1 is as follows.
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1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Seven computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router.
f. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
g. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
h. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
i. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.13. Model 4.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 4.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 4.2 is as follows.
8. Network the Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router together.
9. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End
User router.
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Figure 3.14. Model 4.2 Test Topology.
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10.

Power up the units.

11.

Configure the routers as needed.

12.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
13.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

14.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

15.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.2.

16.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 4.3 is as follows.
17.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

18.

Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.15. Model 4.3 Test Topology.
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19.

Power up the units.

20.

Configure the routers as needed.

21.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the CC router.
22.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC
router as an additional route.

23.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

24.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.3.

25.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 4.4 is as follows.
26.

Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

27.

Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.16. Model 4.4 Test Topology.
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28.

Power up the units.

29.

Configure the routers as needed.

30.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP1 router.
31.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1
router as an additional route.

32.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

33.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.4.

34.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 4.5 is as follows.
35.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router
connection.

36.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.17. Model 4.5 Test Topology.
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37.

Power up the units.

38.

Configure the routers as needed.

39.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
40.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

41.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

42.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 4.5.

43.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 5
In Scenario 5, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by only a public MAN between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor
ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last
mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 5.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
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a. Five computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, Public MAN,
ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router.
c. Tier I ISP router-Public MAN router.
d. Public MAN router-Downstream End User router.
e. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.18. Model 5.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 5.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 5.2 is as follows.
8. Disconnect the Upstream End User router and the Public MAN router from the Tier I ISP
router.
9. Network a switch to the Tier I ISP router.
10.

Network the Upstream End User router, Public MAN router, and ISP2 router to the Tier I
router switch.

11.

Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.19. Model 5.2 Test Topology.
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12.

Power up the units.

13.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and
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Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router.
14.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

15.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

16.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 5.2.

17.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 5.3 is as follows.
18.

Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router
connection.

19.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.20. Model 5.3 Test Topology.
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20.

Power up the units.

21.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and
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Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router.
22.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

23.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

24.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 5.3.

25.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 6
In Scenario 6, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a Public MAN between the upstream providers to the end
users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt
to enter the local and last mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 6.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
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b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router.
g. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
h. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
i. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.
j. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
k. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.21. Model 6.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 6.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 6.2 is as follows.
8. Network the Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router together.
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End
User router.
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Figure 3.22. Model 6.2 Test Topology.
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10.

Power up the units.

11.

Configure the routers as needed.

12.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP and
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Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router.
13.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

14.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

15.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire.

16.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 6.3 is as follows.
17.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

18.

Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.23. Model 6.3 Test Topology.
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19.

Power up the units.

20.

Configure the routers as needed.

21.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC
router as an additional route.

22.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

23.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.3.

24.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 6.4 is as follows.
25.

Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

26.

Network the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.24. Model 6.4 Test Topology.
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27.

Power up the units.

28.

Configure the routers as needed.

29.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
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Public MAN router as an additional route.
30.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

31.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.4.

32.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 6.5 is as follows.
33.

Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router
connection.

34.

Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.25. Model 6.5 Test Topology.
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35.

Power up the units.

36.

Configure the routers as needed.

37.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1
router as an additional route.

38.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

39.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.5.

40.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 6.6 is as follows.
41.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router
connection.

42.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.26. Model 6.6 Test Topology.
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43.

Power up the units.

44.

Configure the routers as needed.

45.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

46.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

47.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 6.6.

48.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 7
In Scenario 7, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market
including a Public MAN dominated by two duopolistic private providers between the upstream
providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local and last
mile markets. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile
markets as ISP2. Note – only a representative sample of all of the possible last mile connection
combinations will be tested.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 7.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
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a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Three computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User,
Downstream End User #1, and Downstream End User #2.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router.
g. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
h. CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2.
i. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.
j. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User Workstation #2.
k. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation #1.
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Figure 3.27. Model 7.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 7.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 7.2 is as follows.
8. Network the Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router together.
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End
User Workstation #2.
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Figure 3.28. Model 7.2 Test Topology.
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10.

Power up the units.

11.

Configure the routers as needed.

12.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
13.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route.

14.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User workstation #2.

15.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 7.2.

16.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 7.3 is as follows.
17.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

18.

Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2
connection.

19.

Network the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router together.

20.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together.
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Figure 3.29. Model 7.3 Test Topology.
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21.

Power up the units.

22.

Configure the routers as needed.

23.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
24.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the ISP2 router as an additional route.

25.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User workstation #2.

26.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 7.3.

27.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 7.4 is as follows.
28.

Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router
connection.

29.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP2 router-Downstream End User Workstation
#2 connection.

30.

Network the LEC router-Downstream End User router together.

31.

Network the CC router-Downstream End User Workstation #2 together.
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32.
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Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.30. Model 7.4 Test Topology.
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33.

Power up the units.

34.

Configure the routers as needed.

35.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the Google router.

36.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP router to utilize the Google router as an additional
route.

37.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User workstation #2.

38.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 7.4.

39.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 8
In Scenario 8, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market
including a public MAN dominated by a monopolistic private provider between the upstream
providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as
Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Test 8.1 is as follows.
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1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. One switch for the Tier I ISP router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router.
g. LEC router-Downstream End User router.
h. Connect a cable to the CC router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
i. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.
j. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
k. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.31. Model 8.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 8.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Test 8.2 is as follows.
8. Network the Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router together.
9. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream End
User router.
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Figure 3.32. Model 8.2 Test Topology.
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10.

Power up the units.

11.

Configure the routers as needed.

12.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
13.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

14.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

15.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.2.

16.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 8.3 is as follows.
17.

Disconnect the downstream end of the LEC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

18.

Network the CC router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.33. Model 8.3 Test Topology.
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19.

Power up the units.

20.

Configure the routers as needed.

21.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the CC router.
22.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the CC
router as an additional route.

23.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

24.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.3.

25.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 8.4 is as follows.
26.

Disconnect the downstream end of the CC router-Downstream End User router
connection.

27.

Network the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.34. Model 8.4 Test Topology.
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28.

Power up the units.

29.

Configure the routers as needed.

30.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Public MAN router.
31.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Public MAN router as an additional route.

32.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

33.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.4.

34.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 8.5 is as follows.
35.

Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router
connection.

36.

Network the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.35. Model 8.5 Test Topology.
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37.

Power up the units.

38.

Configure the routers as needed.

39.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP1 router.
40.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP1
router as an additional route.

41.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

42.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.5.

43.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 8.6 is as follows.
44.

Disconnect the downstream end of the ISP1 router-Downstream End User router
connection.

45.

Network the ISP2 router-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.36. Model 8.6 Test Topology.

Upstream
End User
WS

Upstream
End User
Router

Tier I
ISP

LEC

CC

Public
MAN

Dnstream
End User
Router

Dnstream
End User
WS

ISP1

ISP2

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION
46.

Power up the units.

47.

Configure the routers as needed.

48.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
49.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

50.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

51.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 8.6.

52.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 9
In Scenario 9, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN between the upstream providers to the end
users, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.
In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter
the local and last mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 9.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
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a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and the Downstream End User.
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch.
m. LEC router switch-Downstream End User router switch.
n. Connect a cable to the CC router switch destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.
o. Connect a cable to the Public MAN router switch destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION
p. Connect a cable to the ISP1 router switch destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.
q. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.37. Model 9.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 9.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
8. The procedure for Part B, Test 9.2 is as follows.
9. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
f. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router switch destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User router.
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Figure 3.38. Model 9.2 Test Topology.
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10.

Power up the units.

11.

Configure the routers as needed.

12.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
13.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

14.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

15.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 9.2.

16.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 10
In Scenario 10, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN but dominated by two duopolistic private
providers, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market
systems. The two duopolistic private providers are the only last mile providers. In Part B,
competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 10.1 is as follows.
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1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. Seven switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream
End User routers.
c. Three computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User,
Downstream End User #1, and Downstream End User #2.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch.
m. LEC router switch-Downstream End User router switch.
n. CC router switch-Downstream End User workstation #2.
o. Downstream End User router switch-Downstream End User workstation #1.
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Figure 3.39. Model 10.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation 1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User workstation 2.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 10.1.
7. Power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 10.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
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Figure 3.40. Model 10.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation 1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User workstation 2.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 10.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 10.3 is as follows.
16.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.

17.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User workstation #2.
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Figure 3.41. Model 10.3 Test Topology.
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18.

Power up the units.

19.

Configure the routers as needed.

20.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Google router.
21.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Google router as an additional route.

22.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation 1.
b. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC
router-Downstream End User workstation 2.

23.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 10.3.

24.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 11
In Scenario 11, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN but dominated by a monopolistic private
provider, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market
systems. The monopolistic private provider is the only last mile provider. In Part B, competitor
ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt
to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
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Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 11.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 routers.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch.
m. LEC router switch-Downstream End User router.
n. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.42. Model 11.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 11.1.
7. Power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 11.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
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Figure 3.43. Model 11.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 11.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 11.3 is as follows.
16.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.44. Model 11.3 Test Topology.
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17.

Power up the units.

18.

Configure the routers as needed.

19.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Google router.
20.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Google router as an additional route.

21.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

22.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 11.3.

23.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 12
In Scenario 12, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN but dominated by the monopolistic public
MAN, and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems.
The monopolistic public MAN is the only last mile provider. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will
then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter
the local and last mile markets as ISP2.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 12.1 is as follows.
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1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. Seven switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 routers.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch.
m. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router.
n. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.45. Model 12.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 12.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 12.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
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Figure 3.46. Model 12.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 12.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 12.3 is as follows.
16.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.47. Model 12.3 Test Topology.
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17.

Power up the units.

18.

Configure the routers as needed.

19.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Google router.
20.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Google router as an additional route.

21.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

22.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 12.3.

23.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 13
In Scenario 13, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by only a public MAN. The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not
provide upstream carriage service. In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and
as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 13.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
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a. Five computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, Public MAN,
ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. One switch for the ISP2 router.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router.
c. Public MAN router-Downstream End User router.
d. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.48. Model 13.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 13.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 13.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router-ISP2 router switch.
b. Public MAN router-ISP2 router switch.
c. Connect a cable to the ISP2 router switch destined to but not connecting with the
Downstream End User Router.
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Figure 3.49. Model 13.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 13.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

The procedure for Part B, Test 13.3 is as follows.
16.

Disconnect the downstream end of the Public MAN router-Downstream End User router
connection.

17.

Network the ISP2 router switch-Downstream End User router together.
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Figure 3.50. Model 13.3 Test Topology.
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18.

Power up the units.

19.

Configure the routers as needed.

20.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the ISP2 router.
21.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

22.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

23.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 13.3.

24.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 14
In Scenario 14, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN, where the Public MAN is the sole last
mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage service. All providers can
optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will
then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter
the local and last mile markets as ISP2.

Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 14.1 is as follows.
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1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 routers.
c. Two computers to be used as workstation clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-Public MAN router switch.
f. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
g. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
h. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
i. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
j. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
k. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-ISP1 router switch.
m. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router.
n. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.51. Model 14.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerPublic MAN Router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 14.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 14.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
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Figure 3.52. Model 14.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Public MAN Router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 14.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 14.3 is as follows.
16.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.53. Model 14.3 Test Topology.
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17.

Power up the units.

18.

Configure the routers as needed.

19.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Google router.
20.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Google router as an additional route.

21.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Public MAN Router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

22.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 14.3.

23.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 15
In Scenario 15, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by two private
duopolistic providers. The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not
provide upstream carriage service. All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local
market systems. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part
C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
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Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 15.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, andISP1, and ISP2 routers.
c. Two computers to be used as workstations for the clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
f. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
g. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
h. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
i. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
j. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
k. ISP1 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router.
m. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Figure 3.54. Model 15.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerPublic MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 15.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 15.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
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Figure 3.55. Model 15.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 15.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
16.

The procedure for Part C, Test 15.3 is as follows.

17.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.56. Model 15.3 Test Topology.
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18.

Power up the units.

19.

Configure the routers as needed.

20.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
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acknowledges the Google router.
21.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Google router as an additional route.

22.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

23.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 15.3.

24.

When finished, power down the units.

Scenario 16
In Scenario 16, Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served
by multiple private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by a private
monopolistic provider. The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not
provide upstream carriage service. All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local
market systems. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part
C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
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Part A.
The procedure for Part A, Test 16.1 is as follows.
1. Secure and situate the following units.
a. Eight computers to be used as routers for an Upstream End User, Tier I ISP, LEC, CC,
Public MAN, ISP1, ISP2, and Downstream End User.
b. Six switches for the Tier I ISP, LEC, CC, Public MAN, andISP1, and ISP2 routers.
c. Two computers to be used as workstations for the clients of the Upstream End User and
Downstream End User routers.
2. Network the following units together.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router.
b. Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router switch.
c. Tier I ISP router switch-LEC router switch.
d. Tier I ISP router switch-CC router switch.
e. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP1 router switch.
f. LEC router switch-CC router switch.
g. LEC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
h. LEC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
i. CC router switch-Public MAN router switch.
j. CC router switch-ISP1 router switch.
k. ISP1 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
l. Public MAN router switch-Downstream End User router.
m. Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

298

Figure 3.57. Model 16.1 Base Topology.
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3. Power up the units.
4. Configure the routers as needed.
5. Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerPublic MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
6. Complete Section A of the questionnaire for Test 16.1.
7. When finished, power down the units.

Part B.
The procedure for Part B, Test 16.2 is as follows.
8. Network the following units together.
a. Tier I ISP router switch-ISP2 router switch.
b. ISP2 router switch-LEC router switch.
c. ISP2 router switch-CC router switch.
d. ISP2 router switch-Public MAN router switch.
e. ISP2 router switch-ISP1 router switch.
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Figure 3.58. Model 16.2 Test Topology.
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9. Power up the units.
10.

Configure the routers as needed.

11.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the ISP2 router.

12.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the ISP2
router as an additional route.

13.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

14.

Complete Section B of the questionnaire for Test 16.2.

15.

When finished, power down the units.

Part C.
The procedure for Part C, Test 16.3 is as follows.
16.

Connect a cable to the Google router destined to but not connecting with the Downstream
End User router.
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Figure 3.59. Model 16.3 Test Topology.
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17.

Power up the units.

18.

Configure the routers as needed.

19.

Using the network analysis software, record whether or not the Tier I ISP router
acknowledges the Google router.

20.

Attempt to configure the Tier I ISP and Downstream End User routers to utilize the
Google router as an additional route.

21.

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s
routes, and record the results.
a. Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC
router-Public MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User
workstation.

22.

Complete Section C of the questionnaire for Test 16.3.

23.

When finished, power down the units.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
Trace file data generated by the end user workstations and certain observational data
requested by the Ch. 3 Procedures and Scenario Questions (Appendix B - Scenario
Questionnaire) were to be acquired (Appendix C - Data) for the analysis of each emulation’s
validation and verification of its models.

Experiment Validation and Verification Data
Trace file data was requested by the Procedures for all of the models.

•

Use network analysis software to confirm the connected units recognize the model’s routes,
and record the results.

Data Acquisition Issues
The routers were thought to have been properly configured and wired correctly to reflect
Model 1.1 and its projected routing table as follows.

1.

Upstream End User Workstation

192.168.7.20

2.

Upstream End User Router

192.168.7.1

3.

Tier I ISP Router

192.168.4.1

4.

LEC Router

192.168.6.1

5.

Downstream End User Router

192.168.12.1

6.

Downstream End User Workstation 192.168.7.20

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION
The construct was documented visually in the following two photos (brightened 20% using
Photoshop).

Figure 4.1. Model 1.1 Test Topology.
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Figure 4.2. Model 1.1 Test Topology Detail.

As a test, the Traceroute command was issued by the Upstream End User Workstation to access
the Tier I ISP router being the next hop. However the request failed to recognize the Tier I ISP
router as shown in an example of the output.

4-29-2013 21:58:23
Traceroute has started ...
traceroute to 192.168.4.1 (192.168.4.1), 64 hops max, 40 byte
packets
1 192.168.7.1 (192.168.7.1) 3.575 ms 17.337 ms 1.857 ms
2 192.168.7.1 (192.168.7.1) 3008.866 ms !H 3005.810 ms !H
3006.944 ms !H
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Numerous changes were made including reconfiguring the routers, swapping cables, swapping
routers, using LAN port-WAN port and WAN port-LAN port router connections vs. LAN portLAN port connections, and trying Traceroute from the downstream routers to the upstream
routers, but the network was unable to have two neighbor routers recognize each other as
required by the scenarios.
To confirm Traceroute itself and the workstation were not at fault, the Upstream End
User Workstation was removed as a client of the Upstream End User router, connected to the
researcher’s home Internet connection, had its IP changed from the static IP 192.168.7.20 to
DHCP, and Traceroute was run with www.Google.com being the destination. The following
route was generated.

4-29-2013 22:31:00
Traceroute has started ...
traceroute: Warning: www.google.com has multiple addresses; using
74.125.228.19
traceroute to www.google.com (74.125.228.19), 64 hops max, 40 byte
packets
1 192.168.2.1 (192.168.2.1) 0.824 ms 1.682 ms 0.289 ms
2 10.15.44.1 (10.15.44.1) 1076.207 ms 62.182 ms 39.625 ms
3 64-5-173-29.rev.omnicity.net (64.5.173.29) 195.465 ms 65.690
ms 110.043 ms
4 68-142-163-1.rev.omnicity.net (68.142.163.1) 54.772 ms
63.983 ms 21.990 ms
5 rrcs-96-11-185-161.central.biz.rr.com (96.11.185.161) 39.543
ms 980.867 ms 73.997 ms
6 be14.clevohek-ccr01.mwrtn.rr.com (65.189.100.62) 73.069 ms
60.793 ms 78.481 ms
7 ae10-0.cr0.dca20.tbone.rr.com (107.14.19.14) 125.139 ms
42.367 ms 84.075 ms
8 ae-2-0.c1.nyc90.tbone.rr.com (66.109.1.49) 194.713 ms
107.14.19.135 (107.14.19.135) 227.399 ms 82.082 ms
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9 74.125.49.181 (74.125.49.181) 229.502 ms 1115.884 ms *
10 209.85.252.46 (209.85.252.46) 301.081 ms 96.707 ms 80.704
ms
11 72.14.238.173 (72.14.238.173) 75.440 ms * 970.551 ms
12 iad23s05-in-f19.1e100.net (74.125.228.19) 2417.000 ms
865.785 ms 86.554 ms

The network was constructed and configured with only very minimal assistance received
from any consultants, as most of them requested to provide service for the experiment, even with
substantial compensation offered, failed to participate and/or help. The following was a
rundown of the individuals and organizations that were contacted for consultation and the results
(note - most of the actual names have been withheld).

•

Student – A very gifted high school student quite literate in networking was requested to
assist with the experiment. After his graduation from high school and enrolment into college
a decade prior to the prospectus of this study being approved, he and his family left the area
and were out of contact thereafter.

•

CTO #1 – A very knowledgeable chief technical officer of an area business indicated interest
in the experiment, but later became more involved with his employer’s networks and was
thereafter unavailable.

•

CTO #2 – A highly knowledgeable and experienced CTO of an actual ISP agreed to consult
on the project, but a few years prior to the prospectus of this study being approved, he
accepted a major business opportunity that understandably required an immense amount of
his time. He subsequently ceased returning calls and emails.

•

Consultant #1 – A local independent consultant to numerous small businesses was interested
in the project and even diagrammed a few configurations, but after numerous calls, emails,
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and in-person meetings that in some later encounters were reduced to begging, he kept
delaying his services saying he was too busy. Other friends of his said he had disappeared.
•

WVU OIT – West Virginia University’s Office of Information Technology that provided
some technical assistance to students was contacted for their potential assistance or if any of
their staff could assist outside of their normal work. Their reply was as follows.

From: "Daniel L" <dlve@wifi7.com>
To: dlve@wifi7.com
Subject: Fwd: Dissertation Consult: *ref#24-587093
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 05:49:46 -0400
----- Original Message ----From:
OITINCIDENT@mail.wvu.edu
To:
dlve@wifi7.com
Cc:
Sent:
26 Feb 2013 09:36:36 -0500
Subject:
Dissertation Consult: *ref#24-587093
Hello,
I am sorry OIT does not offer anything like that.
OIT Help Desk
304-293-4444
*****The progress of your Incident can be obtained at http://oit.wvu.edu/helpdesk/selfservice. If
you are
responding with a screen shot please do not embed them within your message, please add them as
an
attachment.*****
ref#24-587093
Email sent using webmail from Omnicity

•

Consultant #2 – A local firm that serves small and medium sized businesses (and known for
their high prices) was visited in person to request their consultation. Their representative
said the Linux operating system was rarely used, and that two consultants on staff that might
know Linux and would call back later. The consultants never responded.
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Consultant #3 – A past acquaintance quite literate in Linux and networking was contacted via
voice mail for his potential interest, but he never returned the call. Further followup with a
mutual friend revealed he had an “episode” after marriage and fathering a child.

•

Consultant #4 – The mutual friend then placed an advertisement on Facebook requesting
consultation for the project, which was answered by a consultant having an extensive resume
of projects and experience in operating systems and networking. He was interested in the
project, but after reading a prospectus he later emailed that he was too busy with other clients
He did refer another independent consultant located in the area.

•

Consultant #5 – An online background search showed the referred consultant was involved in
a number of area projects, but he never returned a voice mail requesting his services.

•

CTO #3 – A government official recommended a school system CTO as a possible
consultant. After a couple requests by the official, the CTO replied she was not interested.

•

Consultant #6 – The son of the aforementioned school system CTO was also identified as a
consultant. The government official reported he too was not interested in the project.

•

CTO #4 – A mutual friend who was once CTO of a medium-sized firm was contacted for his
interest in the project. He never returned an email.

•

Consultant #6 – Another local firm that served small and medium sized businesses (and
known for advertising their services on local media outlets) was called and an initial meeting
was scheduled for the next week due to their heavy workload. Upon arriving for the meeting,
the consultant announced the meeting had been cancelled shortly after the initial call, and no
future meeting was scheduled due again to their workload.

•

CTO #5 – A government agency CTO was contacted by email and visited in person to
explain the project and request their consultation. The CTO was pleasant but could not fully
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understand the experiment, offered incomprehensible advice, and never seemingly
understood the request for his consultation outside of work so as not to take up much of his
time during official business and risk getting him in trouble.
•

Consultant #7 – A Linux-literate consultant was interested in the project but also was very
busy. He could only offer bits and pieces of information at a time, and his response time to
calls and emails took up to a week at a time. He tried to reconfigure the scenarios to better
reflect the actual end-to-end telecommunication industry including adding numerous market
participants (Appendix D), but the network configurations were confusing, incomplete, and
did not appear to make sense.

Internet searches and YouTube tutorials were a little helpful, but many of them featured different
types of routers, various network configurations, few cases of connecting more than two routers,
and most were primarily concerned with connecting routers and their clients to the Internet. The
instructional quality of their presentations was also largely questionable.
The observation questions requesting verification and validation data for each scenario
included the following.

•

What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?

During the experiment’s design phase, samples of actual hypothetical local and last mile wireline
telecommunications markets were modeled into diagrams and grouped into related types of
scenarios. Various factors including access restrictions, market control, and end user choices
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were then added to each of the scenarios’ conditions. Those factors and conditions for each of
the 16 scenarios served as responses to the question.
Other questions requesting verification and validation data for all Part A Base Models
included the following.

•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and
conditions.

•

Do the connected units recognize each other?

•

What is the potential routing table?

•

Additional observations.

Data requested in all Part B Test Models included the following.

•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and
conditions.

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?

•

Do the connected units recognize each other?

•

What is the potential routing table?

•

Additional observations.
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Data requested in all Part C Test Models where Google entered the market included the
following.

•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and
conditions.

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?

•

Do the connected units recognize each other?

•

What is the potential routing table?

•

Additional observations.

The models’ routes from each procedure and the resulting trace file data were to accompany each
of the Part A, B, and C observation question responses.

•

Do the connected units recognize each other?

For example, Scenario 1, Part A, Test 1.1’s model used the following route.

Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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The resulting trace file from the end user workstation should have shown the route previously
listed, but as mentioned Traceroute never got past the first hop being the Upstream End User
router. Both were to have been combined with the observation question and response.

•

Do the connected units recognize each other? (was to be “Yes”, but due to the routing failure
was listed as “No”.)

Data acquired for the remaining observation questions was further described as follows.

•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.

The question requested additional information regarding the particular model being emulated.
Observations included how well served the local market was, the situation that occurred when
ISP2 entered the market, what provider the end user(s) chose as their upstream provider, what
providers end user(s) could not choose and why, local market interconnectivity among providers,
etc.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and
conditions.

The question received responses regarding if the routers and end user workstations were
successfully networked together and functioned per the model and the scenario. Any unavailable
routes were to be confirmed as disconnections required by the model’s construct and conditions.
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What is the potential routing table?

The question requested all of the potential combinations of routings between the Upstream End
User to the Downstream End User(s). As the number of providers, the number of last mile
networks, and local market interconnections among providers grew, so too did the routing table
to account for all of the permutations.

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?

The Part B and C related questions requested verification that those providers’ routers were
acknowledged by the network’s other routers.

Open Access and Competition Data
Other observational data requested by the Scenario Questions (Appendix B) was however
successfully acquired (Appendix C) pertaining to the open access and competition concerns of
the research question. The data acquired for each scenario model included the following.

•

What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?

During the design phase, samples of actual and hypothetical local and last mile wireline
telecommunications markets were modeled into diagrams and grouped into related types of
scenarios. Various factors including access restrictions, market control, and end user choices
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were then added to each of the scenarios’ conditions. Those factors and conditions for each of
the 16 scenarios served as responses to the question.
Other questions requesting open access and competition data for all Part A Base Models
included the following.

•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and
conditions.

•

Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.

•

Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.

•

Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.

•

Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile
markets?

•

Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?

•

What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?

•

How do the providers access downstream end users?

•

Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each
if necessary.

•

Additional observations.

Data requested in all Part B Test Models included the following.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION
•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and

317

conditions.
•

Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.

•

Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.

•

Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.

•

Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile
markets?

•

Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?

•

What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?

•

Does adding the ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2
affect the conditions governing each scenario?

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?

•

How do the providers access downstream end users?

•

Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each
if necessary.

•

Additional observations.

Data requested in all Part C Test Models where Google entered the market included the
following.
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conditions.
•

Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.

•

Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.

•

Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.

•

Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile
markets?

•

Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?

•

What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?

•

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?

•

How do the providers access downstream end users?

•

Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each
if necessary.

•

Additional observations.

Data acquired for the observation questions was further described as follows.

•

Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
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The responses provided additional information regarding the particular model being emulated.
Observations included how well served the local market was, the situation that occurred when
ISP2 entered the market, what provider the end user(s) chose as their upstream provider, what
providers end user(s) could not choose and why, local market interconnectivity among providers,
etc.

•

Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and
conditions.

Responses were to regard if the routers and end user workstations had been successfully
networked together and functioned per the model and the scenario. Any unavailable routes were
to be confirmed as disconnections required by the model’s construct and conditions. However
because the routers could not be configured to network with each other, the emulations could not
conform to the constructs and conditions.

•

Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.

Responses to the question identified the middle mile, local, and last mile market participants and
the degree of competition in each market. Additional observations noted the effects of limited
competition such as restricted marketplace entry for potential competitors.

•

Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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The responses identified the construct for each providers’ local and last mile networks.

•

Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.

Public MANs present in some models were typically considered non-profit government
enterprises, while the other providers were usually for-profit corporations.

•

Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile
markets?

For those models where a Public MAN was in the same market with for-profit providers, there
was the potential for business-related conflicts.

•

Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?

Local and/or last mile market control by one or more providers depended upon the construct of
the model. Providers highlighted in bold type in the model’s topology had control and were
noted as such. If providers did not extend their own last mile networks to the downstream end
users (whether the end users subscribed to them or not), then the provider(s) with their own last
mile networks were assumed to have potential control of that market. If the local market
providers were interconnected, the providers without last mile networks could technically access
end users via third party providers’ last mile networks if they were afforded equal open access.
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One or more incumbent providers having control of the markets, and possibly together with other
providers not having significant control in the market, could jointly collude to restrict further
market entry by other potential competitors. The Public MAN could dominate markets given
their government backing and potential control over public rights of way, poles, streets, etc.

•

What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?

In a truly competitive market, provider market shares could fluctuate between 100% for one
provider and 0% for other providers, and vice versa. In lesser competitive markets, a monopoly
provider will always have a majority of the market share over the other competitors, and duopoly
providers will always have a combined majority of the market share over the other competitors.
The market share split ranges also depended upon the number of competitors in each model.

•

How do the providers access downstream end users?

Providers accessed the downstream end users either via their own last mile networks or via
access to third party providers’ networks.

•

Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each
if necessary.

If the local market providers had their own last mile networks there was no concern for equal
access. However if they did not and had to share local interconnections to other providers and

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

322

use their last mile networks then there was a concern of issues including access, discrimination,
pricing, etc.

•

Additional observations.

Responses to the question included traffic sharing issues among local market providers, how a
Public MAN without its own last mile network might not technically qualify as a public MAN,
the potential for a Public MAN to solely provide openly accessible last mile service without
engaging in competitive local market service, the potential for Downstream End User 1 to use its
router to switch among providers it currently subscribed to, etc.

Parts B and C had the following related questions.

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?

•

Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?

Responses were to verify that those providers’ routers were acknowledged by the network’s
other routers, and if so it confirmed that those routers emulated the providers entering and
providing service in the local market.

Data Categorization
Qualitative data is somewhat more difficult to present than quantitative data.
Categorization of the data into various groupings could however assist with comparisons and
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further analyses. Regarding topology groupings, Part A of the scenarios resulted in data from the
Base models, Part B resulted in data featuring the entry of ISP2 and Google as ISP2 in some
cases, and Part C resulted in data featuring the entry of only Google. Models in both Parts B and
C featured more complex topologies than the Part A base models thereby yielding more data
than Part A. Models with low numbers of providers kept those markets relatively “underserved” and resulted in less data than models with higher numbers of providers in the markets
that were increasingly better-served. In some models the LEC and Public MAN were local
market monopolies, and in other models both LEC and CC were a local market duopoly.
Providers were highlighted in bold if they had excessive control of the local market, with one
highlighted provider per market having a monopoly and two highlighted providers per market
having a duopoly. (Oligopolies while commonplace in telecommunications and other markets
were not modeled for this study.) Models without monopolies and duopolies in the local market
were considered to be competitive. Some models featuring only one or two providers were not
designated as monopolies or duopolies. The rationale was in those scenarios the providers were
actually competitive, and due to various factors (capitalization, political power, etc.) they could
not control the market or fend off future competition. Those markets were considered to be more
easily enterable by competitors.
Each scenario featured an ISP2 or no ISP2 and Google or no Google in their models,
while all of the later scenarios featured a Public MAN. Those three providers had distinctive
market influences – all added to the market competition, the Public MAN may have enjoyed
certain advantages as a public sector provider, and Google could completely dominate even a
previously monopolized market.
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A local market provider without its own upstream and/or downstream networks and being
required to use third party networks was subject to potential discrimination and control by the
other providers. Access from a local market provider to the Tier I market provider, and from a
local market provider to the End Users, ranged among the following.

•

No access.

•

Access via a third party provider.

•

Access via multiple third party providers.

•

Access via its own lines.

•

Access via multiple third party providers and its own lines.

Each model featured at least one and up to five last mile providers. Last mile lines were
monopolized or duopolized unless other providers also owned and administered their own last
mile lines, whereupon the last mile market would be more competitive. If a provider owned and
operated its own lines to end users, they were considered to provide both infrastructure and
service (the DubLink conduit-only infrastructure provider case discussed in the literature review
was not included in the scenarios).

Market Participants
Data regarding the market participants could possibly be categorized. Generally the
scenarios examined local markets with providers ranging among the following.
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LEC only.

•

Public MAN only.

•

Various combinations of up to five providers.

•

LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2.

•

LEC, CC, Public MAN, ISP1, and Google.
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Upstream Network Segment Providers
All models featured an Upstream End User, Upstream End User Router, and Tier I ISP
Router ordered in a linear configuration designed to standardize those upstream markets across
all models and eliminate the need for additional variant data and analysis on those providers.
The Tier I ISP was always connected to local providers except in Models 13.1 - 16.2 where it
deliberately was not connected to the Public MAN.

LEC and CC
LEC and CC were modeled in numerous scenarios as typical incumbents. In some
models the LEC was in a competitive market even as the sole provider. Usually though the LEC
enjoyed a monopoly in the local and/or last mile market. (The size and power of an LEC could
be correlated to the range of competitiveness of the market, i.e., a larger LEC was usually able to
monopolize a market and defend itself from competitors.) Usually LEC and CC provided their
own last mile system types. This resulted in each potentially having monopolies over the
particular wireline type. Regardless, data could be transmitted over either type, so the wireline
type differences were not modeled. The LEC’s main competition was usually from CC, thus if
both were participating in the same markets, they could have a “double monopoly” (over
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wireline types), or essentially a duopoly (over provided data). LEC and/or CC may or may not
have interconnected with other providers in the local market. Such interconnections could have
been used on an equal basis for redundancy and emergency purposes; however either could have
possibly tried to discriminate against other providers if they were forced by say governments to
“open access” their local and last mile lines. In some cases LEC and/or CC could also be the
Tier I ISP, potentially vertically integrating the backbone provider, middle mile, local provider,
and/or last mile market segments. (Such integration should be recognized but an analysis of the
structure and data was beyond the scope of this report.)

ISP1
ISP1 was modeled as a local market competitor to the LEC and/or CC incumbents,
although in numerous scenarios it was also a local market incumbent. A number of models
featured ISP1 providing its own last mile network, however in reality independent ISPs typically
refrained from constructing their own last mile networks and instead tried to use other providers’
networks to access end users. As discussed, such access via third party providers to end users
could have been discretionary and restrictive, particularly in markets dominated by one or more
incumbent providers. Such ISP1 providers were usually at a disadvantage to the incumbents in
the local and last mile markets.

ISP2
ISP2 joined the local market as a competitive provider in each scenario’s Part B and in
some other variants. Once entering the local market, it was then concerned with upstream and
downstream access and possibly local marker interconnectivity. As discussed with ISP1’s,
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upstream and downstream access via third party providers could be discretionary and restrictive,
particularly in markets dominated by incumbent providers. Consequently such ISP2 providers
were also usually at a disadvantage in the local and last mile markets. As discussed in the
literature review, there was much advocacy for ISP2-like competitors to enter local markets. The
popular solution was for governments to mandate forced access upon other providers’ networks
vs. the challenge of ISP2s constructing from scratch and administering their own upstream, local
market interconnections, and/or last mile networks.

Public MAN
A Public MAN provider was introduced in Scenarios 5 - 16. In some models the Public
MAN was featured as a regular competitive ISP with both upstream and last mile connections;
however in Models 13.1 – 16.3 it was without an upstream connection to Tier I ISP and therefore
had to rely upon other providers for upstream connectivity if they were agreeable to local market
interconnections. The Public MAN was the sole last mile provider in some models while in
others it was without a last mile connection to one or both end users and therefore had to rely
upon other providers for last mile connectivity if they were agreeable to local market
interconnections. In theory if a Public MAN does not own and administer its own last mile
network and must acquire access via a third party’s last mile network for service provision, it
may risk being considered a true public MAN. In some models the Public MAN was the sole
local market provider but the market remained competitive; competed against monopolists,
duopolists, and equal competition; and was a monopolistic ISP vs. other providers in the local
and/or last mile markets. In Models 13.2 – 16.3 the Public MAN had no upstream access of its
own, was interconnected among the other local mile providers, and except for Part C cases was
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the sole downstream last mile provider. The Public MAN could theoretically forgo being a local
market ISP and instead act as an open access “bridge” so that other providers need not construct
and administer their own last mile networks. Google’s own last mile network would be
duplicative and inefficient if it had equal open access to the Public MAN’s local network and if
its last mile featured sufficient speeds and capacities for their service provision.

Google
Google could substitute for ISP2 in most of the scenarios. However Google was be
considered to be significantly different from standard ISPs entering the market as it most likely
had the wherewithal to construct/extend its own middle mile network downstream, interconnect
with other local market providers, and provide its own last mile network to most end users.
Google could demonopolize any monopolized or duopolized last mile market by offering faster
service at a fraction of the market price. Usually when Google entered a market it acquired
significant market shares from incumbents and other competitors, and therefore could become a
monopolist itself in the local and/or last mile markets. However Google had indicated it did not
really want to be an ISP - it merely wanted faster and cheaper access and better service to end
users in the markets, and it would provide ISP functions by itself to achieve those goals if
necessary. Google was not likely to enter “unserved” markets investing in cutting edge
infrastructure and providing services until it had entered other markets with uncompetitive
incumbents and populated with more end users. Google was not only a major end user, but it
had acquired its own backbone trunk lines and middle mile lines, and could somewhat be
considered its own Tier I ISP as it created and extended its own WAN closer to the “edge”, i.e.,
downstream to the local market and end users. The scenarios and models did not represent that
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construct, but it should be taken into consideration as more high end end users would likely
emulate Google’s buildout and possibly compete and/or provide their own custom services in the
local and last mile markets. Google recently purchased the Provo public MAN that was
competing in a fairly well served market, though it would most likely not open access its local
and last mile networks to those competitors.

Downstream End Users
Downstream End User 1 was assigned a router while Downstream End User 2 was not.
DEU1 could therefore represent a business end user with a more powerful router and be able to
connect with multiple providers potentially simultaneously and/or connect with multiple lines to
a sole provider for increased throughput. DEU2 likely represented an average residential user
with a basic router/switch and little or no need (at the present) for multiple simultaneous
providers and/or multiple lines from a sole provider. Few actual constructs featured multiple
providers serving end users with their own last mile networks, and typically end users were
served by one type of wireline per provider. While the providers may have been well
interconnected in some local markets, end users were modeled not to enjoy such redundancy in
the last mile to the providers. (The topic is beyond the scope of this study, but it must be noted
those models with sole last mile networks while more economically efficient as natural utilities
were also more at risk technically particularly regarding downstream redundancy.)

Model Filtering
A question for qualitative studies was what to do with the data in the various groups.
Perhaps a process of elimination by filtering out undesired models based upon the group types
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(essentially simulating market restructuring) could help determine which model(s) were the most
feasible, beneficial, and efficient per particular interest group. (As a quick reference aide for this
discussion, just the models were copied from the scenarios into their own document and saved as
Appendix E.) Such interest groups having their own goals and objectives could include the
following.

•

Downstream End Users.

•

Upstream ASP End Users.

•

Providers.

•

Governments.

•

Investors.

•

Researchers.

Downstream End Users could be subdivided into those more literate, moderately literate,
and less literate regarding their desires for local and last mile constructs. Literate end users
might desire open access of the local market to maximize the number of potential providers;
local market interconnectivity to ensure if their provider went down for some reason there was
redundant access to others and to ensure their provider was able to route traffic upstream; a
competitive local market for providers to offer their best services, speeds and least prices; and
each provider owning their own last mile networks so in case of contingency the end user could
switch quickly to an alternative provider. Lesser literate end users might not appreciate the
issues as much unless they actually experienced the potential benefits of the restructuring.
Upstream Application Service Provider End Users could be divided into large end users (Google,

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

331

Facebook, Sony, etc.), medium, and small sizes. ASPs would likely want many of the same
models that more literate Downstream End Users desired.
Providers could be divided among incumbents, competitors, for-profit/non-profit, and by
sizes. Reserving non-profits for the following Government group, most for-profit incumbent
providers would want models without forced access. They would want restrictions on
competitors’ new last mile builds, but might consider using openly accessible neutral third party
provider last mile networks. Others might advocate their continued control of both markets to
better ensure continued profits. They might desire models with some local market
interconnectivity in case of contingencies, or if they could control and discriminate the sharing.
Incumbents would likely reject models increasing competition that would unnecessarily cause
them to invest in increased speeds and services while lowering prices (and profit margins).
Smaller for-profit and/or competitive providers would likely advocate for forced access. They
would want fewer restrictions on new competitive last mile builds, but might consider using
openly accessible third party provider last mile networks more strongly than incumbents.
Competitors would advocate less control of both markets. They might desire models with local
market interconnectivity if there was less control and discrimination by incumbents in the
sharing. Competitive providers would likely advocate models increasing competition that that
could result in increased speeds and services while lowering prices and gaining some market
shares.
Governments would likely advocate increased local market competition, but not
necessarily for a large number of local providers (an “un-breakupable” oligopoly might suffice).
They might advocate local market interconnectivity to assist providers with contingencies, but
not if sharing increased costs or created other burdens upon providers. Depending upon their
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political philosophical control at the time, governments could advocate forced access while
sanctioning incumbent monopolies, or prohibit forced access respecting private property rights,
and likewise still sanction incumbent monopolies. Australian-like market restructuring was
unlikely in the U.S. at the time. Government enterprise Public MANs could enter markets as
competitive providers even if the markets were fairly well served with no guarantee of acquiring
necessary market shares to justify the enterprise. Governments could advocate a Public MAN
monopoly as a weapon vs. incumbent monopolies and duopolies thinking the markets would
ultimately be demonopolized (or more likely oligopolized), but completely overlook an option of
the Public MAN being restricted from competing in the local market and serving only as a
sanctioned openly accessible last mile “bridge” provider. Thus a government’s position on
models could greatly vary.
Likewise investors could be categorized into numerous groups per their interests
including market control advocacy, long term vs. short term profits, stock and bond investing vs.
mergers and acquisitions investing, investors in ASPs vs. providers, etc. Obviously those
investors seeking shorter term profits and pricing powers would likely advocate the incumbent
provider models.
Researchers including Yochai Benkler, Barbara van Schewick, Tim Wu, etc. as discussed
had opinions on what models should be advocated per their personal methodologies of desired
access and competition. This study sought to answer the research question’s concerns of
creating open access and competition in the local and last mile market segments. Fundamental
filtering examples would include seamless end-to-end connectivity; therefore Model 13.1 would
be eliminated since its last mile market and Tier I market were disconnected. Some level of local
market competition beyond one sole provider was desirable in most markets; therefore Models

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

333

1.1 (LEC was the sole provider) and Models 5.1 and 13.1 (the Public MAN was the provider)
would also be eliminated. Filters directly addressing the open access and competition concerns
would include the following.
(Researcher’s Note - After the models were originally designed, Google then announced
it intended entering the local and last mile markets. Due to the importance of the development
upon this study, Google was therefore retrofitted into the models. Method One of doing so was
by doubling Google and ISP2, meaning in some scenarios “ISP2” could either represent ISP2 or
Google as they were equally interchangeable - see Model 2.5. Method Two was by designing
ISP2 and Google as separate models if the two were not equally interchangeable in a scenario,
i.e., Model 3.3 vs. Model 3.4. For the following filtering cases, the Method One models had to
be converted to Method Two models by adding a “dummy” model to the model sets within each
scenario. Thus for instance in Scenario 9, Model 9.2 was converted to only ISP2, and Model
9.2G was added to accommodate Google as ISP2. In retrospect, all scenarios where Google
could have entered the markets should have had separate ISP2 and Google models to avoid
confusion.)

Competitive Local Market
Since competitive local markets were desired, models with monopolies and duopolies
would be eliminated except those where Google entered the market. Thus the following models
would be eliminated.

•

3.1, 3.2, 3.3.

•

4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 (except 4.5G where Google is ISP2).
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•

7.1, 7.2, 7.3.

•

8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6 (except 8.6G where Google is ISP2).

•

10.1, 10.2.

•

11.2, 11.2.

•

12.1, 12.2.

•

15.1, 15.2.

•

16.1, 16.2.
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Maximized Number of Local Market Providers
End users would likely desire a choice among local market providers, with the more
choices available the better. End User access to four or more providers in the local market could
possibly reduce monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies. Access between End Users and
providers could be direct or indirect via local market interconnectivity among providers. End
User access restricted to three or fewer providers would eliminate those models. Thus the
following models would be eliminated.

•

1.1, 1.2, 1.3.

•

2.1.

•

3.1, 3.2, 3.3.

•

4.1.

•

5.1, 5.2, 5.3.

•

13.1, 13.2, 13.3.
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Local Market Provider Interconnectivity
Providers in the local market are desired to be interconnected and able to assist other
providers trying to reach their upstream and downstream end users. No discrimination would be
permissible in the sharing. Thus the following models would be eliminated for the lack of
interconnectivity.

•

1.1, 1.2, 1.3.

•

2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5G.

•

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.

•

4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5G

•

5.1, 5.2, 5.3.

•

6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.6G.

•

7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4.

•

8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.6G.

•

13.1.

Individual Provider-Owned Last Miles
One method of achieving competition in the last mile would be to require all local market
providers own and administer their own last mile networks to all Ends Users that desired access
and service. No provider could share their last mile lines with other providers. Local market
providers would have to access at least one End User downstream with their own network. Thus
the following models would be eliminated.
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•

10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.3G.

•

11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.3G.

•

12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.3G.

•

14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.3G.

•

15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.3G.

•

16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.3G.
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Multiple Last Miles
Instead of requiring every provider to own and administer their own last mile networks,
more than one network could be provided in the market to at least one End User. Last mile
networks could be shared by multiple providers. Thus the following models would be
eliminated.

•

1.1.

•

5.1.

•

10.1, 10.2.

•

11.1, 11.2.

•

12.1, 12.2.

•

13.1.

•

14.1, 14.2.

•

15.1, 15.2.

•

16.1, 16.2.
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Consolidated Last Mile Networks
Instead of multiple last mile networks in the market, one network could be provided to all
End Users if the provider was a neutral asset-only (last mile-only) provider and its network was
able to be equally accessible and shared by all local market providers. The last mile-only
provider would own and administer the sole last mile network in the market. No monopoly or
duopoly local market providers could be the sole last mile network provider. Thus the following
models would be eliminated.

•

1.2, 1.3.

•

2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5G.

•

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.

•

4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5G.

•

5.2, 5.3.

•

6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.6G.

•

7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4.

•

8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.6G.

•

9.1, 9.2, 9.2G.

•

10.1, 10.2, 10.3.

•

11.1, 11.2, 11.3.

•

12.1, 12.2, 12.3.

•

13.2, 13.3.

•

14.3

•

15.3.
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16.3.

Non-Profit Last Mile
If a Public MAN was the sole last mile provider, it could administer the network as a
non-profit government agency and not as a for-profit middleman. No other provider could own
and administer its own last mile network in the market. The Public MAN could not be an ISP in
the local market having or sharing in any market control (i.e., not a monopoly or duopoly). Thus
the following models would be eliminated.

•

1.1, 1.2, 1.3.

•

2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.5G.

•

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.

•

4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5G.

•

5.2, 5.3.

•

6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.6G.

•

7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4.

•

8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.6G.

•

9.1, 9.2, 9.2G.

•

10.1, 10.2, 10.3.

•

11.1, 11.2, 11.3.

•

12.1, 12.2, 12.3.

•

13.2, 13.3.

•

14.1, 14.2.
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15.1, 15.2.

•

16.1, 16.2.
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Model Filtering Tabulation
The model filtering results from the previous section were tabulated in a spreadsheet
(Appendix F, Model Filtering Results). Eliminated models were represented with the number
“1” in the correlating cells, and retained models had no data entered in the correlating cells.

Model Filtering Scoring
The most desirable unfiltered models in each filtering case could be added together, and
the models with the lowest scores could be considered as better achieving open access and
competition in the markets. However because the four last mile market filtering cases are all
desirable for different reasons, they cannot be added together for a total score. Instead the first
five filtering cases could all be added together for a subtotal, and then one of the four last mile
filtering cases could be added to them one at a time to determine a grand total. The resulting
four sets of grand total scores could then be compared amongst each other more appropriately.
Those four sets of scores were tabulated in another spreadsheet (Appendix F, Model Filtering
Scoring Results). Each of the four sets was entered into its own worksheet within the
spreadsheet.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Discussion
The experiment’s validation and verification trace file data were all expected to
accurately correlate with the models, thereby verifying and validating the emulation, and would
ensure to a high degree of confidence the experiment and data was replicable by other
researchers. Facing a deadline to complete the study and degree program, a decision was made
by the researcher to cease spending numerous valuable hours “hacking” the experiment’s routers
in hopes of making them function properly, and instead forego the emulation and report the
subsequent failure. In doing so, the experiment could not be verified or validated against errors
and questions; thus the scenarios and models remained more conceptual vs. realistic.
The most likely cause for failure was a router configuration setting or proper cabling
among the ports. Proper consultation would probably have detected the errors and enabled the
routers to communicate properly with each other, which would have ruled out other issues.
There was a very outside but highly probable chance that the units were faulty because they were
remanufactured models, and could even have been counterfeit as they were purchased online
from a California-based liquidator that was not primarily a computer equipment outlet. Such
cases of fake equipment are not unheard of in the industry, particularly in Asia. On 4-30-2013,
Pricewatch.com listed eight vendors selling the same routers for between $107 to $152 each
including shipping. The ten routers purchased as a lot on 4-23-2013 cost $188 minus shipping.
Also, all of the serial numbers were blackened out on the bottoms of the units but could still be
read from an angle. Determining internal router errors or counterfeit units would require expert
analysis or returning a sample to Netgear for their examination and determination.
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The observation questionnaire requested a routing table of all of the possible routes
available for each model. To ensure verification and validation, trace files of all the
permutations could be run, but due to time constraints on the study only the routes requested in
the procedure for each model topology (that also appeared in the routing table) were to be run
and generated. Most of the routing table permutations per model were unnecessary to actually
trace, as routers are programmed to automatically seek and take available routes with the fewest
hops among other routers. Routes containing more hops (such as in the models with local
market interconnections) would be more inefficient and increase traffic delays. Some longer
routes might be necessary so as to aggregate small providers’ traffic before interconnecting with
larger providers’ networks in the local and/or upstream markets due to potentially imbalanced
peering agreements (traffic interchange policies).
The model filtering scoring data results from Appendix F for the Individual ProviderOwned Last Mile Networks showed the following models had total scores of 0 (0 being the best
score possible).

•

9.1, 9.2, 9.2G.

The model filtering scoring data results for the Multiple Last Mile Networks showed the
following models had total scores of 0.

•

9.1, 9.2, and 9.2G, 10.3, 11.3, 12.3, 14.3, 15.3, 16.3.
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The model filtering scoring data results for the Consolidated Last Mile Networks showed the
following models had total scores of 0.

•

14.1, 14.2.

The model filtering scoring data results for the Non-Profit Last Mile Networks showed the
following models had total scores of 0.

•

14.1, 14.2.

Conclusions
The models that could be the most feasible, beneficial, and efficient regarding the
Research Question’s concern for open access and competition in the local and last mile markets
included the following. For markets where Individual Provider-Owned Last Mile Networks are
desired, Scenario 9 (A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN where
all providers provide their own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to
local market end users, and where other private providers and the public MAN can optionally
access and use each others’ last mile systems to provide service), Models 9.1, 9.2, and/or 9.2G
were recommended.
For markets where Multiple Last Mile Networks were desired, Scenarios 9 (A local
market served by multiple providers including a public MAN where all providers provide their
own systems and carriage services between upstream providers to local market end users, and
where other private providers and the public MAN can optionally access and use each others’
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last mile systems to provide service), Models 9.1, 9.2, and 9.2G; 10 (A local market served by
multiple providers including a public MAN, where two private providers are the only last mile
system and service providers. Other private providers and the public MAN must access and use
either or both of those private providers’ last mile systems to provide service), Model 10.3; 11 (A
local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where one private provider is
the only last mile system and service provider. Other private providers and the public MAN
must access and use the sole private provider’s last mile system to provide service), Model 11.3;
12 (A local market served by multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public
MAN is the only last mile system and service provider. Other private providers must access and
use the MAN’s last mile system to provide service), Model 12.3; 14 (A local market served by
multiple providers including a public MAN, where the public MAN is the sole last mile system
provider but does not provide upstream carriage service), Model 14.3; 15 (A local market served
by multiple providers including a public MAN that is dominated by two duopolistic providers.
The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage
service), Model 15.3, and 16 (A local market served by multiple providers including a public
MAN that is dominated by a monopolistic provider. The public MAN is the sole last mile
system provider but does not provide upstream carriage service), Model 16.3 were
recommended. For markets where Consolidated Last Mile Networks and Non-Profit Last Mile
Networks were desired, Scenario 14 (A local market served by multiple providers including a
public MAN, where the public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide
upstream carriage service), Models 14.1 and/or 14.2 were recommended.
The “best solution” referring back to Wyckoff‘s rail proposal could possibly be a mixed
market approach where providers of various types (for-profits, non-profits, coops, etc.) compete
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in the local market, interconnect in the local market at least for contingency purposes, and access
the last mile via an extensive multi-route last mile network provided by a non-profit Public MAN
to further reduce end user costs and ensure open access to the End Users. Such market
restructuring should enable more local market competition vs. relying solely upon market entry
by competitors, forced access mandates, and likely subsidies that further skew the market.

Recommendations for Further Research
Other researchers should be able to conduct similar local and last mile market emulations,
add more filtering items (properly standardized if not also weighted), and possibly verify the
study conclusions using formulas with costs, speeds, and other factors for quantitative results and
analyses. The Monte Carlo method could be utilized to simulate market shares for the models
and to determine further optimizations and efficiencies. Perhaps the scaled models and
emulations would be considered more representative of actual markets and networks if the
experiment was better financed and conducted within a mode modern, well-equipped laboratory
(i.e., GENI), and provided with a full research team (i.e., Benkler’s Berkman Center for Internet
and Society at Harvard University). Note though that many initial telecommunication systems
(most likely) evolved from experimental equipment and networking technology experiments
within early laboratory and research settings, and the successful products were eventually were
scaled up and rolled out into the field and markets.
The last mile market question remained open to debate regarding which of the four
desired models were ideal. The apparent issues involved are technological robustness of the
network vs. system buildout and administration economics vs. information (being transmitted
over the networks) valuation economics.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

345

The study's results could further benefit the previously listed parties including providers,
end users, governments, equipment providers, and investors requiring increased access to
advanced and competitive telecommunications services. Educational providers could better
implement previously discussed telepresence technologies and private WANs connecting
providers, and expedite access to upstream high end academic and research networks given
additional market competition and potentially reduced prices and increased available throughput.
The study’s experiment could possibly be implemented as a real world proof of concept by
governments to create new or possibly restructure their Public MANs per the recommended local
and last mile market structures.
Throughout the study researcher was required to be aware of current events such as
Australia’s telecommunication market restructuring, and its case research was fortunately able to
be incorporated into the study. However Google was not anticipated entering the markets so
quickly despite warnings of technological and market disruptions elsewhere. Omitting Google’s
venture would have quickly dated the study’s research and limited the potential results. Google
entering all U.S. markets would reportedly cost $140B (Yarow, 2012). Competitors would
therefore have to expend additional amounts to stay competitive with Google. Are the
competitors capitalized enough to catch up to and stay equal with Google, or might they consider
ceasing business in the market? Wireline providers AT&T and Verizon were selling local
exchanges to concentrate on wireless services, so the market outlook is in flux.
Some lessons learned during the course of the study included the necessity to confirm the
abilities and reliability of outside consultants, particularly computer and network consultants. A
few may mean well in trying to use their experiences and training to make recommendations for
the researcher that could in fact change the intended construct of the experiment from that of the
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researcher to their own solution. Their rationales may be oriented more towards standard
networking practices and not adaptable to more experimental constructs and explorations of the
capabilities of the equipment. Consultants may also accept too much new work and then get in
trouble by not allotting adequate time to all of the clients and their projects.
Other student researchers may want to attempt trials of their experiments prior to waiting
for official permission to start the experiment so as to avoid any potential setbacks such as those
previously discussed. Confirming the equipment works and can be configured as intended prior
to the experiment is highly recommended so that any problems can be addressed before time
limits are reached.
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Network Data Reference Charts
Ethernet
10bT:
100bT:
1000bT:
10GigE:
1TbE:
10TbE:

10Mb/sec
100Mb/sec
1Gb/sec
10Gb/sec
1Tb/sec
10Tb/sec

TDM Circuits
DS0/T0:
64Kb/sec
DS1/T1:
1.54Mb/sec
DS2/T2:
6.3Mb/sec
DS3/T3:
44.7Mb/sec
DS4/T4:
274.17Mb/sec
DS5/T5:
400.352Mb/sec

1 Circuit
24 Circuits
96 Circuits
672 Circuits
4032 Circuits
5760 Circuits

SONET Optical Carrier
OC1:
51.5Mb/sec
OC3:
155.5Mb/sec
OC12:
622Mb/sec
OC48:
2.48Gb/sec
OC192:
9.95Gb/sec
OC768:
38.81Gb/sec
OC3072:
160Gb/sec
International System of Units
Multiplication
Prefix
Factor
Name
10^3
kilo
10^6
mega
10^9
giga
10^12
tera
10^15
peta
10^18
exa
10^21
zetta
10^24
yotta

Nomenclature
Prefix
Symbol
k
M
G
T
P
E
Z
Y
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A.
Test .1
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
Do the connected units recognize each other?
What is the potential routing table?
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
Additional observations.
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Part B.
Test .
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
Does adding the ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
Do the connected units recognize each other?
What is the potential routing table?
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
Additional observations.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test .
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
Do the connected units recognize each other?
What is the potential routing table?
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
Additional observations.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #1
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by only one
incumbent provider between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor ISP2
(as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile
markets.
Part A.
Test 1.1
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 1.1 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
LEC that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider and the
DEU. The DEU has selected LEC as its upstream provider, although it is the only provider
available to choose from participating in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users:
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only ISP2 has its own connection
from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the middle
market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the construct indicates LEC does
not have an actual monopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the middle mile
market.
The local market is virtually monopolized, as LEC is the only provider. However the
construct indicates LEC does have an actual monopoly, and other providers are therefore able to
enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own connection from
the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last mile market is
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theoretically competitive as LEC is not a sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are
therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC provides both infrastructure and service to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC is typically a for-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Not applicable, as LEC is the only local and last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC does not have an actual monopoly, but it could potentially
control the local and last mile markets since it is the only current provider in both markets
thereby giving it de facto control over them. LEC cannot discriminate against other providers
until there actually are other providers in the two markets. However LEC could announce
discriminatory policies as a barrier towards potential competitors including network access
restrictions, monopoly service under-pricing in the particular local market, etc.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
LEC has a 100% share of both the local and last mile market.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as LEC uses its own last mile system to the DEU for
service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
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Part B.
Test 1.2
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 1.2 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
LEC that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to the
DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen to retain LEC as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cable being disconnected
between the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented
the end user having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users:
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the construct indicates
neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
middle mile market.
The local market is virtually duopolized, as LEC and ISP2 are the only providers.
However the construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other
providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last mile
market is theoretically competitive as neither LEC nor ISP2 are sanctioned natural utilities, and
other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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LEC and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC is typically a for-profit corporation. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but
could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since both providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
provider or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since both LEC and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither provider could use
access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing end users. Both
could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by LEC to establish a monopoly in them
more difficult. Likewise LEC makes any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets
more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Both LEC and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as both LEC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to
the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
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The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP2 or use both
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

380

Test 1.3
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 1.3 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the incumbent LEC
that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has switched to the ISP2 as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cable being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented
the end user having access to LEC but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the construct indicates
neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
middle mile market.
The local market is virtually duopolized, as LEC and ISP2 are the only providers.
However the construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other
providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last mile
market is theoretically competitive as neither LEC nor ISP2 are sanctioned natural utilities, and
other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC is typically a for-profit corporation. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but
could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since both providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates neither LEC nor ISP2 currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
provider or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since both LEC and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither provider could use
access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing end users. Both
could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by LEC to establish a monopoly in them
more difficult. Likewise LEC makes any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets
more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.

How do the providers access downstream end users?
Both LEC and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as both LEC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to
the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
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Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP2 or use both
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #2
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor ISP2
(as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile
markets.
Part A.
Test 2.1
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 2.1 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the three providers and has chosen LEC as its upstream
provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers and ISP1 and Downstream End User routers
thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC and ISP1 but not
subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 are all providers. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own connections
from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of those providers
could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing end users.
Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
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100%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
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ISP1
0%
0%
100%

Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, and ISP1, or use
two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
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Part B.
Test 2.2
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 2.2 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen to retain LEC as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the
end user having access to CC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. Other
providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%
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Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 2.3
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 2.3 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen CC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes
represented the end user having access to LEC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. Other
providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
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LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
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If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 2.4
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 2.4 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP1 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the
end user having access to LEC, CC, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. Other
providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
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LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
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If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 2.5
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 2.5 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP2 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the
end user having access to LEC, CC, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. Other
providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
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LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

401

ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
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If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #3
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local market dominated by two private duopolistic
providers between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then
attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the
local and last mile markets as ISP2. Note – only a representative sample of all of the possible
last mile connection combinations will tested.
Part A.
Test 3.1
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 3.1 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers,
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEUs. LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and ISP1 and has chosen LEC as its upstream
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC since there is no last mile
access to it. DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but
cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there is no last mile access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cable being disconnected
between the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented
End User 1 having access to ISP1 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 are all providers. However the
construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to
enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 have their
own connections from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is virtually
monopolized, as only CC has its own connection from the local market to DEU2. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the providers are
sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC provides
its own infrastructure and service to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other provider or potential
competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of those providers
could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing end users.
Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
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> 1/3rd%
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ISP1
0%
< 1/3rd%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
> 50%

ISP1
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
CC has a 100% share of last mile market to DEU2.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and ISP1 access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC accesses
DEU2 directly via its own last mile system.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct somewhat. Both LEC and ISP1 use their own last mile
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC uses its own last mile system to DEU2 for
service provision.
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system
for provision to DEU2. If CC chose to provide service to DEU1, it would either have to
establish its own system to DEU1 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s
and/or ISP1’s system for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and
be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP1 or use both
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Part B.
Test 3.2
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 3.2 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers,
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEUs. LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and ISP1 and has chosen LEC as its upstream
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP2 since there is no last
mile access to either of them. DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last
mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there is no last mile access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers and the ISP2 router and End User 2
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to ISP1 and
End User 2 having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. However
the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities
to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 have their
own connections from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually
duopolized, as only CC and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC and ISP2
provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 25%

CC
50%
> 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

ISP2
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
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ISP1
0%
< 50%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
> 50%

ISP2
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 33.33% making the
market more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into ISP1’s already minor market share. Likewise
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent provider ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish
a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers
at two. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to
the low number of total providers.
ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 100%
making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low number of
total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The ISP1 and Downstream End User routers and the ISP2 router and Downstream End
User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the
whole emulation malfunctioned.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

410

What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and ISP1 access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC and ISP2
access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. Both LEC and ISP1 use their own last mile
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to
DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or
ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU1,
they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or interconnect with and be
granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and
be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP1 or use both
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Test 3.3
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 3.3 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers,
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEUs. LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and ISP1 and has chosen ISP1 as its upstream
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP2 since there is no last
mile access to either of them. DEU2 has chosen ISP2 as its upstream provider in the local and
last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there is no last mile access to either of
them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers and the CC router and End User 2
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to LEC and
End User 2 having access to CC but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. However
the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities
to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 have their
own connections from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually
duopolized, as only CC and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC and ISP2
provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 25%

CC
50%
> 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

ISP2
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
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ISP1
0%
< 50%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
> 50%

ISP2
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 33.33% making the
market more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into ISP1’s already minor market share. Likewise
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent provider ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish
a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers
at two. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to
the low number of total providers.
ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 100%
making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low number of
total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers and the CC router and Downstream End
User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the
whole emulation malfunctioned.
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What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and ISP1 access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC and ISP2
access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. Both LEC and ISP1 use their own last mile
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and ISP2 use their own last mile systems to
DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or
ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU1,
they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or interconnect with and be
granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and
be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and ISP1 or use both
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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DEU1 and DEU2 have selected ISP1 and ISP2 respectively as their providers even
though LEC’s and CC’s monopolies likely make their provision more advantageous to end users.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 3.4
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 3.4 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers,
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEUs. LEC’s and ISP1’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to both DEUs.
DEU1 has an equal choice among LEC, ISP1, and Google, and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC since there is no last
mile access to it. DEU2 has an equal choice between CC and Google, and has chosen CC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or ISP1 since there
is no last mile access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, the Google and Downstream End User
routers, and the Google router and End User 2 workstation thereby interrupting the routes
represented End User 1 having access to ISP1 and Google and End User 2 having access to
Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google are all providers. The
construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to
enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and
CC’s duopoly.
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The last mile market to DEU1 was virtually duopolized, as only LEC and ISP1 had their
own connections from the local market to DEU1. However Google’s entry into the last market
eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually
duopolized, as only CC and Google have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and CC and
Google provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and
CC’s duopoly. Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly in the
market if it so desired.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
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The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 33.33% making
the market more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate number of total
providers.
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could
further cut into ISP1’s already minor market share. Efforts by former duopolists LEC and CC
and incumbent provider ISP1 to prevent Google from establishing a monopoly in the market if it
so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU1 increases the number of providers by
50% making that market more competitive.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
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Do the connected units recognize each other?
The ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 router and Downstream End User
2 workstation, and the Google router and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize
each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google
router-Downstream End User workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, ISP1, and Google access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC
and Google access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. LEC, ISP1, and Google use their own last mile
systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and Google use their own last mile systems to
DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have to establish
their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or
Google’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC chose to provide service to DEU1, it would
either have to establish its own system to DEU1 or interconnect with and be granted adequate
access to LEC’s, ISP1’s and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

421

adequate access to LEC’s, ISP1’s, and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU1, or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or Google’s systems for provision
to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, ISP1, and Google, or use
two or all simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to multiple providers.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #4
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market dominated by a
monopolistic private provider between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B,
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local
and last mile markets.
Part A.
Test 4.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 4.1 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers,
all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEUs. The DEU has an equal choice among the three providers and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the End User having access to CC and ISP1
but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 are all providers. However the
construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter the
local market.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

423

The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own connections
from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of those providers
could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing end users.
Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market entry unless
competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 1/3rd%

CC
0%
< 1/3rd%

ISP1
0%
< 1/3rd%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last market share range is:
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100%
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0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
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ISP1
0%
0%
100%

Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, and ISP1, or use
two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
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Part B.
Test 4.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 4.2 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen to retain LEC as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the
End User having access to CC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. However
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter
the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

ISP2
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares. Likewise
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 4.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 4.3 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen CC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes
represented the End User having access to LEC, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. However
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter
the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

ISP2
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares. Likewise
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 4.4.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 4.4 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP1 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the
End User having access to LEC, CC, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. However
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter
the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

ISP2
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares. Likewise
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 4.5.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 4.5 is attempting to emulate a local market served by three incumbent providers
that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen ISP2 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the
End User having access to LEC, CC, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 are all providers. However
the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to enter
the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit
corporation, but could be a government enterprise or non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Since all providers are typically for-profit corporations, there are likely few if any
significant conflicts regarding differing business types within the local and last mile markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers.
Since LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, none of those
providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from accessing
end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

ISP2
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
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ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
33.33% making those markets more competitive and relatively well served due to the moderate
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s and ISP1’s already minor market shares. Likewise
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC and ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only because of
the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2,
or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #5
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by only a public
MAN between the upstream providers to the end users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an
independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets.
Part A.
Test 5.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 5.1 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider
and the DEU. The DEU has selected the Public MAN as its upstream provider, although it is the
only provider available to choose from participating in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has its own
connection from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the construct indicates the
Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter
the middle mile market.
The local market is virtually monopolized, as the Public MAN is the only provider.
However the construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other
providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has its own
connection from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last mile
market is theoretically competitive as the Public MAN is not a sanctioned natural utility, and
other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides both infrastructure and I service to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Not applicable, as the Public MAN is the only local and last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, but the
Public MAN could potentially control the local and last mile markets since it is the only current
provider in both markets thereby giving it de facto control over them. The Public MAN cannot
discriminate against other providers until there actually are other providers in the two markets.
However the Public MAN could announce discriminatory policies as a barrier towards potential
competitors including network access restrictions, monopoly service under-pricing in the
particular local market, certain governmental enterprise advantages, etc.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The Public MAN has a 100% share of both the local and last mile market.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
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The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as the Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
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Part B.
Test 5.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 5.2 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to
the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen to retain the
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users:
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the
construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers
are therefore able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only
providers. However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last
mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. ISP2 is typically a forprofit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both
markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing
end users. Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
MAN
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
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ISP2
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a
monopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
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What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile
systems to the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 5.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 5.3 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service between the upstream provider to
the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has switched to the ISP2 as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route
represented the End User having access to the Public MAN but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the
construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers
are therefore able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only
providers. However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last
mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services o the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. ISP2 is typically a forprofit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both
markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing
end users. Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
MAN
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
MAN
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%
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Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a
monopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile
systems to the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
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Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #6
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a Public MAN between the upstream providers to the end users. In
Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter
the local and last mile markets.
Part A.
Test 6.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 6.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEU. The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes
represented the end user having access to CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to
them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market between the Tier I ISP and the local market is competitive, as the
construct indicates LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their own connections from the
Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the local market too or
currently refuses to participate there. The construct indicates the local market is competitive.
The last mile market between the local market and the DEU is competitive since LEC, CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP1 have their own connections to the DEU, and other providers are also able
to enter the market.
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The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter
the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to the
DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from
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accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%

Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
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LEC, CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile
systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the
DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
and ISP1, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
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Part B.
Test 6.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 6.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen to retain LEC as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC, the Public
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 6.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 6.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen CC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End
User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End
User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, the
Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

The potential last mile market share range is:

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 6.4.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 6.4 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen the Public MAN
as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers
thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, ISP1, and
ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

The potential last mile market share range is:

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do
not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation
malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 6.5.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 6.5 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen ISP1 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

The potential last mile market share range is:

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 6.6.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 6.6 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen ISP2 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
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Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

The potential last mile market share range is:

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #7
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market including a Public
MAN dominated by two duopolistic private providers between the upstream providers to the end
users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets. In
Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
Note – only a representative sample of all of the possible last mile connection combinations will
tested.
Part A.
Test 7.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 7.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEUs. LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and
ISP1’s systems access DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and the Public MAN and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP1 since there is
no last mile access to either of them. DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local
and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since there is no last mile
access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 router and End User 2
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to the Public
MAN and End User 2 having access to ISP1 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public MAN
have their own connections from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is
virtually duopolized, as only CC and ISP1 have their own connections from the local market to
DEU2. However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none
of the providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and
CC and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have
certain unfair advantages.
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since both CC and ISP1 are typically for-profit
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
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The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from
accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 25%

CC
50%
> 25%

MAN
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
> 50%

MAN
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
> 50%

ISP1
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers and the ISP1 router and
Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
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What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and the Public MAN access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC
and ISP1 access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. Both LEC and the Public MAN use their own last
mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and ISP1 use their own last mile systems
to DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to
CC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC and/or ISP1 chose to provide service
to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or interconnect with
and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to
DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to DEU1, or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to
DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and the Public MAN or
use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Part B.
Test 7.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 7.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to DEU2. LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and ISP1’s
systems access DEU2.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and the Public MAN and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, ISP1, or ISP2 since
there is no last mile access to either of them. DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in
the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since there is no last
mile access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 router and End User 2
workstation, and the ISP2 router and End User 2 workstation thereby interrupting the routes
represented End User 1 having access to the Public MAN and End User 2 having access to ISP1
and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public MAN
have their own connections from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is
competitive, as CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.
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However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the
providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and
ISP1, and CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a
non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary
public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have
certain unfair advantages.
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
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barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
50%
> 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
> 50%

MAN
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
> 1/3rd%

ISP1
0%
< 1/3rd%

ISP2
0%
< 1/3rd%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor
market shares. Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers
at two. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to
the low number of total providers.
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ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 50%
making that market more competitive.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the ISP1 router and Downstream
End User 2 workstation, and the ISP2 router and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not
recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation
malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and the Public MAN access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct somewhat. Both LEC and the Public MAN use their own last
mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC, ISP1, and ISP2 use their own last mile
systems to DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to
CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to
provide service to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for
provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to DEU1, or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for
provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and the Public MAN or
use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 7.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 7.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEUs. LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and
ISP1’s systems access DEU2.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and the Public MAN and has chosen the Public
MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, ISP1, or
ISP2 since there is no last mile access to either of them. DEU2 has chosen ISP2 as its upstream
provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since
there is no last mile access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC router and End User 2 workstation,
and the ISP1 router and End User 2 workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End
User 1 having access to the LEC and End User 2 having access to CC and ISP1 but not
subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public MAN
have their own connections from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is
competitive, as CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.
However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically competitive as none of the
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providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and
ISP1, and CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a
non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary
public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have
certain unfair advantages.
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

487

barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
50%
> 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
> 50%

MAN
0%
< 50%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
> 1/3rd%

ISP1
0%
< 1/3rd%

ISP2
0%
< 1/3rd%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market share.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor
market shares. Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers
at two. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still relatively underserved due to
the low number of total providers.
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ISP2’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by 50%
making that market more competitive.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC router and Downstream End User 2
workstation, and the ISP1 router and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize each
other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and the Public MAN access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. Both LEC and the Public MAN use their own last
mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC, ISP1, and ISP2 use their own last mile
systems to DEU2 for service provision.
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If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to
CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to
provide service to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for
provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s and/or the Public MAN’s systems for provision to DEU1, or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for
provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and the Public MAN or
use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 7.4.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 7.4 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEUs. LEC’s and the Public MAN’s systems access DEU1, while CC’s and
ISP1’s systems access DEU2.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to both DEUs.
DEU1 has an equal choice among LEC, the Public MAN, and Google, and has chosen
LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC or ISP1
since there is no last mile access to either of them. DEU2 has an equal choice among CC, ISP1,
and Google, and has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but
cannot choose LEC or the Public MAN since there is no last mile access to either of them.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the Google and Downstream End
User routers, the ISP1 router and End User 2 workstation, and the Google router and End User 2
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 having access to the Public
MAN and Google and End User 2 having access to ISP1 and Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and Google
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and Google are all
providers. The construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market
eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly.
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The last mile market to DEU1 was virtually duopolized, as only LEC and the Public
MAN had their own connections from the local market to DEU1. However Google’s entry into
the last market eliminates LEC’s and the Public MAN’s duopoly to DEU1. The last mile market
to DEU2 is competitive, as CC, ISP1, and Google have their own connections from the local
market to DEU2. However the construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically
competitive as none of the providers are sanctioned natural utilities, and other providers are
therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and the Public MAN provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU1, and
ISP1, and CC, ISP1, and Google provide their own infrastructures and services to DEU2.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a
non-profit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit
government enterprise and LEC is typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have
certain unfair advantages.
In the last mile market to DEU2 no, since CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit
corporations there are likely few if any significant conflicts regarding differing business types.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. However Google’s
entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly and could counter any
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governmental advantages the Public MAN may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers
it could become a monopoly in the market if it so desired.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could
further cut into the Public MAN’s and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares. Efforts by former
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and ISP1 to prevent Google from
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
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Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU1 increases the number of providers by
50% making that market more competitive.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by
50% making that market more competitive.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, the Google and Downstream End
User routers, the ISP1 router and Downstream End User 2 workstation, and the Google router
and Downstream End User 2 workstation do not recognize each other not only because of the
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User Workstation #2.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google
router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User Workstation #1.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Google
router-Downstream End User workstation #2.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, the Public MAN, and Google access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems,
and CC, ISP1, and Google access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
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Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. LEC, the Public MAN, and Google use their own
last mile systems to DEU1 for service provision, while CC, ISP1, and Google use their own last
mile systems to DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC and/or the Public MAN chose to provide service to DEU2, they would either have
to establish their own systems to DEU2 or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to
CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU2. If CC and/or ISP1 chose to
provide service to DEU1, they would either have to establish their own systems to DEU1 or
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or Google’s
systems for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEUs, or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or Google’s systems for provision to DEU1,
or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s, ISP1’s, and/or Google’s systems
for provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, ISP1, and Google, or use
two or all simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to multiple providers.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #8
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market including a public
MAN dominated by a monopolistic private provider between the upstream providers to the end
users. In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt
to enter the local and last mile markets.
Part A.
Test 8.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 8.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the DEU. The DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes
represented the end user having access to CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to
them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
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The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter
the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own infrastructures and services to
the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from
accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

MAN
0%
< 25%
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ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%

Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 access the DEU directly via their own last mile
systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
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According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the
DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
and ISP1, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
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Part B.
Test 8.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 8.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen to retain LEC as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC, the Public
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a
non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary
public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last mile market share range is:
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 8.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 8.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen CC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End
User routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End
User routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, the
Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last mile market share range is:
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 8.4.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 8.4 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen the Public MAN
as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers
thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, ISP1, and
ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last mile market share range is:
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do
not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation
malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 8.5.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 8.5 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to DEU2.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen ISP1 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
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LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last mile market share range is:
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 8.6.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 8.6 is attempting to emulate a local market very well served by four incumbent
providers and a competitive ISP2, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services
between the upstream provider to the DEU. The DEU has an equal choice among the five
providers and has chosen ISP2 as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The network cables being disconnected
between the LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to LEC, CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own infrastructures and services
to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
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The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The potential last mile market share range is:
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LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
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ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The LEC and Downstream End User routers, the CC and Downstream End User routers,
the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User
routers do not recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the whole
emulation malfunctioned.

What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-LEC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-CC routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP1 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last
mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #9
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN between the upstream providers to the end users, and
where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. In Part B,
competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will then attempt to enter the local
and last mile markets.
Part A.
Test 9.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 9.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers that provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream provider to
the downstream end user. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU. The
DEU has an equal choice among the four providers and has chosen LEC as its upstream provider
in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the routes
represented the end user having access to CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 but not subscribing to
them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to enter
the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other
providers, and their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own last mile systems, none of
those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others from
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accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to
market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the market does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%

Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, and the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can access the DEU both directly via their own last
mile systems and via the other providers’ last mile systems using interconnections.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems and
interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s systems for provision to the
DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
and ISP1, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to them.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
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Part B.
Test 9.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 9.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the downstream end users. All of the providers are interconnected to each other,
enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the
DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
The DEU has an equal choice among the five providers and has chosen to retain LEC as
its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cables being disconnected
between the CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers thereby interrupting the routes represented the end user having access to CC, the Public
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 have
their own connections from the local market to the DEU. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the market.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

527

Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the
other providers, and their own infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could have certain unfair
advantages over them in both markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
Since LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems,
none of those providers could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the others
from accessing end users. Each could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a
barrier to market entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile
systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
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The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by 25%
making those markets even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total
providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the incumbent providers to establish a
monopoly or duopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the incumbent providers make any effort
by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The CC and Downstream End User routers, the Public MAN and Downstream End User
routers, the ISP1 and Downstream End User routers, and the ISP2 and Downstream End User
routers do not directly recognize each other not only because of the disconnection since the
whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 can access the DEU both directly via their
own last mile systems and via the other providers’ last mile systems using interconnections.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as all providers use their own last mile systems and
interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to LEC’s, CC’s, the Public MAN’s, ISP1’s, and/or ISP2’s systems for provision
to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch among LEC, CC, the Public MAN,
ISP1, and ISP2, or use two or more providers simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to
them.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #10
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN but dominated by two duopolistic private providers,
and where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. The
two duopolistic private providers are the only last mile providers. In Part B, competitor ISP2
will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to
enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
Part A.
Test 10.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 10.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEUs.
LEC’s system accesses DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
DEU1 has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first accessing LEC since there is no direct
access to the others available. DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local and last
mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first accessing CC since
there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and the Public MAN, ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own
connection from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually
monopolized, as only CC has its own connection from the local market to DEU2. CC, the Public
MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own connections to DEU1 or currently refuse to provide
their own, and LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own connections to DEU2
or currently refuse to provide their own. However the construct indicates the last mile market is
theoretically uncompetitive as LEC and CC appear to be sanctioned natural utilities, and other
providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and
service to DEU1. CC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure
and service to DEU2.
The Public MAN and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
can provide their own services to the two DEUs via LEC and CC.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last
mile market provider.
In the last mile market to DEU2 the question is not applicable, as CC is the only last mile
market provider.
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Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict
last mile access to DEU1, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market.
Likewise if CC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict last mile
access to DEU2, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market. If both LEC
and CC denied the other providers access to their own networks, the other providers could use
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access either of the DEUs, enforcing that
technique as an effective way to control the market.
If the Public MAN and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC and/or CC. The Public MAN
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the only last mile system providers
wielding the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 25%

CC
50%
> 25%

MAN
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU1. CC has a 100% share of the last mile
market to DEU2.
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Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC accesses DEU1 directly via its own last mile system, and CC accesses DEU2
directly via its own last mile system.
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access DEU1 via interconnections with
LEC as the last hop in those routes. LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access
DEU2 via interconnections with CC as the last hop in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. LEC uses its own last mile system to DEU1 for service
provision, while CC uses its own last mile system to DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to DEU2.
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU1, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to
DEU1, or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to
DEU2.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other
providers.
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Part B.
Test 10.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 10.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEUs.
LEC’s system accesses DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
DEU1 has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing LEC since there is no
direct access to the others available. DEU2 has chosen CC as its upstream provider in the local
and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, or ISP2 without first
accessing CC since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to DEU1 is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own
connection from the local market to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually
monopolized, as only CC has its own connection from the local market to DEU2. CC, the Public
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had their own connections to DEU1 or currently refuse to
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provide their own, and LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had their own
connections to DEU2 or currently refuse to provide their own. However the construct indicates
the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC and CC appear to be sanctioned
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and
service to DEU1. CC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure
and service to DEU2.
The Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other
providers, and can provide their own services to the two DEUs via LEC and CC.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last
mile market provider.
In the last mile market to DEU2 the question is not applicable, as CC is the only last mile
market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
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All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict
last mile access to DEU1, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market.
Likewise if CC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict last mile
access to DEU2, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the market. If both LEC
and CC denied the other providers access to their own networks, the other providers could use
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access either of the DEUs, enforcing that
technique as an effective way to control the market.
If the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC and/or CC. The
Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as
an attempt to control the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the only last mile system providers
wielding the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
50%
> 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU1. CC has a 100% share of the last mile
market to DEU2.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor
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market shares. Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers
at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to its sole
provider.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU2, leaving the number of those providers
at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to its sole
provider.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC accesses DEU1 directly via its own last mile system, and CC accesses DEU2
directly via its own last mile system.
CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access DEU1 via interconnections
with LEC as the last hop in those routes. LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly
access DEU2 via interconnections with CC as the last hop in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. LEC uses its own last mile system to DEU1 for service
provision, while CC uses its own last mile system to DEU2 for service provision.
If LEC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU2, they
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to
DEU2. If CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to DEU1, they
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision
to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to
DEU1, or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s system for provision to
DEU2.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other
providers.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 10.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 10.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEUs.
LEC’s system accesses DEU1, while CC’s system accesses DEU2.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to both DEUs. Google interconnects with the
other local market providers, and also accesses both DEU1 and DEU2.
DEU1 has an equal choice between LEC and Google, and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or
ISP1 without first accessing LEC or Google since there is no direct access to the others available.
DEU2 has an equal choice between CC and Google, and has chosen CC as its upstream provider
in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first
accessing CC or Google since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cables being disconnected
between the Google and Downstream End User routers and the Google router and End User 2
workstation thereby interrupting the routes represented End User 1 and End User 2 having access
to Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google are all providers. The
construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other providers’ abilities to
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enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and
CC’s duopoly.
The last mile market to DEU1 was virtually monopolized, as only LEC had its own
connection from the local market to DEU1. However Google’s entry into the last market
eliminates LEC’s monopoly to DEU1. The last mile market to DEU2 is also virtually
duopolized, as only CC and Google have their own connections from the local market to DEU2.
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own connections to DEU1 or currently
refuse to provide their own, and LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their own
connections to DEU2 or currently refuse to provide their own. The construct indicates the last
mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as LEC and CC appeared to be sanctioned natural
utilities, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market. However
Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utilities.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and
service to DEU1. CC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure
and service to DEU2. Google provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructures and services to DEU1 and DEU2.
The Public MAN and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
can provide their own services to the two DEUs via LEC, CC, and Google.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU1 the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last
mile market provider.
In the last mile market to DEU2 the question is not applicable, as CC is the only last mile
market provider.
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Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. However Google’s
entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly and could counter any
governmental advantages the Public MAN may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers
it could become a monopoly in the market if it so desired.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if LEC and Google denied other providers access to their own networks, they
could also restrict last mile access to DEU1, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market. Likewise if CC and Google denied other providers access to their own
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to DEU2, enforcing that technique as an
effective way to control the market. If LEC, CC, and Google denied the other providers access
to their own networks, the other providers could use interconnections to each other but would not
be able to access either of the DEUs, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the
market.
If the Public MAN and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC, CC, and/or Google. The Public
MAN and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to
control the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC, CC, and Google as the only last mile system providers wielding
the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
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The potential last mile market share range to DEU1 is:
LEC
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to DEU2 is:
CC
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could
further cut into the Public MAN’s and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares. Efforts by former
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and ISP1 to prevent Google from
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU1 increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to DEU2 increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Google and Downstream End User routers and the Google router and Downstream
End User 2 workstation do not directly recognize each other not only because of the
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and Google access DEU1 directly via their own last mile systems, and CC and
Google access DEU2 directly via their own last mile systems.
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access DEU1 via interconnections with
LEC and Google as the last hops in those routes. LEC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly
access DEU2 via interconnections with CC and Google as the last hops in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. LEC and Google use their own last mile systems
to DEU1 for service provision, while CC and Google use their own last mile systems to DEU2
for service provision.
If LEC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU2, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or Google’s systems for
provision to DEU2. If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to DEU1, they
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s
systems for provision to DEU1.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEUs, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s systems for
provision to DEU1, or interconnect with and be granted adequate access to CC’s and/or Google’s
systems for provision to DEU2.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other
providers.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and Google, or use both
simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

572

Scenario Questions
Scenario #11
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN but dominated by a monopolistic private provider, and
where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. The
monopolistic private provider is the only last mile provider. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then
attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the
local and last mile markets as ISP2.
Part A.
Test 11.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 11.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.
LEC’s system accesses the DEU.
The DEU has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or ISP1 without first accessing LEC since there is no direct
access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
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The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own
connection from the local market to the DEU. CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appears to be
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and
service to the DEU.
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers,
and can provide their own services to the DEU via LEC.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last mile
market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and
other potential providers in the local market too.
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All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict
last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each other but
would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the
market.
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC. CC, the Public
MAN, and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to
control the market inconsequential.
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the only last mile system provider wielding
the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

MAN
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. CC, the Public MAN, and
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with LEC as the last hop in those
routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. LEC uses its own last mile system to the DEU for service
provision.
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the
DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the
DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other
providers.
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Part B.
Test 11.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 11.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.
LEC’s system accesses the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
The DEU has chosen LEC as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but
cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing LEC since there is no
direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only LEC has its own
connection from the local market to the DEU. CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 either once
had their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appears to be
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and infrastructure and
service to the DEU.
CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other
providers, and can provide their own services to the DEU via LEC.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last mile
market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and
other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if LEC denied other providers access to its own network, it could also restrict
last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each other but
would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to control the
market.
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If CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC. CC, the Public
MAN, ISP1, and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an
attempt to control the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the only last mile system provider wielding
the most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
LEC has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s monopoly a little more difficult to
maintain, and could further cut into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those
providers at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to
its sole provider.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. CC, the Public MAN, ISP1,
and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with LEC as the last hop in those
routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. LEC uses its own last mile system to the DEU for service
provision.
If CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they
would have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision
to the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s system for provision to the
DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other
providers.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 11.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 11.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU.
LEC’s system accesses the DEU.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. Google interconnects with the other
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between LEC and Google, and has chosen LEC as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose CC, the Public MAN, or
ISP1 without first accessing LEC or Google since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cable being disconnected
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all
providers. The construct indicates LEC had a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’
abilities to enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates
LEC’s monopoly.
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The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only LEC had its own
connection from the local market to the DEU. However Google’s entry into the last market
eliminates LEC’s monopoly to the DEU. CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 either once had their
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. The construct indicates
the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appeared to be the sanctioned
natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market.
However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
LEC and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructures and services to the DEU.
CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers,
and can provide their own services to the DEU via LEC and Google.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as LEC is the only last mile
market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and
other potential providers in the local market too. However Google’s entry into the local market
eliminates LEC’s monopoly and could counter any governmental advantages the Public MAN
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may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly in the market
if it so desired.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if LEC and Google denied other providers access to their own networks, they
could also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to
each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way
to control the market.
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own
networks, the others could still provide access via interconnections to LEC and Google. CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an
attempt to control the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC and Google as the only last mile system providers wielding the
most power and the Public MAN potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages
for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is:
LEC
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
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Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s monopoly, and could further cut
into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares. Efforts by former
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 to prevent Google from
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

595

How do the providers access downstream end users?
LEC and Google accesses the DEU directly via their own last mile systems. CC, the
Public MAN, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with LEC and Google
as the last hops in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. LEC and Google use their own last mile systems
to the DEU for service provision.
If CC, the Public MAN, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s systems for
provision to the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to LEC’s and/or Google’s systems for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is technically not a true public MAN in this model as it does not own
and operate its own last mile system, and instead it must acquire last mile access from other
providers.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between LEC and Google, or use
both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #12
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN but dominated by the monopolistic public MAN, and
where all providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. The
monopolistic public MAN is the only last mile provider. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then
attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the
local and last mile markets as ISP2.
Part A.
Test 12.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 12.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU. The
Public MAN’s system accesses the DEU.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since
there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 have
their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

597

The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly, whereby limiting
other providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the construct
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as LEC appears to be sanctioned
natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly in the local market. The
provider could possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service
under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive
providers. It could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and
other potential providers in the local market too.
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All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, and ISP1
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the
market inconsequential.
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as a monopolist and the only last mile system
provider wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
0%
< 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

MAN
100%
> 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC, and
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in
those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
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Part B.
Test 12.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 12.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU. The
Public MAN’s system accesses the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN
since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2
have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly, whereby limiting
other providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN
appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to
enter the market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly in the local market. The
provider could possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service
under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive
providers. It could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and
other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
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If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, ISP1,
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as a monopolist and the only last mile system
provider wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise
advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
0%
< 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
100%
> 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make the Public MAN’s monopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into LEC’s CC’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise the monopolist Public MAN and incumbent providers LEC, CC, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those
providers at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to
its sole provider.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the
last hop in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 12.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 12.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers, all of which provide their own systems and carriage services between the upstream
provider to the local market. All of the providers are interconnected to each other, enabling a
variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market providers, and the DEU. The
Public MAN’s system accesses the DEU.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. Google interconnects with the other
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC,
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to
the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cable being disconnected
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers are likewise able to
enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all
providers. The construct indicates the Public MAN had a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market
eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly.
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The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. However Google’s entry into the last
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. The construct
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market. However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers,
and infrastructures and services to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates the Public MAN has a monopoly in the local market. The
provider could possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service
under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive
providers. It could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbents and
other potential providers in the local market too. However Google’s entry into the local market
eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly and could counter any governmental advantages the
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Public MAN may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly
in the market if it so desired.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique
as an effective way to control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN and Google. LEC, CC,
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with the Public MAN and Google as the only last mile system providers
wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for
such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is:
MAN
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
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Google’s presence in the local market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly, and could
further cut into LEC’s CC’s, and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares. Efforts by former
monopolist Public MAN and incumbent providers LEC, CC, and ISP1 to prevent Google from
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN
and Google as the last hops in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. The Public MAN and Google use their own last
mile systems to the DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems
for provision to the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s
systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and
Google, or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #13
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by only a public
MAN. The public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream
carriage service. In Part B, competitor ISP2 (as both an independent ISP and as Google) will
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets.
Part A.
Test 13.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 13.1 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
Public MAN that provides its own system and carriage service to the DEU, but not to the
upstream provider. The DEU has selected the Public MAN as its upstream provider, although it
is the only provider available to choose from participating in the local and last mile markets, and
it cannot access any other networks further upstream directly from the Public MAN.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is unserved and not competitive, as the construct indicates no
providers have their own connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN
either once had a connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP
either once participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. The
Tier I ISP, the Public MAN, and/or other third parties may have a virtual monopoly upon the
middle mile ROW and/or infrastructure artificially restricting the market from being served.
However the construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other
providers may therefore be able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is virtually monopolized, as the Public MAN is the only provider.
However the construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, and other
providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
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The last mile market is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has its own
connection from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last mile
market is theoretically competitive as the Public MAN is not a sanctioned natural utility, and
other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides both infrastructure and service to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Not applicable, as the Public MAN is the only local and last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates the Public MAN does not have an actual monopoly, but the
Public MAN could potentially control the local and last mile markets since it is the only current
provider in both markets thereby giving it de facto control over them. The Public MAN cannot
discriminate against other providers until there actually are other providers in the two markets.
However the Public MAN could announce discriminatory policies as a barrier towards potential
competitors including network access restrictions, monopoly service under-pricing in the
particular local market, certain governmental enterprise advantages, etc.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The Public MAN has a 100% share of both the local and last mile market.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Tier I and Public MAN routers do not recognize each other not only because of the
disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as the Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
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Part B.
Test 13.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 13.2 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
Public MAN. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage service to the DEU, but
not to the upstream provider.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. ISP2 also interconnects with the
Public MAN.
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen to retain the
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot access any
other networks further upstream directly from the Public MAN, and must access ISP2 for further
upstream connectivity.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cables being disconnected
between the ISP2 and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to ISP2 but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only ISP2 has its own connection
from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a connection to the
Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the construct indicates
neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able
to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only
providers. However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last
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mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to each other, and
infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. ISP2 is typically a forprofit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both
markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Both of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider
denied others access to its own network, the other could still provide access via its
interconnection if necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the
market.
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing
end users. Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
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What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
MAN
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
MAN
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a
monopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The ISP2 and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerPublic MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
How do the providers access downstream end users?
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile
systems and interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is an intermediary hop since the DEU choose it as its upstream
provider, though the Public MAN must use the shared interconnection with ISP2 for its direct
connection further upstream to Tier I ISP.
Repeat Part B if the scenario has additional models.
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Test 13.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 13.3 is attempting to emulate a local market “under-served” by the only incumbent
Public MAN. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage service to the DEU, but
not to the upstream provider.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. ISP2 also interconnects with the
Public MAN.
The DEU has an equal choice between the two providers and has chosen ISP2 as its
upstream provider in the local and last mile markets.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cables being disconnected
between the Public MAN and Downstream End User routers thereby interrupting the route
represented the End User having access to the Public MAN but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is virtually monopolized, as only ISP2 has its own connection
from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a connection to the
Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once participated in the
middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. However the construct indicates
neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual duopoly, and other providers are therefore able
to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is virtually duopolized, as the Public MAN and ISP2 are the only
providers. However the construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 have an actual
duopoly, and other providers are therefore able to enter the local market.
The last mile market is virtually duopolized, as only the Public MAN and ISP2 have their
own connections from the local market to the DEU. However the construct indicates the last
mile market is theoretically competitive as neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 are sanctioned
natural utilities, and other providers are therefore able to enter the market.
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Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to each other, and
infrastructures and services to the DEU.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. ISP2 is typically a forprofit corporation, but could be a non-profit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government
enterprise to avoid unnecessary public sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
Yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise and ISP2 is
typically a for-profit corporation, the Public MAN could have certain unfair advantages in both
markets.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates neither the Public MAN nor ISP2 currently have actual
monopolies nor a duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly
try to control the local market, or both providers could possibly try to jointly control the local
market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users
than the other provider or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could
use certain governmental enterprise advantages against ISP2 and other potential providers in the
local market too.
Both of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider
denied others access to its own network, the other could still provide access via its
interconnection if necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the
market.
Since both the Public MAN and ISP2 provide their own last mile systems, neither
provider could use access restrictions to their own systems to prevent the other from accessing
end users. Both could potentially use access restrictions to their systems as a barrier to market
entry unless competitive providers likewise provide their own last mile systems.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
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ISP2
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range is:
MAN
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
100%

Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local and last mile markets increases the number of providers by
100% making those markets more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the markets makes any effort by the Public MAN to establish a
monopoly in them more difficult. Likewise the Public MAN makes any effort by ISP2 to
establish a monopoly in the markets more difficult.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Public MAN and Downstream End User routers do not recognize each other not only
because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-Public
MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerPublic MAN router-Downstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
Upstream End User workstation-Upstream End User router-Tier I ISP router-ISP2 routerDownstream End User router-Downstream End User workstation.
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
Both the Public MAN and ISP2 access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct yes, as both the Public MAN and ISP2 use their own last mile
systems and interconnect with each others’ systems for access to the DEU for service provision.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
either have to establish their own systems to the DEU or interconnect with and be granted
adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or ISP2’s systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The DEU can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and ISP2
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN is eliminated as an intermediary hop with the DEU choosing ISP2 as its
upstream provider with its direct connection to Tier I ISP.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #14
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN, where the Public MAN is the sole last mile system
provider but does not provide upstream carriage service. All providers can optionally access and
use each other’s local market systems. In Part B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the
local market. In Part C, competitor Google will then attempt to enter the local and last mile
markets as ISP2.
Part A.
Test 14.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 14.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since
there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the construct
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appears to be
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
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instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, and ISP1
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the
market inconsequential.
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as the only last mile system provider wielding the
most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the market does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%

The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC, and
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in
those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Part B.
Test 14.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 14.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN
since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1 and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN
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appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
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However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, ISP1,
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with the Public MAN as the only last mile system provider wielding the
most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

ISP2
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those
providers at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to
its sole provider.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the
last hop in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 14.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 14.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. Google interconnects with the other
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC,
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to
the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cable being disconnected
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all
providers. Other providers are likewise able to enter the local market.
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The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. However Google’s entry into the last
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. The construct
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market. However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers,
and infrastructures and services to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates none of the providers currently have actual monopolies or a
duopoly in the local and last mile markets. One of the providers could possibly try to control the
local market, or two providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for
instance monopoly service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other
providers or potential competitive providers respectively. The Public MAN could use certain
governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and other potential providers in the
local market too. However Google’s entry into the local market could counter any governmental
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advantages the Public MAN may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could
become a monopoly in the market if it so desired.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique
as an effective way to control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN and Google. LEC, CC,
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with the Public MAN and Google as the only last mile system providers
wielding the most power and potentially using certain governmental enterprise advantages for
such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is:
MAN
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
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Efforts by incumbent providers LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 to prevent Google
from establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN
and Google as the last hops in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. The Public MAN and Google use their own last
mile systems to the DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems
for provision to the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s
systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and Google,
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #15
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by two private duopolistic providers.
The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage
service. All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. In Part
B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
Part A.
Test 15.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 15.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since
there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the construct
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appears to be
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

656

service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, and ISP1
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the
market inconsequential.
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the Public MAN as the only last mile
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain
governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 25%

CC
50%
> 25%

MAN
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC, and
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in
those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Part B.
Test 15.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 15.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN
since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN
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appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
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However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, ISP1,
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the Public MAN as the only last mile
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain
governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
50%
> 20%

CC
50%
> 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the duopoly providers’ market shares.
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make LEC’s and CC’s duopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into the Public MAN’s and ISP1’s already minor
market shares. Likewise duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and
ISP1 could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to DEU1, leaving the number of those providers
at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to its sole
provider.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the
last hop in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 15.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 15.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. Google interconnects with the other
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC,
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to
the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cable being disconnected
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all
providers. The construct indicates LEC and CC had a duopoly, whereby limiting other
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providers’ abilities to enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market
eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly.
The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. However Google’s entry into the last
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. The construct
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market. However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers,
and infrastructures and services to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC and CC have a duopoly in the local market. The two
providers could possibly try to jointly control the local market, by using for instance duopoly
service under-pricing to gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential
competitive providers. The Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages
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against the incumbent and other potential providers in the local market too. However Google’s
entry into the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly and could counter any
governmental advantages the Public MAN may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers
it could become a monopoly in the market if it so desired.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique
as an effective way to control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN and Google. LEC, CC,
and ISP1 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC and CC as duopolists and the Public MAN and Google as the
only last mile system providers wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using
certain governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is:
MAN
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
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Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s and CC’s duopoly, and could
further cut into the Public MAN’s and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares. Efforts by former
duopolists LEC and CC and incumbent providers Public MAN and ISP1 to prevent Google from
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN
and Google as the last hops in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. The Public MAN and Google use their own last
mile systems to the DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems
for provision to the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s
systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and Google,
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Scenario Questions
Scenario #16
What are the constructs and conditions of the scenario?
Part A will attempt to emulate a local telecommunications market served by multiple
private providers including a public MAN that is dominated by a private monopolistic provider.
The Public MAN is the sole last mile system provider but does not provide upstream carriage
service. All providers can optionally access and use each other’s local market systems. In Part
B, competitor ISP2 will then attempt to enter the local market. In Part C, competitor Google will
then attempt to enter the local and last mile markets as ISP2.
Part A.
Test 16.1.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 16.1 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN since
there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, and ISP1 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
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participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, and ISP1 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had their
own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the construct
indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appears to be
sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise, and LEC, CC, and ISP1
are typically for-profit corporations.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, and ISP1 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN could
have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
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gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 denied the other providers access to their own networks, the
others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, and ISP1
lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control the
market inconsequential.
The four providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the Public MAN as the only last mile
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain
governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 25%

CC
0%
< 25%

MAN
0%
< 25%

ISP1
0%
< 25%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC, and
ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the last hop in
those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Part B.
Test 16.2.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 16.2 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
ISP2 then enters the local market as a competitive ISP, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the local market. ISP2 also interconnects with
the other local market providers.
The DEU has chosen the Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile
markets, but cannot choose LEC, CC, ISP1, or ISP2 without first accessing the Public MAN
since there is no direct access to the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1 and ISP2 are all
providers. However the construct indicates LEC has a monopoly, whereby limiting other
providers’ abilities to enter the local market.
The last mile market to the DEU is virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN has
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. However the
construct indicates the last mile market is theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN
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appears to be sanctioned natural utility, and other providers are therefore unlikely or unable to
enter the market.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN provides its own interconnections to the other providers, and
infrastructure and service to the DEU.
LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and
can provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation. ISP2 is likely not another government enterprise to avoid unnecessary public
sector duplication and competition.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
other potential providers in the local market too.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
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However if the Public MAN denied other providers access to its own network, it could
also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use interconnections to each
other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique as an effective way to
control the market.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, ISP1,
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the Public MAN as the only last mile
system provider wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain
governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
> 20%

CC
0%
< 20%

MAN
0%
< 20%

ISP1
0%
< 20%

ISP2
0%
< 20%

Note - No competitor can exceed the monopoly provider’s market shares.
The Public MAN has a 100% share of the last mile market to DEU.
Does adding ISP2 make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding ISP2 affect
the conditions governing each scenario?
ISP2’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
ISP2’s presence in the local market may make the Public MAN’s monopoly a little more
difficult to maintain, and could further cut into LEC’s, CC’s, and ISP1’s already minor market
shares. Likewise the monopolist Public MAN and incumbent providers LEC, CC, and ISP1
could make any effort by ISP2 to establish a monopoly in the market quite difficult.
ISP2 does not enter the last mile market to the DEU, leaving the number of those
providers at one. That market’s competitiveness remains unaffected and still underserved due to
its sole provider.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge the ISP2 router?
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Do the connected units recognize each other?
No.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN accesses the DEU directly via its own last mile system. LEC, CC,
ISP1, and ISP2 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN as the
last hop in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct no. The Public MAN uses its own last mile system to the
DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for provision to
the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s system for
provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Part C.
Repeat Part B substituting Google Fiber for ISP2.
Test 16.3.
Describe what the model is trying to emulate.
Model 16.3 is attempting to emulate a local market well served by four incumbent
providers. LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own systems and carriage services between the
upstream provider to the local market. The Public MAN provides its own system and carriage
service to the DEU, but not to the upstream provider. All of the providers are interconnected to
each other, enabling a variety of routes between the upstream provider, the local market
providers, and the DEU.
Google then enters the local market as competitive ISP2, providing its own system and
carriage service between the upstream provider to the DEU. Google interconnects with the other
local market providers, and also accesses the DEU.
The DEU has an equal choice between the Public MAN and Google, and has chosen the
Public MAN as its upstream provider in the local and last mile markets, but cannot choose LEC,
CC, or ISP1 without first accessing the Public MAN or Google since there is no direct access to
the others available.
Comment upon the computer network emulation's conformity to the constructs and conditions.
The end user workstations, end user router, and provider routers were not successfully
networked together and did not function properly to form the end-to-end network as envisioned
by the model and under the constraints of the scenario. The interconnection of provider routers
in the local market enabled route sharing among them. The network cable being disconnected
between the Google and Downstream End User router thereby interrupting the route represented
the End User having access to Google but not subscribing to them.
Describe the market competition between the Tier I ISP and the downstream end users.
The middle mile market is competitive, as LEC, CC, ISP1, and Google have their own
connections from the Tier I ISP to the local market. The Public MAN either once had a
connection to the Tier I ISP or currently refuses to provide one. The Tier I ISP either once
participated in the middle market too or currently refuses to participate there. Other providers
are likewise able to enter the middle mile market.
The local market is competitive, as LEC, CC, the Public MAN, ISP1, and Google are all
providers. The construct indicates LEC had a monopoly, whereby limiting other providers’
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abilities to enter the local market. However Google’s entry into the local market eliminates
LEC’s monopoly.
The last mile market to the DEU was virtually monopolized, as only the Public MAN had
its own connection from the local market to the DEU. However Google’s entry into the last
market eliminates the Public MAN’s monopoly to the DEU. LEC, CC, and ISP1 either once had
their own connections to the DEU or currently refuse to provide their own. The construct
indicates the last mile market was theoretically uncompetitive as the Public MAN appeared to be
the sanctioned natural utility, and other providers were therefore unlikely or unable to enter the
market. However Google’s entry into the last market eliminates the natural utility.
Indicate if each provider provides only infrastructure, only service, or both infrastructure and
service.
The Public MAN and Google provide their own interconnections to the other providers,
and infrastructures and services to the DEU.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 provide their own interconnections to the other providers, and can
provide their own services to the DEU via the Public MAN and Google.
Indicate the business type (for-profit or non-profit) for each provider.
The Public MAN is typically a non-profit government enterprise. LEC, CC, and ISP1 are
typically for-profit corporations. ISP2 is typically a for-profit corporation, but could be a nonprofit corporation.
Is there a potential conflict with differing business types within the local and last mile markets?
In the local market yes, since the Public MAN is typically a non-profit government
enterprise and LEC, CC, ISP1, and ISP2 are typically for-profit corporations, the Public MAN
could have certain unfair advantages over them.
In the last mile market to DEU the question is not applicable, as the Public MAN is the
only last mile market provider.
Is there an opportunity for a provider to control the local and last mile markets and/or
discriminate vs. other providers? How?
The construct indicates LEC has a monopoly in the local market. The provider could
possibly try to control the local market, by using for instance monopoly service under-pricing to
gain and retain more end users than the other providers or potential competitive providers. The
Public MAN could use certain governmental enterprise advantages against the incumbent and
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other potential providers in the local market too. However Google’s entry into the local market
eliminates LEC’s monopoly and could counter any governmental advantages the Public MAN
may have. Given Google’s corporate size and powers it could become a monopoly in the market
if it so desired.
All of the providers’ local market networks are interconnected, so if one provider denied
others access to its own network, the others could still provide access via their interconnections if
necessary, making that technique harder to use as an attempt to control the market.
However if the Public MAN and Google denied other providers access to their own
networks, they could also restrict last mile access to the DEU. The other providers could use
interconnections to each other but would not be able to access the DEU, enforcing that technique
as an effective way to control the market.
If LEC, CC, ISP1, and/or ISP2 denied the other providers access to their own networks,
the others could still provide access via interconnections to the Public MAN. LEC, CC, ISP1,
and ISP2 lacking their own last mile systems render using that technique as an attempt to control
the market inconsequential.
The five providers could possibly jointly control the local market from other potential
competitors entering, with LEC as a monopolist and the Public MAN and Google as the only last
mile system providers wielding the most power, and the Public MAN potentially using certain
governmental enterprise advantages for such control.
What fraction(s) or percentage(s) of the local and last mile markets does each provider have?
The potential local market share range is:
LEC
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%

CC
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%

MAN
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%

ISP1
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%

Google
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%

The potential last mile market share range to the DEU is:
MAN
100%
0%

Google
0%
100%

Does adding Google make the market in the models more competitive? Does adding Google
affect the conditions governing each scenario?
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Google’s entry in the local market increases the number of providers by 25% making the
market even more competitive and well served due to the larger number of total providers.
Google’s presence in the local market eliminates LEC’s monopoly, and could further cut
into CC’s, the Public MAN’s, and/or ISP1’s already minor market shares. Efforts by former
monopolist LEC and incumbent providers CC, Public MAN, and ISP1 to prevent Google from
establishing a monopoly in the market if it so desired would be quite difficult for them.
Google’s entry in the last mile market to the DEU increases the number of providers by
100% making that market more competitive but still relatively underserved due to the low
number of total providers.
Do the Tier I ISP and the Downstream End User routers acknowledge Google’s router?
No.
Do the connected units recognize each other?
The Google and Downstream End User routers do not directly recognize each other not
only because of the disconnection since the whole emulation malfunctioned.
What is the potential routing table?
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How do the providers access downstream end users?
The Public MAN and Google access the DEU directly via their own last mile systems.
LEC, CC, and ISP1 can indirectly access the DEU via interconnections with the Public MAN
and Google as the last hops in those routes.
Do all providers have equal access to the end users in the last mile market? Explain for each if
necessary.
According to the construct somewhat. The Public MAN and Google use their own last
mile systems to the DEU for service provision.
If LEC, CC, and/or ISP1 chose to provide service to the DEU, they would have to
interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s systems
for provision to the DEU.
If other providers chose to enter the market and provide service to the DEU, they would
have to interconnect with and be granted adequate access to the Public MAN’s and/or Google’s
systems for provision to the DEU.
Additional observations.
The shared access model is possible in theory, but in a typical capitalistic/mixed
economy, a host provider would likely require a guest provider to provide equivalent access,
access fees, etc., to compensate provision expenses and to earn profits; else third party access is
most likely an unfair model and cost for them.
DEU1 can use its router to instantaneously switch between the Public MAN and Google,
or use both simultaneously if it concurrently subscribes to both providers.
The Public MAN could opt out of competitive service provision in the local market, and
act solely as a common provider in the last mile. Thus no other local market provider would
have to provide their own last mile system.
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Model 1.2 Test Topology.

Upstream
End User
WS

Upstream
End User
Router

Tier I
ISP

LEC

Dnstream
End User
Router

Dnstream
End User
WS

ISP2

EQUAL OPEN ACCESS AND COMPETITION

705

Model 1.3 Test Topology.
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Model 2.1 Base Topology.
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Model 2.2 Test Topology.
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Model 2.3 Test Topology.
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Model 2.4 Test Topology.
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Model 2.5 Test Topology.
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Model 3.1 Base Topology.
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Model 3.2 Test Topology.
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Appendix F
Model Filtering Results
Model Filtering Scoring Results
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